• Ukraine's missiles have kept Russian aircraft away from the battlefield.
• Russia has responded by battering Ukraine's defenses with glide bombs dropped farther away.
• Increasing glide-bomb production should be a critical priority for NATO.

One of the surprises of the Ukraine war has been the marginal role played by Russian airpower. Expectations that Russian fighters and bombers would blast a path for the ground troops — as US airpower did in Desert Storm — were disappointed. Instead, Ukrainian anti-aircraft missiles have kept Russia's air force at bay.

But Russia has hit on a way for its air force — known as the VKS — to make a difference while staying away from the battlefield — massive glide bombing. And that approach seems to be successful enough that a British think tank is calling for NATO air forces to be ready to do the same.

"Glide bombs gave the VKS teeth without the need to first achieve air superiority or gain the ability to penetrate Ukrainian airspace," wrote analysts Jack Watling and Nick Reynolds in a report for the Royal United Services Institute, a British think tank.

Ironically, Russia's airpower woes have become NATO's worries. Since 1941, the warfighting concept of America, Britain and other Western nations has been to maintain relatively small armies backed by copious amounts of airpower. The concept eventually worked in World War II. It might have worked in the Cold War to repel a massive Soviet ground invasion of Europe.

But the air war over Ukraine raises doubts about this approach. If Ukrainian S-300 and Patriot anti-aircraft missiles can destroy Russian planes, then couldn't Russian missiles do the same to NATO planes? Ukraine claims 369 Russian warplanes have been shot down as of February 2025, with most claimed by missiles rather than Ukraine's small fleet of fighter jets.

That's why Western experts are paying close attention to how Russia has managed to make its air force relevant to the ground war. Much like the Russian war machine in general, the Russian air force is now emphasizing brute-force tactics that rely on massive amounts of bombs rather than accuracy. Instead of running the gauntlet of Ukrainian air defenses as they drop their bombs, Russian jets safely orbit up to 60 miles behind the Russian front line — out of range of Ukrainian long-range surface-to-air missiles — and lob glide bombs. These are low-budget guided weapons that mate a conventional iron bomb with a satellite-guidance system, and aerodynamic fins to control the bomb's trajectory.

Russian UPMK glide bombs lack in accuracy compared to their Western counterparts such as the US Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM). But Russia doesn't care. The giant FAB-1500 — a 1.5-ton glide bomb — or the 3.4-ton FAB-5000 have such a large blast radius that even a near miss will destroy Ukrainian trenches and bunkers. It's the same sort of approach long practiced by Russian artillery: saturation bombardment to pulverize enemy defenses and rattle soldiers inside before the assault troops go in.

Ukrainian troops have yet to find an effective defense against glide bombs; moving air defenses forward to fire at a launch aircraft also risks systems like Patriot that are in short supply. Instead, "they have been pushed to completely avoid observation of their positions, to disperse or seek concealment underground, and to rely on uncrewed or autonomous systems to keep and kill the enemy at arm's length," Watling and Reynolds wrote.

The Ukraine war has shown the biggest shortcoming of precision-guided munitions: they are so expensive that nations only procure small numbers, which are quickly depleted during a long war. Because glide bombs use cheap components — old-fashioned iron bombs and inexpensive navigation systems — Russia can easily mass produce them. "The rise in UMPK glide bomb production from 40,000 units in 2024 to 70,000 units anticipated in 2025, has significantly increased the number of Ukrainian troops killed during defensive operations," RUSI noted.

RUSI recommends that NATO increase its stockpiles and manufacturing capacity for stand-off weapons like JDAMs and the Joint Standoff Weapon made by Raytheon (JDAM bombs cost around $20,000 each). In addition, NATO air forces need more long-range air-to-air missiles: Russian fighters have had success in suppressing Ukrainian airpower by using long-range missiles such as the R-77-1, with a range of more than 62 miles.

Given the ferocious consumption of munitions seen in Ukraine, procuring mass quantities is only viable if the price is right. "Increasing stockpiles and the capacity to produce long-range air-to-air munitions and stand-off strike weapons at as low a cost as possible should be critical priorities for the force," RUSI argued.

The Ukraine war offers one bit of consolation for NATO. The fact that Russia had restored some effectiveness to air force suggests that NATO's emphasis on airpower is still relevant. "The disproportionate impact of the VKS, despite the generally poor performance of Russian airpower, validates the importance placed on air power across NATO," RUSI concluded.

Michael Peck is a defense writer whose work has appeared in Forbes, Defense News, Foreign Policy magazine, and other publications. He holds an MA in political science from Rutgers Univ. Follow him on Twitter and LinkedIn.

• In a rare move, China publicized a wargame in which US ships sank a top Chinese warship.
• In that simulation, the Chinese ship succeeded in temporarily blinding the incoming US missiles.
• The Chinese wargame is highly irregular and smacks of disinformation, naval experts said.

In a recent Chinese wargame, US missiles sank one of China's most powerful warships. So why does China appear to be happy about that result?

The answer may be that China is signaling that it knows the secrets of America's prime ship-killing missile. Or — as some Western analysts suggest — China could be trying to undermine America's confidence in its own weapons.

The wargame was disclosed to the public in early January by the South China Morning Post, citing a November paper in the Chinese journal Command Control & Simulation. The game, run by the North China Institute of Computing Technology, involved a Chinese carrier battle group sailing in the South China Sea near the Pratas island, which are controlled by Taiwan but claimed by China.

For reasons unspecified, the Chinese task force was attacked by a US carrier strike group, which targeted a Type 055 destroyer escorting the Chinese carrier. The new Type 055 — a 13,000-ton destroyer that the Pentagon classifies as a cruiser — is a formidable vessel armed with 112 launchers capable of firing anti-ship, anti-aircraft and land-attack cruise missiles.

"The US military suddenly began a large-scale attack on the Chinese fleet, with one wave of 10 AGM-158C Long Range Anti-Ship Missiles (LRASMs) launched simultaneously from different platforms," according to the Morning Post.

The Lockheed Martin-built LRASM is a stealthy, subsonic cruise missile with an estimated range of at least 200 miles. Equipped with multiple guidance systems, LRASM features GPS as well as onboard radar and thermal sensors to home in on the target if satellite-based GPS is jammed.

In the Chinese simulation, the US destroyers launched LRASM, which initially rose to high altitude and then descended to skim close to the sea to try to delay their detection by radar, the Morning Post said. "When they were about 10 kilometers [6.2 miles] away from the target, their radars malfunctioned one after another due to electronic warfare interference from the [People's Liberation Army], and they were unable to receive GPS positioning signals."

"At this point, the missiles switched to thermal imaging cameras to continue flying and, at a very close distance from the target, they suddenly rose up, confirmed the specific attack location, and then plunged to an extremely low altitude, successfully hitting the Chinese destroyer."

Chinese researchers claimed to have gleaned details of the LRASM from open-source intelligence and "long-term accumulation. Yet even the Morning Post — owned by e-commerce giant Alibaba, which has close ties to the Chinese government — admitted that it couldn't use public information to verify the accuracy of the missile's depiction in the game.

'Humble brag'

That China would include the new LRASM in its wargames is no surprise: the missile, with an estimated range of at least 200 miles, would be key to any American attempt to defend Taiwan from Chinese invasion. What did surprise Western analysts was that China felt it had enough knowledge of LRASM, such as its guidance systems, to model them in a game.

Also notable was that the Chinese government must have given its permission for Chinese media and defense journals to publish the results of a wargame that typically has been classified. When nations learn the secrets of enemy weapons, through espionage or other means, they are wary about tipping off the enemy.

British naval experts offer another potential explanation: China is playing mind games with America. "Although framed as a 'humble brag' with the loss of a PLAN [People's Liberation Army Navy] destroyer, the article clearly advertised a certain Chinese confidence in the inevitable arms race in which China and the US, as technological world leaders, are engaged," said Edward Black and Sidharth Kaushal in an essay for the Royal United Services Institute, a British think tank.

Black and Kaushal point to several glaring aspects of the Chinese wargame. For example, the simulation assumes that the Chinese destroyer successfully jammed the LRASM's passive radar, which homes in on electronic signals from enemy ships rather than emitting its own waves that return as an active radar does. In fact, China has been developing methods to jam passive radar, such as feeding it false signals.

"The PLA's claimed success here would, if true, have ramifications both for the survivability of missiles with a low radar cross-section (which the PLA is implicitly claiming the ability to track) and for US naval efforts at emissions control and the use of passive detection," the RUSI researchers note. In addition, the game portrays LRASM's GPS being jammed, which suggests Chinese confidence that it can defeat anti-jam features on American GPS.

The British experts — and Chinese social media — also point out a curious omission: the Type 055 destroyer only used electronic warfare to stop the LRASMs, even though the ship is well-armed with HHQ-9 and HHQ-10 anti-aircraft missiles as well as a short-range air defense cannon. Yet the destroyer must have detected the LRASMs to jam their passive radar, and radar tracking would allow the crew to fire these interceptors to knock out the incoming missiles.

Since each LRASM has a 1,000-pound warhead that can devastate a warship, it's highly unusual to rely on electronic warfare alone and at such close range (only 6 miles) to down an incoming salvo of missiles. Even in the presence of jamming, LRASM could still lock onto the ship's thermal exhaust via infrared guidance. A warship is also unlikely to rely only on electronic warfare against missiles that close: if jamming fails, there's no time to launch missile interceptors and hardly enough for a gun to track and fire at multiple incoming missiles.

Black and Kaushal raise a truly Machiavellian possibility for why China is publicizing the wargame: Disinformation to undermine American confidence in LRASM. Precise details of the LRASM's performance, such as its maximum range, are classified. If China is modeling the LRASM in their wargames, then perhaps Beijing has managed to steal the missile's secrets?

Not likely, conclude the British analysts. "If the PLA [People's Liberation Army] was truly confident in its success in accessing sensitive data, it would have strong incentives to keep this private to achieve surprise in a conflict rather than alerting the US to the compromise of critical systems," Black and Kaushal said.

Michael Peck is a defense writer whose work has appeared in Forbes, Defense News, Foreign Policy magazine, and other publications. He holds an MA in political science from Rutgers Univ. Follow him on Twitter and LinkedIn.

• The US Army asked businesses for ways to use robots to erect bridges under fire.
• Forging river crossings is one of the most dangerous and difficult jobs soldiers face.
• The Ukraine war has revealed the dangers combat engineers face are rising.

Building a bridge under fire for troops and their armored vehicles is one of the most hazardous of military operations. This became evident in the Ukraine war, where Russian forces have taken heavy casualties as they tried to assault across rivers defended by Ukrainian troops.

That's why the US Army wants to develop robots that can do the job — and spare the lives of combat engineers.

What the Army envisions are AI-controlled, self-propelled rafts that can autonomously join together to form a bridge and are soliciting ideas from small businesses. It's the combat engineering equivalent of drone swarms, in which hordes of small autonomous UAVs fly in close and self-guided coordination.

"The fielding of autonomous powered floating bridges will enable the Army to conduct unpredictable dispersed river crossings, increase crew survivability by removing the man from the craft, and reduce logistics footprint over the Improved Ribbon Bridge in use today by combining both payload capacity and powertrain into a single craft," according to the Army's Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) solicitation.

Perhaps not coincidentally, the proposal comes as even the Army's own engineers question whether it has adequate bridge-building capabilities, especially for "wet gap" assaults across defended river lines. While the Army became proficient in such operations during World War II, such as attacking across the Rhine River in 1945, decades of counterinsurgency warfare has come at the expense of skills such as erecting bridges capable of bearing heavy vehicles such as the M1 Abrams.

Some experts also worry that there aren't enough bridge-building units. Or, that Army divisions lack sufficient river-crossing resources without additional engineering support from corps headquarters.

But the real wake-up call has been the Ukraine conflict. In the Napoleonic Wars or World War II, bridge builders faced artillery fire or air attack. Today, an array of drones, long-range tactical missiles, and smart artillery shells are an immense danger to any troops in the open. Not least to Army engineers who might spend up to 30 minutes in the middle of a river while trying to erect the Army's standard Improved Ribbon Bridge, produced by General Dynamics European Land Systems.

Even the Army admits that its current bridging capabilities need to change. "Future Gap Crossing technology must consider near peer adversarial capabilities and support sustainment operations in a lethal contested logistics environment when the enemy can attack targets at virtually any depth within the battlespace," warned the SBIR.

Still, there are numerous technical hurdles to overcome for automated bridge building to become a reality. In particular, there is the challenge of getting a bunch of robots to coordinate their actions, all while preventing "numerous unmanned robotic rafting bays, all in the general vicinity of each other, from colliding with terrain obstacles (man-made or natural) and each other in potentially turbulent waters," the SBIR explained.

Phase I of the project asks for contractors to specify the necessary AI, sensors and communication systems to enable automated bridge-builders to operate. Phase II includes delivering a prototype that can function despite cyberattack, and in a GPS-denied environment (where jammers block the signals from GPS satellites). Other companies that produce are military bridging systems are the European defense firm KNDS and the US-based construction company Acrow.

If the project is successful, it could benefit the commercial market, according to the Army. Potential uses include pipeline inspection, package delivery, undersea exploration, agricultural work and space exploration.

But the main beneficiaries would be sappers whose difficult task will be a little less dangerous. So would tank battalions that won't have to wait as long while a bridge is built under fire, or supply columns that won't present juicy targets while waiting in a traffic jam. Let the robots do the dirty work.

Michael Peck is a defense writer whose work has appeared in Forbes, Defense News, Foreign Policy magazine, and other publications. He holds an MA in political science from Rutgers Univ. Follow him on Twitter and LinkedIn.

• China appears to be erecting structures in the Yellow Sea between China and the Korean peninsula.
• China's playbook for dominating neighbors includes island reclamation and maritime structures.
• The Yellow Sea is of historic importance to China, a former South Korea diplomat argues.

With China's neighbors already nervous about its territorial ambitions, a new flashpoint has emerged between China and South Korea.

China appears to be erecting structures in the Yellow Sea, located between China and the Korean peninsula. South Korea fears this could be a prelude to Beijing asserting sovereignty over the 150,000-square-mile body of water, which is rich in fish and has oil and gas deposits. This power play would have implications for the US.

South Korean spy satellites detected the Chinese structure in December, according to the Chosun Daily, a South Korean newspaper. "The installation, a mobile steel framework exceeding 50 meters in diameter and height, was spotted in the disputed waters," the newspaper said. China erected two similar structures in 2024, eliciting South Korean protests.

"China has reportedly described the structures as 'fishing support facilities,' dismissing concerns," the Chosun Daily noted. "South Korean officials believe China plans to install up to 12 such structures."

To describe the situation as complicated would be an understatement. The Yellow Sea is in the exclusive economic zone, or EEZ, of both China and South Korea. Under international law, an EEZ allows nations to claim jurisdiction over economic resources out to 200 miles from their coastlines (at 4.3 million square miles, the US has the second-largest EEZ in the world after France). China has built islands to bolster its dubious claims to most of the South China Sea and challenged the EEZ rights of neighbors like the Philippines.

Asked for comment on the sighted construction in the Yellow Sea, Liu Pengyu, a spokeman for the Chinese Embassy in the US, said "I am not aware of the specific situation, but as far as I know, China and the [Republic of Korea] are pushing forward negotiations on maritime delimitation and have established a dialogue and cooperation mechanism on maritime affairs. The two sides maintain sound communication on maritime issues."

Not surprisingly, in a world where oceanic resources — such as oil and fish — are coveted like buried treasure, disputes over EEZs are not uncommon. In the Mediterranean, for example, Greece and Turkey are at odds over energy deposits.

In this case, South Korea argues that the boundary between the conflicting EEZs should be drawn down the middle of the Yellow Sea. However, "China maintains that the maritime boundary should be proportional to its longer coastline and larger population," according to the National Bureau of Asian Research, a US think tank.

In 2001, China and South Korea created the Provisional Measures Zone, or PMZ, which covers the area of their overlapping EEZs. In addition to delineating joint fishing rights and fisheries management, the PMZ also mandated that both nations would gradually restrict fishing to their respective EEZs. Instead, South Korea has long complained about Chinese vessels fishing in the Korean side, which has led to South Korean ships firing on Chinese fishermen.

Were this simply a fishing dispute, the Yellow Sea might resemble the infamous "Cod Wars" between Britain and Iceland, which was an economic conflict rather than a shooting war. But Korea, and China's other neighbors, fear that Beijing is trawling for more than fish.

Tensions between South Korea and China risk drawing in the US, which has a mutual defense pact with South Korea and bases 28,000 troops there.

Erecting permanent maritime structures has become the calling card announcing Chinese claims to the Western Pacific. Most notorious are the artificial islands China has created in the South China Sea, which serve as air and naval bases to assert Beijing's claims to sovereignty over mineral-rich waters also claimed by Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines and other Southeast Asian nations.

These Chinese outposts spread like inkspots. For example, Beijing recently declared the waters around Scarborough Shoal — disputed reefs claimed by China and the Philippines — as territorial waters. In effect, these installations serve as the maritime equivalent of boots on the ground to assert a physical presence in an area.

The Yellow Sea hasn't received as much global attention as flashpoints in the South China Sea, or China's simmering dispute over Japanese-controlled islands in the East China Sea. But the Yellow Sea is quite crucial to China, which is sensitive about its coastal areas, Sang Hun Seok, a former South Korean diplomat, argued in an essay for the Royal United Services Institute, a British think tank.

"From China's strategic point of view, solidifying its littoral defense and expanding the areas where it can enjoy freedom of action are critically important for its security," Sang Hun wrote.

There is also a psychological sensitivity rooted in Chinese history over the last 200 years, in which China lost several wars and had its territory seized by colonial powers such as Great Britain, Japan and Russia. "Most critical battles in Northeast Asia since the 19th century — a period China sees as a brief deviation from its rightful historical trajectory — have been fought in the vicinity of the Yellow Sea," Sang Hun wrote.

Unless South Korea and its allies can stop China from erecting outposts in the Yellow Sea, "the strategic balance in the region will ultimately shift in China's favor, leaving the allies' freedom of action restricted to a fraction of the Yellow Sea," Sang Hun warned. "This gradual shift would first weaken the defense posture for critical military assets along the west coast of the Korean Peninsula, gradually followed by Kyushu, Okinawa and ultimately Taiwan."

Michael Peck is a defense writer whose work has appeared in Forbes, Defense News, Foreign Policy magazine, and other publications. He holds an MA in political science from Rutgers Univ. Follow him on Twitter and LinkedIn.

• Russia has four options to rebuild its military power after heavy losses against Ukraine.
• Russia's easiest option isn't to move into the future, but rather go back to the past.
• If the war were to end soon, it's likely Russia would opt for a large, Soviet-style army.

Regardless of whether Russia wins or loses in Ukraine, one thing is certain: the Russian military will have to be rebuilt.

With its arsenal depleted and its reputation battered, Russia will have to decide the future shape of its armed forces. The most likely choices range from reverting back to a Soviet-style mass army, to adopting a smaller but more flexible Western-style military, according to a new study by the Washington-based RAND Corp. think tank. But all of those options are either difficult to implement or wouldn't fix the flaws in Russia's military system.

Focused for now on winning the war in Ukraine, the Kremlin is sticking to what it knows best: a large military designed to fight major land wars. "Moscow has, for now, decided to embark on rebuilding the armed forces based on a model familiar to Russian military leaders, a group that was highly critical of earlier reform attempts," RAND wrote. Nowhere is this need more clear than in Russia's ground forces, which have lost thousands of armored vehicles, hundreds of thousands of troops and been bolstered with convicts.

After the war, Russia will have to assess its goals, resources and the international situation, especially vis-a-vis the West, which has imposed export controls that, if kept in place, will hamper the rebuilding effort.

RAND envisions four ways Russia might rebuild. The first is what RAND dubs the "Shoigu plan," based on various statements by Sergei Shoigu, a close associate of Russian leader Vladimir Putin who led the defense ministry from 2012 to 2024. This would return the Russian military to what it was before the Ukraine war. It would try to balance mass and firepower by expanding and modernizing the military, and importing weapons to make up for domestic shortfalls.

What is most striking is that the Shoigu plan assumes that Russia's military is basically in good shape, no matter the evidence to the contrary in Ukraine. It contends that "the Russian armed forces were not structurally flawed, at least for conflicts such as those in the Donbas region [of Ukraine] (2014) and Syria (2015), as much as they were poorly led in the initial stages of the conflict and unable to execute in the context of high-intensity conflict in a contested environment," the study explained.

Another option is to fully implement reforms proposed in 2008, that would create a smaller but higher-quality military designed for hybrid warfare, including cyber and information operations, and private military contractors such as the former Wagner Group. "This approach would entail a serious attempt to pursue personnel reforms and prioritize the development and use of asymmetric means of warfare," said RAND. Hybrid warfare depends on intimidation and disruption — deniable operations to undermine NATO and non-aligned states — but this plan likely lacks the ground force size to expand Russian hegemony.

The third option is the most radical one. Junk the old Soviet and Russian ways of war, and create an entirely new military system. This could mean copying tactics from other nations, such as less rigid command and control found in Western armies, and discarding traditional military culture.

This idea is rooted in "the realization that the Soviet and Russian operational models are no longer viable, a fact highlighted by the Russian armed forces' poor performance in Ukraine," RAND wrote.

Ironically, Russia's easiest option isn't to move into the future, but rather go back to the past. This path would see the Russian military revert back to the Soviet-era, with huge armies of conscripts armed from massive weapons stocks built by Russia's defense-industrial base. "An underlying argument for this pathway is that the Russian military, in many respects, has had to revert to this model during its war in Ukraine by relying on older systems, overwhelming firepower, and mass — and while this has not led to a decisive Russian victory in Ukraine, it has been sufficient to achieve a stalemate," RAND wrote.

A Soviet-style military is "a more comfortable fit for Russia's current leaders — both political and military — because it remains highly centralized, and mass- and attrition-oriented," Mark Cozad, who coauthored the RAND study, told Business Insider.

It's normal for nations to analyze and incorporate lessons after a war, especially for the losing side. The Germans studied their defeat in the First World War — and the advent of new technologies such as the tank and airplane — to devise its blitzkrieg strategy in World War II, while America's failure in Vietnam spurred military reforms that bore fruit in Desert Storm.

Russia's record on military reform is checkered. Defeat in World War I generated innovations in mechanized warfare by Soviet theorists like General Mikhail Tukhachevsky in the 1930s. Poor combat performance in Chechnya in the 1990s, and Georgia in 2008, led to calls for changes, such as shifting away from mass conscript armies to a professional volunteer force.

The problem is that these reforms have tended to be stymied by obstacles such as Russia's economic woes after the collapse of the Soviet Union, reactionary Soviet-era generals resistant to change, cronyism and politicians distrustful of their own military; Tukhachevsky was executed by Stalin in 1938.

RAND expects Russia will ultimately choose some mixture of the various reform options. The final decision will be shaped by several factors, including how the Ukraine war ends, the strength of Russia's economy, declining birthrates, the ability to develop and manufacture advanced military technologies, the opportunity to import technologies that can't be produced domestically, and relations with allies such as China.

Much will depend on how Russia reads the lessons of the Ukraine war. Their record so far doesn't inspire confidence. "In general, Russian military experts' perceptions of the nature of future warfare have not materialized in the war in Ukraine," the RAND study pointed out, such as overestimating the impact of airpower and how trench warfare replaced maneuver.

Russia would probably choose to go back to a Soviet-style army "if the war were to end tomorrow and Putin walks away declaring and believing that Russia was successful, because that was what ended up working and Russia is limited by material and technical factors," said Cozad. "In a second case, if Putin were to somehow exit the scene you might see some more drastic change."

Either way, the US and NATO need to monitor how Russia rebuilds its military, Cozad warns. Whatever the model chosen, "they have some impressive capabilities that will factor heavily into their future conventional forces, particularly in the areas of electronic warfare and drones."

Most dangerous might be a Soviet-style mass army. This would certainly be smaller than the 12 million soldiers deployed by the Red Army in 1945, but might be larger than the 1.5 million active-duty personnel decreed by Putin in 2024. "For the past three decades we've planned for much more limited scenarios, and we've not had to address the cost and inventory issues associated with countering an enemy built on mass and attrition," Cozad said.

Michael Peck is a defense writer whose work has appeared in Forbes, Defense News, Foreign Policy magazine, and other publications. He holds an MA in political science from Rutgers Univ. Follow him on Twitter and LinkedIn.

• Wall Street analysts changed their Lockheed ratings after photos emerged of new Chinese jets.
• They worry that the US could buy fewer Lockheed F-35s in favor of future jets still being designed.
• However, there is little evidence so far China's new aircraft could match the F-35's capabilities.

Glimpses of China's next-generation jet fighter don't just worry the Pentagon.

Wall Street worries that Lockheed Martin — maker of the three versions of the F-35 Lightning II stealth fighter, the most expensive weapon in history — could see its stock price tumble if the US military opts to buy fewer F-35s in favor of more advanced aircraft.

Deutsche Bank analyst Scott Deuschle had raised Lockheed's rating to Buy in July, as market analysts predicted that multiple wars and higher global defense spending would boost revenue for the giant defense firm. Lockheed stock took a tumble Tuesday after trading around $500 a share, versus around $400 just before Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, which has precipitated a frantic arms buildup in Europe and beyond.

But Deuschle downgraded Lockheed after China unveiled two stealth fighter prototypes in December. Little is known about the prototypes but some worry they could outmatch the F-35, a fifth-generation aircraft that first flew in 2006. Other investment banks also cut their ratings for Lockheed.

"We're downgrading Lockheed to Hold (from Buy) as we feel our prior thesis struggles to hold water and we have increased concern on the long-term support for F-35 in the face of China's combat aircraft modernization efforts," Deuschle recently told investors, according to the Barron's financial newspaper. His estimate for Lockheed's share price dropped from $611 to $523.

The crux of the issue is that the US military is buying lots of F-35s. The Air Force plans to acquire 1,763 F-35A models by 2049, the Navy 273 carrier-based F-35Cs, and the Marine Corps 67 F-35Cs and 353 jump-jet F-35Bs. And this comes amid the increasing clout of SpaceX CEO Elon Musk, a top Trump advisor who recently called manned fighter jets like the F-35 obsolete.

Yet at the same time, the military is developing sixth-generation fighters, including the Air Force's Next Generation Air Dominance program (NGAD) and the Navy's F/A-XX, the replacement for its carrier-based fighters like the Super Hornet. The NGAD, which the Air Force hopes could fly by 2030, will have more advanced features than the F-35, including better engines, sensors and stealth capabilities, as well as the ability to team with robot fighters such as the Collaborative Combat Aircraft.

If sixth-generation fighters are coming, analysts worry that the Pentagon could buy fewer F-35s and spend the money on more advanced aircraft. "The reveal of further advancements in combat aircraft capabilities by China as potentially undermining long-term [Department of Defense] demand for the F-35 aircraft," Deuschle wrote.

Deuschle's concern is real, however there's little public evidence to compare the new Chinese prototypes pound-for-pound with the F-35; even whether it is a fifth-generation aircraft is debated, with some airpower experts skeptical China has built the world's first six-generation aircraft.

The F-35 has become the poster child for what critics denounce as wasteful government spending by the military-industrial complex. The program has been mired in controversy, delays and cost overruns since its inception in the 1990s.

The total price of the F-35, including acquisition and maintenance, has soared to more than $2 trillion, which is more than the annual GDP of most nations (US gross domestic product is $27.3 trillion). Even though more than 1,000 aircraft have already been delivered to the US and other nations, there are still concerns about bugs such as excessive maintenance demands, fragile stealth coatings, and a cannon that can't shoot straight.

Compounding the problem is that F-35 acquisition will stretch over decades. Only 110 were delivered in 2024, and the US Air Force won't receive the last jet until 2049. Given how rapidly technology evolves, a procurement program that stretches out more than 40 years is bound to struggle with obsolescence at some point.

Nonetheless, the fact that the F-35 has survived all the controversy is a warning not to underestimate its prospects. Put simply, the F-35 program may be too big to fail. The US military has invested enormous resources — and prestige — in the aircraft, while politicians may be reluctant to kill the golden goose. "More than 1,900 suppliers build and sustain the F-35 program in 48 US states and in more than 10 countries," boasts Lockheed Martin's F-35 website. Lockheed's net earnings fell in the fourth quarter to $527 million, down from $1.7 billion in the fourth quarter of 2023, and contributed to the stock's slide to $457 per share.

Whatever the flaws of the F-35, what aircraft could realistically replace it right now? The US combat air fleet is aging: the average F-16, for example, is more than 30 years old. The Air Force has hedged its bets by buying some F-15EX fighters to supplement the F-35. But while the F-15 has proven highly capable, an upgraded 1980s design can only so far into the 21st Century.

That pretty much leaves the inchoate NGAD as the alternative. But this naturally raises another question: given the problems with the F-35 and other big Pentagon projects, what if America's sixth-generation fighter projects also suffer delays, cost overruns and teething problems? The Air Force has already paused the NGAD program amid estimates that the NGAD fighters will cost $250 million apiece, or about triple the price of an F-35.

Skeptics may also question the alarm over China's new aircraft. So far, all the world has seen is a few images of two new Chinese aircraft. Despite breathless warnings that China might field a sixth-generation fighter before America does, the capabilities — and limitations — of the Chinese designs have yet to be revealed.

During the Cold War, new Russian weapons would be unveiled that would spur American fears of falling behind in the arms race, such as the mythical "bomber gap" of the 1950s. Often these Russian wonder weapons turned out to be dismal on the battlefield. America and China are vying to develop sixth-generation aircraft and other technologies like hypersonic missiles. But the threat posed by new Chinese stealth aircraft could similarly prove illusory.

Michael Peck is a defense writer whose work has appeared in Forbes, Defense News, Foreign Policy magazine, and other publications. He holds an MA in political science from Rutgers Univ. Follow him on Twitter and LinkedIn.

• Analysts with RAND Corp. say it is time for the US Navy to field drone aircraft carriers.
• These drone carriers disperse combat power at less expense and with less crew.
• A fleet of drone carriers could help alleviate a major strategic headache for the US Navy.

The time has come for the US Navy to field a new type of ship to supplement its supercarriers: Drone flattops.

They would be crewed by robots and artificial intelligence, alongside human sailors, and guarded by wholly uncrewed escort ships, military analysts at the RAND Corporation think tank argue, in a peek at a leap-ahead for naval warfare likely years away, if ever.

"A carrier strike group could include an auxiliary all-UAV carrier alongside a traditional carrier, resulting in increased overall sortie rates," RAND said in a report, using the acronym for unmanned aerial vehicle. "As the US Navy comes to better understand how to design and use all-UAV carriers, they could someday operate alongside other ships without a traditional carrier. In time, one or more all-UAV carriers might be used as the centerpiece of a carrier strike group."

A traditional carrier — not counting its wing of 30 to 90 manned aircraft such as the F-35C fighter — is formidably expensive: around $11 billion each for a 100,000-ton US Ford-class nuclear-powered carrier and $4 billion for Britain's 65,000-ton Queen Elizabeth-class. Hence, some nations are turning to drone carriers as a cheaper alternative in the face of the rising threat of long-range missiles.

These ships can combine naval air operations with other missions. For example, Turkey's new amphibious assault ship, the 27,000-ton Anadolu, can carry 30 to 50 UAVs and UCAV (unmanned combat aerial vehicle), as well as helicopters, marines and amphibious assault vehicles.

Originally, Turkey planned the Anadolu to carry piloted F-35B stealth fighters. But after the US barred Turkey from the F-35 program for buying Russian anti-aircraft missiles, the Turks replaced the F-35s with combat UAVs such as the TB3 Bayraktar and the Kizilelma, a jet-powered drone designed for air-to-air combat. China is also believed to have built a mothership for aerial drones.

The RAND researchers see several advantages to a drone carrier, especially if some crew functions can be automated. "Spaces for berthing, storing food and cooking, generating potable water, and meeting other human needs can contain weapons or fuel instead."

Crew size — and the accompanying expense of recruiting and sustaining personnel — could be minimized by using future robots for tasks such as maintenance and damage control, as well as monitoring systems and standing watch. "These changes could have a multiplicative effect: Every operator whose presence was eliminated would enable a large fraction of another person to be subtracted from the crew, given diminished demand for roles from cooks to military police," the study said.

But there are reasons to be cautious about under-crewed ships. Automations are proving capable of navigating ships, but robots are still far from the capabilities of trained sailors who will be needed in fixing any combat damages sustained.

Freed from the demands of launching heavy fixed-wing aircraft, drone carriers could be built smaller and cheaper, RAND argues. "Today's aircraft carriers need to be long enough to launch and recover aircraft while subjecting pilots to tolerable G-forces," said RAND. "That critical length constraint could be relaxed if UAVs were launched and recovered over shorter distances, using advanced materials with greater tensile strengths than those used to launch and recover today's aircraft. Put another way, some existing amphibious ships could serve as all-UAV carriers when they are not hosting Marines."

Of course, a drone carrier is only feasible if suitable drones are available. As an example of what is coming, RAND points to the US Navy's MQ-25 Stingray, scheduled for deployment in 2026 as an unmanned tanker aboard traditional aircraft carriers. MQ-25 manufacturer Boeing is now pitching the Stingray as a surveillance or missile-armed combat drone.

A fleet of drone carriers could help alleviate a major strategic headache. US maritime power centers on the Navy's 11 nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, which are arguably the powerful warships afloat. The problem is that there are too few of these enormous and expensive vessels for sustained operations around the world. And between deployments up to a year, training cycles and short-notice departures, and heavier than expected maintenance, the big carriers are vastly overworked.

"If smaller all-UAV carriers are less costly than existing aircraft carriers, and require fewer personnel, the US Navy can acquire more of them," RAND pointed out. "The result could be strike groups involving two or more carriers, increasing redundancy and distributing lethality."

Redundancy is military-speak for designing systems more able to sustain a hit without a loss of function.

RAND doesn't envision totally unmanned carriers, but their consorts are a different matter. Unmanned surface vessels (USV) are already a fact of life, at least in smaller versions such as autonomous patrol craft, or kamikaze boats as in the Ukraine war.

So why not larger unmanned vessels equivalent in size to, say, a frigate or destroyer and operating in the future as part of carrier or amphibious strike groups? "Some could host sensors, such as radar and sonar, while others would serve as oilers that would effectively constitute offsite storage for other ships," RAND argues. Other robot ships could carry "missiles, torpedoes, or lasers and other electromagnetic weapons and be directed to use them by personnel aboard crewed ships within the strike group."

"Perhaps each weapon-firing vessel would host only one type of weapon, enabling its design to be optimized for that purpose. For example, a frigate-sized USV might launch barrages of missiles, while a corvette could be used exclusively to drop torpedoes in the vicinity of any intruding submarines detected by the sonar of other USVs."

However, there are major obstacles to a future fleet of drone carriers and robot frigates. One is the amount of bandwidth needed for UAVs and autonomous ships to communicate with human controllers who will need to be included in decisions such as employing weapons in accordance with Defense Department directives. "Ensuring reliable, secure communications — with enough bandwidth and low enough data latency for humans to correct machine errors — can be difficult in an increasingly crowded and contested electromagnetic environment," RAND warned.

Unmanned or semi-manned ships employing robotics will also need to rely on sophisticated AI. But as experience with self-driving cars has shown, AI-controlled machines can have difficulty responding to unexpected situations, or generate plausible-sounding but incorrect answers ("hallucinations"). Combat is often defined by confusion, not to mention work-arounds to repair battle damage, leaving it highly unclear whether today's machines are anywhere close to the task. These challenges may leave robot crews in the realm of sci-fi for the foreseeable future.

"Even if AI overcomes technological hurdles and the ability of adversaries to manipulate it, widespread military use of AI requires a high degree of institutional trust in it and the modification of procedures to accommodate its use," RAND concluded. "Both may take some years to achieve."

Michael Peck is a defense writer whose work has appeared in Forbes, Defense News, Foreign Policy magazine, and other publications. He holds an MA in political science from Rutgers Univ. Follow him on Twitter and LinkedIn.

• President-elect Trump has warned he may try to withdraw the US from NATO.
• Any attempt would counter Congress and venture into uncharted legal waters.
• A legislative expert saw signs that could favor Congress in this largely untested area.

In 2018, President Donald Trump privately warned that he might withdraw the US from NATO. He complained that other alliance members weren't contributing their fair share of defense spending, which left American taxpayers to pick up the tab.

Congress thought otherwise. It added a special provision in the 2020 National Defense Authorization Act, which sets funding for the US military. Section 1250A specifies that the president cannot unilaterally withdraw America from NATO without an act of Congress, or unless two-thirds of the Senate concur.

Should Trump follow through during his second term, which starts Monday, the withdrawal would fall into a legal gray area likely to be settled in court and that may favor Congress. The problem is that while the Constitution specifies that the president has the power to negotiate treaties, it doesn't say whether he has the power to break them.

"Although Congress has to some extent regulated the President's withdrawal from a treaty in the past, Section 1250A is the first statute in which Congress has prohibited unilateral presidential withdrawal from a treaty," according to a report by Karen Sokol, a legislative attorney for the Congressional Research Service, which analyzes issues for Congress.

The Founding Fathers were rightly proud that they created a government of checks and balances, where neither the executive, legislative or judicial branches could monopolize power. But they probably would be less than thrilled with the dispute over NATO, which America was instrumental in forming 75 years ago, when a devastated Europe appeared easy prey for Soviet conquest.

Normally, the executive branch handles most foreign policy and national security matters such as negotiating treaties, though Congress exercises considerable clout through defense budgets, ratifying treaties, and approving arms sales. Powers between the executive and legislative branches are delineated clearly enough that for the most part, the system works.

When the executive and legislature can't agree, the courts are supposed to step in. Yet of all the myriad issues that end up in American courts, foreign policy is the area that judges are most reluctant to touch. In the case of withdrawing from NATO, the courts will search for legal precedents in an area that lacks them.

The White House has long maintained that it can withdraw from treaties absent Congressional opposition, such as when the Carter Administration withdrew from a mutual defense treaty with Taiwan, which Senator Barry Goldwater and other members of Congress then appealed to the courts. "Ultimately, the Supreme Court declined to weigh in on the dispute," Sokol noted. "With a plurality of the Justices concurring in the judgment to dismiss the complaint, concluding that the case presented a political question that was properly addressed by the political branches rather than the judiciary — a determination that is not uncommon in cases involving separation- of-powers disputes in areas of foreign policy."

In 2020, at the end of Trump's first term, the Department of Justice published an opinion that asserted treaty withdrawal is an exclusive presidential power that Congress cannot restrict. And the Supreme Court has ruled that the executive branch has the authority to recognize foreign governments, even though that power is not specified in the Constitution.

Yet past cases suggest that the courts may reject this argument. Sokol points to the 1952 Youngstown Steel case, when the Supreme Court ruled against President Harry S. Truman's attempt to seize steel mills during the Korean War, on the ground that this violated the intent of Congress.

"Under the Youngstown framework, courts assess presidential claims of authority based on what Congress has—or has not—said about the matter," Sokol wrote. By that standard, Congress has expressed its intent that the US remain in NATO by passing Section 1250A.

Sokol also believes that the courts may reject the Trump administration's assertion that the executive branch alone can decide to withdraw from treaties. "A court may find a President's claim of exclusive constitutional power to withdraw from a treaty to be unpersuasive given that the Constitution is silent about treaty withdrawal powers and that Article II makes treaty entry a power shared between the President and the Senate."

Either way, the question of whether Trump has the power to withdraw from NATO means venturing into largely uncharted legal waters. "Ultimately, it is uncertain how a court would rule on the constitutional distribution of treaty withdrawal power based on its analysis of the Constitution's text and structure, relevant Supreme Court precedent, and historical interbranch practice," Sokol concluded.

Trump may not need to formally withdraw from NATO to damage it. For example, a wargame run by British experts last year found that Trump could sabotage the alliance simply by having America do less. This could include minimizing US participation in NATO exercises or restricting American officers serving as NATO commanders. The effects of a US pullback would be global and hard to predict.

Michael Peck is a defense writer whose work has appeared in Forbes, Defense News, Foreign Policy magazine, and other publications. He holds an MA in political science from Rutgers Univ. Follow him on Twitter and LinkedIn.

• NATO allies worry that the growing threat China poses may distract the US from Europe.
• A seapower expert argues the forces needed in Europe are different than in the Asia-Pacific.
• A confrontation over Taiwan would be primarily a naval fight; Europe would be a land battle.

China's threat to Taiwan also poses a profound dilemma for NATO — does it tie up its most powerful ally from European defense at a critical moment?

A new study suggests that while splitting US military resources and focus is a problem, it's a manageable one. That's because the American forces needed to stop a Chinese fleet in the Strait of Taiwan are not the same as those suitable for destroying Russian tanks on the European steppe.

"For example, it is unclear whether armor and multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) have as much utility in a Sino-American conflict — a primarily maritime theatre — as they do in Europe (although both capabilities have a role in each theatre)," wrote analyst Sidharth Kaushal in a report for the Royal United Services Institute.

America has had to cope with the dichotomy between the Atlantic and the Pacific since World War II. In that war, the European theater was a ground conflict fought between huge mechanized armies and hordes of land-based aircraft, albeit with a smaller naval component in the sea battle to resupply Britain. The Pacific theater was a naval and air conflict fought among scattered islands, which put a premium on aircraft carriers, submarines and mobile amphibious units such as the US Marine Corps.

Compounding the problem is that modern armies and weapons are expensive. The US could afford to fight a two-front war in 1941. Building a military sufficient to simultaneously defend Taiwan and Europe today would be ruinous, one of the many reasons the US maintains strong alliances in both regions. To be sure, the US backs Taiwan's independent government, but it's unclear whether it would commit forces to Taiwan's defense.

However, Kaushal believes that the problem may be manageable by focusing on a couple of key variables. In particular, the success of an invasion of Taiwan depends upon China's ability to achieve sufficient air and naval superiority to protect the amphibious fleet ferrying assault troops and the logistics they depend upon.

"The crux of any defense of Taiwan will be denying it this superiority," Kaushal argued. "If this is achieved, it is likely that Taiwan's forces can mount a successful forward defense of likely landing sites on the island, making a protracted defense and the subsequent flow of US forces superfluous. If not, the battle will likely end before either of these things can be considered."

In turn, this means that only some American military capabilities would be relevant, especially anti-ship missiles, submarines and mines. Naval drones, like those wielded by Ukraine, may also prove powerful weapons to attack a Chinese armada. Conversely, heavy armor — and the capacity to transport it — would be paramount in supporting NATO against a Russian attack.

But sinking a Chinese fleet will require SEAD (suppression of enemy air defenses) missions against defensive systems protecting the invasion convoys. And it's there that the difference between the Atlantic and Pacific becomes manifest.

In Europe, Russian ground forces would be protected by land-based surface-to-air missile (SAM) batteries and radars, which are mounted or transported by truck. NATO would first have to locate them and then strike them with air-launched anti-radar missiles such as the US AGM-88 HARM, or ground fire from artillery, tactical missiles, and drones.

A Chinese invasion fleet in the narrow 110-mile-wide Taiwan Strait, by contrast, would be an easily detected target and would be out of range of land-based SAMs on the Chinese mainland. Air defense would have to come from weapons on the Chinese warships, which can put out an impressive amount of firepower against hostile aircraft and missiles. China's Type 055 Renhai-class cruisers, for example, are equipped with 112 vertical launch tubes that can fire anti-aircraft or anti-ship missiles. The ships are also likely to be defended by fighter jets, many launched from airbases in China.

"SEAD in the European context is primarily a function of the ability to suppress or destroy a layered network of elusive and mobile ground-based SAM systems," Kaushal wrote. In the Taiwan Strait, "the challenge is not that targets are elusive, but rather that they are exceedingly well defended."

SEAD weapons, such as the HARM missile, aren't really designed to hit ships. So rather than targeting Chinese air defenses specifically, the US and its allies should simply concentrate on sinking warships. Every Chinese warship destroyed is one less escort for the troop ships.

In a Taiwan war, "SEAD is largely synonymous with anti-surface warfare and OCA [offensive counter-air]," Kaushal wrote. "If the picket of destroyers and cruisers protecting an invasion force suffers substantial losses and if [People's Liberation Army] aircraft, including AWACS, cannot freely operate over the Strait, the amphibious vessels on which an invasion defends are much less defensible." Advanced warning and control aircraft are flying radars that detect hostile threats for a wider force.

A similar dichotomy between Europe and the Pacific applies to weapons needed for missile defense. "While all US IAMD [integrated air and missile defense] will be missed, some capabilities will leave more of a gap than others," Kaushal told Business Insider.

In Europe, the threat is largely from Russian cruise missiles and short-range ballistic missiles. Against these weapons, the best defense is blast-fragmentation interceptors — which detonate an explosive charge near the target — or shorter-range hit-to-kill rockets (which kinetically slam into a missile) such as the US PAC-3 launched from the Patriot air defense system. In the Pacific, the threat is from Chinese intermediate- and medium-range ballistic missiles, such as the DF-21 "carrier killer" missile. Defense against them favors longer-range, high-altitude hit-to-kill interceptors such as the American SM-3 and THAAD.

Weapons won't be the only precious commodity split between East and West. Running two regional wars comes with a problem beyond firepower: brainpower. It demands the US has enough decision-makers and staff officers to focus on their own theater, but distractions are common and even likely — similar to the US loss of focus on Afghanistan after the 2003 invasion of Iraq. In World War II, the European theater had priority. Today, it's more likely to be the Pacific.

Either way, Europe needs to build up its capabilities in case US resources are diverted to the Pacific. This includes air and missile defenses, hardened airbases, and improved anti-submarine warfare systems, Kaushal said.

Europe accepts that America's attention will inevitably switch to the Pacific. "The prospect of the US needing to reallocate resources is increasingly viewed as a structural reality rather than a question of any given administration's policy," Kaushal said. But public discussion "tends to stop at the point where it is assumed that US resources will be stretched and that Europe must fill the gaps, with little granularity as to which resources and what gaps are of greatest concern."

Michael Peck is a defense writer whose work has appeared in Forbes, Defense News, Foreign Policy magazine, and other publications. He holds an MA in political science from Rutgers Univ. Follow him on Twitter and LinkedIn.

• Perceptions of weakness dogged Jimmy Carter's presidency and legacy.
• Carter inherited a struggling economy and a US military adrift after Vietnam.
• But his administration played key parts in countering the Soviets and rising extremism.

When the Soviet Union dissolved in 1991, the man who received the most credit was Ronald Reagan. The Republican president's bellicose policies and tough rhetoric — he called it an "evil empire" — were seen as ultimately forcing the Soviets into an arms race they couldn't afford. And Reagan seemed particularly strong compared to his predecessor, Jimmy Carter.

Almost from the start of his Democratic administration in 1977, Carter was criticized for being weak on national security. Never mind that he was an Annapolis graduate who served as a US Navy submarine officer, including being selected for duty on new nuclear-powered submarines. But these perceptions of his supposed weakness bear revisiting after his December 29 death, as Carter played key roles in countering the Soviets and Islamist extremists in the Middle East.

Carter — along with his predecessor Gerald Ford — had the misfortune of inheriting a national security mess. The US military of the late 1970s was called the "hollow force:" Strong on paper but crippled by poor readiness, racial tensions, and unmotivated recruits who dabbled in drugs as the armed forces shifted to an all-volunteer force.

Battered by inflation, soaring gas prices, and the lingering trauma of Vietnam, the American public was not inclined toward more war or defense spending. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union appeared to be at the height of its power, as Moscow fielded new missiles and tanks, and Soviet and Cuban forces intervened in the Angolan Civil War.

Carter entered the White House with a moralist vision of foreign policy, the polar opposite of Richard Nixon's and Henry Kissinger's realpolitik. He wanted to emphasize human rights and international cooperation. But like previous high-minded presidents such as Harry S. Truman, he evolved into more of a hawk.

Though he had campaigned in 1976 on a pledge to cut the defense budget, Carter oversaw a defense buildup that by 1980 called for a 14% annual budget increase (actually closer to 5% after inflation). This included new M1 tanks, cargo planes, a new ICBM (the MX, which was eventually canceled), and higher pay for military personnel.

He also canceled what he saw as boondoggles, such as the B-1 bomber. He also ended the controversial neutron bomb project, a small nuclear weapon that produced more radiation than blast, and which detractors saw as the ultimate capitalist weapon (it "seems desirable to those who worry about property and hold life cheap," warned science-fiction author Isaac Asimov).

In the pre-green energy days of the 1970s, securing the West's oil supply was paramount. Worried that 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan created a springboard for a Soviet invasion through Iran and Afghanistan to the oil-rich Persian Gulf, Carter laid down the "Carter Doctrine."

"Let our position be absolutely clear," Carter warned in his State of the Union address on Jan. 23, 1980. "An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force."

The Carter administration created the Rapid Deployment Force, which could be dispatched to any crisis zone in the world (though it was really aimed at the Persian Gulf). On paper, it seemed a powerful force: the 82nd Airborne and 101st Airmobile Divisions, a Marine division and "light" Army divisions, all backed by Navy carriers and Air Force fighter wings. Yet critics questioned how rapid the RDF could be given limited transport capacity, and wondered how lightly armed paratroopers and Marines would fare in the desert against Soviet armor.

Carter sought strategic arms control through the SALT II treaty with the Soviet Union (he asked the Senate not to ratify the treaty after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan). Yet after Moscow deployed SS-20 intermediate-range ballistic missiles in Eastern Europe, Carter responded by calling for both diplomacy — and US Pershing II missiles to be stationed in Western Europe.

Carter's critics lambasted his emphasis on human rights, such as the Helsinki Accords, as hopelessly naive. Yet a focus on human rights spurred dissidents, such as the Solidarity movement in Poland, that ultimately weakened the Soviet empire. The Camp David Accords, which brokered peace between Israel and Egypt, dampened Soviet influence in the Middle East and turned Moscow's former client Egypt into an American ally.

In the end, Carter fell victim to the perception that he was a weak president. His biggest albatross was Iran's 444-day seizure of the US Embassy in Tehran: even when Carter authorized a risky rescue mission, the botched operation to free 52 Americans failed.

Against a vigorous and masterful communicator like Ronald Reagan, who touted military strength and confrontation with the Soviet Union as more than a necessity but a virtue, Carter appeared lacking. He was defeated by a landslide in the 1980 election.

There were many reasons why the Soviet Union collapsed. The biggest cause was the decrepit Soviet economy; Mikhail Gorbachev and the new generation of Soviet leaders recognized it was not sustainable, but failed to reform it in time.

To say that Jimmy Carter — or Ronald Reagan — were instrumental by themselves in defeating the Soviet Union would be an exaggeration. It is more accurate to say that Carter continued a tradition — dating back to Truman and the early days of the Cold War — of confronting the Soviet threat. Carter doesn't deserve all the credit, but he deserves his share.

Michael Peck is a defense writer whose work has appeared in Forbes, Defense News, Foreign Policy magazine, and other publications. He holds an MA in political science from Rutgers Univ. Follow him on Twitter and LinkedIn.

• The US military's war plan for fighting zombies began from a training scenario.
• It focuses on identifying the enemy, designating vital infrastructure, and coordinating forces.
• The US military has real-world experience in responding to disasters and outbreaks.

If zombies attack, the US military has a plan. Really.

Upon authorization from the president or the defense secretary, US Strategic Command will begin preparations for safeguarding the civilian population, protecting vital infrastructure, and eradicating the zombie menace.

And all without violating the rights of threatened humans and possibly the zombies themselves.

"This plan was not actually designed as a joke," explains CONPLAN 8888-11 ("Counter Zombie Dominance"), issued on April 30, 2011 by USSTRATCOM, whose normal responsibilities include overseeing America's strategic nuclear weapons, global strike capabilities and missile defense.

It originated as a scenario to train junior officers in the Department of Defense's Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES), by which the US military devises contingency plans. Instructors discovered that a zombie apocalypse scenario was a better teaching tool than using fictional scenarios about Tunisia or Nigeria as was customary at the time, which also risked being misunderstood by the public as real scenarios.

"We elected to use a completely impossible scenario that could never be mistaken as a real plan," explained the CONPLAN 8888-11 document. "Because the plan was so ridiculous, our students not only enjoyed the lessons; they actually were able to explore the basic concepts of plan and order development (fact, assumptions, specified and implied tasks, references etc.) very effectively."

With tongue in cheek — or shot to the head — the plan lays out how USSTRATCOM will handle a global uprising of the undead. When the US military goes on Zombie Condition (ZombieCon) alert, Strategic Command will begin defensive operations to protect the human population, and offensive operations to neutralize zombies by "denial, deception, disruption, degradation or destruction."

Those looking for tactical tips on killing flesh-eating monsters will be disappointed. CONPLAN 8888-11 is a staff plan that focuses on identifying the enemy, designating vital infrastructure such as food, power and medical care, and coordinating friendly forces.

Taking full advantage of abundant open-source intelligence on the undead, planners mined classic movies and popular video games, such as "World War Z," "Night of the Living Dead," and "Plants vs Zombies," to devise a typology of zombies. These include those infected by a virus or mutated by radiation, as well as those caused by magic, extraterrestrials, and human engineering ("Weaponized Zombies"). There are also vegetarian zombies, which consume grain and thus threaten the US food supply.

Like any predator, zombies will go where their prey can be found. Undead armies are expected to focus on cities, as well as water sources (humans need water, but zombies don't). While zombies don't drive vehicles, preferring walking or running with outstretched arms, roads will be crucial transportation arteries for human soldiers as well as crowds of refugees.

CONPLAN 8888-11 is a multiphase plan to put down a zombie outbreak. Preparations will begin prewar with USSTRATCOM and intelligence agencies surveillance to detect "disease vectors that could cause zombieism."

The US government will also try to deter anyone from creating zombies. "It is important to note that zombies are not cognizant life-forms," USSTRATCOM pointed out. "As such, they cannot be

deterred or reasoned with in any way. However, there are zombie-inducing forces that can be deterred from further action. These forces include but are not limited to nation states and terrorist groups with [weapons of mass destruction] programs, and unethical bio-research companies."

Once the outbreak begins, American forces will mobilize, though CONPLAN 8888-11 cautions that to avoid rattling Russia and China, there must be "confidence-building measures to ensure leaders within these nations do not construe USSTRATCOM preparations to counter zombie-dominance as preparations for war."

Within 40 days after the outbreak, the US military will on the offensive. Once the zombies have been wiped, USSTRATCOM will assess the damage and begin reestablishing civil authority. Though some other organization will have to provide the zombie-busting boots on the ground to hold off the Zombie horde far so the military can strike it with overwhelming firepower. "USSTRATCOM has no ground combat forces capable of repelling a zombie assault," CONPLAN 8888-11 notes. "USSTRATCOM can only deliver synchronized fires against a zombie threat via strategic air, space and maritime forces."

This could include nuclear weapons. USSTRATCOM must "maintain emergency plans to employ nuclear weapons within CONUS [continental United States] to eradicate zombie hordes," according to the plan.

One potential hurdle to deploying the US military is lawfare. Laws such as the Insurrection and the Posse Comitatus Acts strictly limit the deployment of the US military in domestic affairs. Though martial law would almost certainly be declared in the event of a mass zombie plague, deployment against undead who were formerly living US citizens could raise questions of Constitutional rights, as well as various international treaties and UN charters governing human rights and the conduct of war.

The question is whether zombies are still US citizens or pathogens who can be killed. "US and international law regulate military operations only insofar as human and animal life are concerned," CONPLAN 8888-11 argued. "There are almost no restrictions on hostile actions that may be taken either defensively or offensively against pathogenic life forms, organic-robotic entities, or 'traditional' zombies."

Though meant as a fun training exercise, would USSTRATCOM's plan actually work? The US military obviously lacks experience in counter-zombie operations but has been involved in infectious disease response like the 2014 Ebola outbreak in West Africa. It has also gained a lot of experience in responding to natural catastrophes and manmade disasters, as well as reestablishing civil authority in devastated places such as post-World War II Europe and the Middle East.

Fictional movies and books about zombies abound. We can only hope this is one real-life contingency plan that never gets dusted off.

Michael Peck is a defense writer whose work has appeared in Forbes, Defense News, Foreign Policy magazine, and other publications. He holds an MA in political science from Rutgers Univ. Follow him on Twitter and LinkedIn.

• A drone pilot argues a massive drone swarm could clear a path through enemy lines.
• Ukraine's Illya Sekirin calls for 40,000 drones to barrage at 6-mile wide sector.
• His vision calls for using drones similar to how tanks were employed a century ago.

Behind the minefields and obstacles, the enemy waits in their entrenchments, poised to strike at tanks and infantry trying to advance through the treacherous ground. Instead, tens of thousands of drones descend on their positions, blowing up vehicles, artillery, and bunkers and clearing a path for friendly ground troops.

This is the vision of a Ukrainian combat drone pilot who believes that armies need to create a separate branch for uncrewed aircraft system (UAS) and electromagnetic warfare — and go on the attack.

"Breakthroughs with large mechanized formations are becoming a thing of the past and static warfare, like the positional stalemate in Ukraine, appears to be the new norm," wrote Illya Sekirin in an article for the British Army Review, "As a result, the role of the UAS and electromagnetic warfare branch would be particularly useful in breaching enemy fortified positions through the use of massed offensive actions."

Drones — along with artillery — have become the dominant weapons in the Ukraine war. In particular, while tanks are still a major weapon on the battlefield, they no longer enjoy the dominance they once had. Hordes of small first-person-view (FPV) drones have made life hazardous for hulking, expensive weapons such as armored vehicles and artillery pieces, which now operate cautiously and under the protection of air defense and electronic warfare systems.

"FPV drones (also known as loitering munitions) have become so effective that they, at a cost of around $350 to $450 per asset, can now be described as the Ukrainian army's principal anti-tank weapon," wrote Sekirin, who has combat experience operating the DJI Mavic 3, a piloted drone popular with hobbyists as well as Ukrainian soldiers.

Sekirin wants to take this to the next level. Breaching fortified lines, as both the Russians and Ukrainians have learned the hard way, is a complex and fraught operation that often results in heavy casualties to the assault troops. Sekirin's alternative: using immense numbers of drones to blast a hole in enemy defenses that creates breathing room for assault troops.

"For example, 40,000 drones that would attack in waves to destroy enemy forces in a frontline area 10 kilometers [6 miles] and 20 kilometers [12 miles] deep, with a resulting drone attack density of 200 UASs per square kilometer," Sekirin wrote. "This drone attack would simultaneously provide accurate covering fire to friendly mine-clearing vehicles and advancing mechanized infantry units tasked with capturing the area. Through the resulting breach of the frontline, conventional maneuver forces could then enter to gain the operational initiative."

Sekirin argues that using drones for breaching operations saves money and reduces friendly casualties. "If the price of an average attack drone is presumed to be $500, drones would cost $20 million, which is roughly equivalent to the price of just two Ml Abrams tanks. 40,000 UASs would also constitute only 0.8 percent of worldwide consumer drone shipments (five million units were shipped in 2020), suggesting that production and supply issues would not be an issue."

This goes well beyond drone use in the nearly three-year war, which has mostly been to try to disable vehicles and to stalk small groups of soldiers. Making drones into a massive strike force would require enhanced communication and tactics to limit friendly fire on advancing troops, who can resemble those of their enemy on grainy video or infrared feeds.

What is ironic is that a century ago, tanks were invented precisely as a means to breach the fortified trench lines of the First World War that had largely been closely defended by machine guns. World War II saw armies rely on masses of tanks not just to penetrate defense lines, but also to use their mobility and firepower to smash enemy forces and capture vast amounts of territory.

Thus, Sekirin's concept would have drones assume the historical role of tanks. But that raises questions in itself. As soon as tanks made their debut in 1916, it quickly became clear that they were not a miracle solution for battlefield problems. Armored vehicles then and now are vulnerable to a variety of weapons, which means they must use combined arms tactics in which they coordinate with other arms such as infantry, artillery, engineers and aircraft.

Because they are cheap and easy to manufacture in quantity, it would be tempting for armies — and penny-pinching politicians — to rely on a massive fleet of drones at the expense of traditional breaching systems such as combat engineers and mine-clearing tanks. But just as tanks became vulnerable to mines, anti-tank rockets and now drones, the drones themselves will likely fall prey to countermeasures such as jamming (which already is disrupting UAV operations in the Ukraine war), as well as projectile weapons and intercept drones.

A horde of 40,000 drones would be an impressive and scary sight. But it is no panacea.

Michael Peck is a defense writer whose work has appeared in Forbes, Defense News, Foreign Policy magazine, and other publications. He holds an MA in political science from Rutgers Univ. Follow him on Twitter and LinkedIn.

• Expendable troops are essential to Russia's costly advance in Ukraine.
• Criminals allow Russia to expand its army without resorting to a larger mobilization.
• Convict troops may be more useful in urban warfare than in open terrain or mechanized warfare.

To Westerners, the solution was inhuman. To compensate for the dismal performance of its troops in the early months of the Ukraine war, Russia formed assault units of convicts and other "expendables" in 2023.

But for Vladimir Putin's government — to whom only victory mattered — sending waves of suicide troops who can absorb real bullets has enabled more valued Russian regulars to seize more ground from Ukraine.

The laboratory for this ruthless approach came at the Battle of Bakhmut in late 2022 and early 2023, when the Wagner Group — a mercenary outfit — employed assault units mostly composed of convicts pardoned in return for fighting in Ukraine. This approach combined with area-battering of glide-bombing has outlasted Wagner Group's involvement, allowing Russian forces to seize more land without triggering the unrest back home that could threaten Putin's rule.

"Wagner — and the battle for Bakhmut, to some extent — became a test bed for Russian forces to determine how best to exploit convicts as an expendable force," researcher Michael Kofman wrote in a study of Russian military adaptation for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace think tank in Washington, D.C. "Wagner's methods were brutal and coercive, but effective. The Russian military was interested in the latter and less concerned with the former."

Turning criminals into soldiers isn't a new idea. Judges in America routinely offered defendants a choice between going to jail or going into the service (today's US military frowns on applicants with criminal records, though waivers are possible). But Russia has taken this to a new level out of deep need. After suffering an estimated 700,000 troops to death, injury or desertion in the nearly three years of its war in Ukraine, Russia should be resorting to mass conscription to replace its losses.

Criminals provide an easy pool of expendable manpower without sparking popular discontent among the Russian public over the draft. As for the criminals, the fact that many volunteer for suicide squads says much about conditions in Russian prisons.

Not that Russia has ever been particularly solicitous about the lives of its soldiers. In World War II, the Red Army frequently used penal battalions for tasks such as clearing minefields under fire. But even by those standards, Wagner was ruthless. Its tactics "depended on simplicity and severe punishment to enforce compliance," Kofman wrote. Soldiers who refused to advance, or retreated without orders, were simply executed.

Wagner warfare was waged on the cheap. "Convict units were given cheap commercial cell phones without SIM cards," wrote Kofman. "The phones had offline maps installed with numerically indicated waypoints and GPS. Wagner commanders would order assault groups to move forward with these preset waypoints over cheap, unencrypted radios, and the convict assault groups would pass back their locations with code words."

One of the tragedies of the Ukraine war is that these tactics have some efficacy for nations willing to treat their citizens as disposable. After nearly a year of bitter combat, Bakhmut was captured in May 2023. Russia may have suffered as many as 100,000 dead and wounded, according to the US government.

"The attrition ratio was favorable to Ukraine, at an average rate of one to four in terms of those killed or seriously wounded, with the bulk of Russian casualties coming from convict-staffed formations employed by Wagner," Kofman wrote. "Publicly available sources suggest that 88 percent of Wagner's losses over the course of the battle for Bakhmut were among convicts."

Ukrainian losses were smaller but more keenly felt. "The fight drained experienced personnel on the Ukrainian side, while the Russian military could concentrate artillery, and expendable infantry formations around Bakhmut in a grinding attritional battle," Kofman noted.

Ironically, while the Russian military has been criticized for rigid tactics, the Wagner convict units proved adaptable under desperate circumstances. For example, the selection of its leaders was impromptu. "Wagner regulars determined who the best convicts were during training, and they would be appointed as the commanders of assault groups," wrote Kofman.

In some cases, the convict units infiltrated and enveloped Ukrainian positions. In others, they attempted to overwhelm the Ukrainians with multiple waves coming from different directions. Ukrainians returning fire disclosed their positions and repeated Wagner attacks aimed to expend their ammunition. Once the convicts had worn down the Ukrainians, Wagner regular (non-convict) troops would go to finish the job.

"Execution was tactically flexible, with units changing course of action depending on the conditions," the report said. "If a position was too strong, they could switch to another."

"The main factors enabling Wagner's operations were availability of expendable convicts from Russia's prison system, artillery support from the Russian army which provided a fires advantage, and the presence of supporting Russian units holding Wagner's flanks to secure their campaign."

Wagner's power in Russia ebbed after its leader, Yevgeny Prigozhin, died in a mysterious plane crash in 2023 after mutinying against the Putin regime. Its mercenaries have found profitable employment overseas, especially in mineral-rich and human rights-challenged countries in Africa whose governments need military support against Islamist groups and other insurgents.

But Wagner's legacy lives on in what Kofman calls the "Wagnerization" of the Russian military. The Russian army now relies on Storm-Z (now Storm-V) assault units manned by ill-trained and ill-equipped convicts. Soldiers complain their chance of surviving the war is no more than 25%, according to the BBC.

The question is whether the convict-soldier concept is effective. The Carnegie study suggests they are in some cases, especially in urban warfare, where structures provide more cover for small units of lightly armed infantry to get within striking distance of enemy strongpoints and armor. But convict units haven't fared well in open terrain and in mechanized warfare where tanks and other heavy weapons are needed. As such, they are best used as auxiliaries for regular troops. Wave assaults over open ground fed to the soaring toll as Russia advanced in November.

Either way, the Russian people pay the price. Those convicts who survive the war come home to their communities as free citizens, where some commit the same crimes — such as murder — that got them jailed in the first place.

Michael Peck is a defense writer whose work has appeared in Forbes, Defense News, Foreign Policy magazine, and other publications. He holds an MA in political science from Rutgers Univ. Follow him on Twitter and LinkedIn.

• The Ukraine war is a wake-up call for NATO to stockpile more ammunition.
• NATO states need more ammo and defense production to replace losses in a long war.
• Powers like Russia and China have invested in huge numbers of artillery.

The Ukraine war shows that the theory behind NATO's combat doctrine is sound. The problem is that Britain and many other NATO allies lack the resources to implement it, a new report argues.

There is not "compelling evidence to suggest that the war necessitates fundamental changes to key ideas and terms in UK or Allied joint operational-level doctrine, such as the maneuverist approach, the comprehensive approach or mission command," according to the RAND Europe think tank, which reviewed open-source literature on the Ukraine war at the behest of the United Kingdom's Ministry of Defense. The report counters other experts who've argued that the West's maneuver strategy for ground combat faces increasing threats.

But to win a large conflict like Ukraine, NATO lacks sufficient equipment and ammunition. The Ukraine war has been marked by heavy losses of armored vehicles and artillery, as well as massive expenditure of munitions that have strained the economies of the combatants. NATO stockpiles and defense manufacturing capacity had already dwindled after the end of the Cold War: providing a steady supply of armaments to Ukraine while replenishing their stockpiles has proven extremely challenging.

"The published literature on Ukraine suggests that the most pressing question is not whether NATO and the UK's joint doctrine is appropriate, but rather whether sufficient resources are available to credibly implement those ideas and principles as envisaged, especially over the course of a long war," RAND warned.

Ukraine is a conflict of contradictions, where 21st-century technologies such as drones exist alongside artillery barrages and trench warfare straight from 1917. While militaries want to learn the lessons for future wars, distinguishing what's old from what's new — and what are specific features of the Ukraine war versus permanent trends — isn't easy.

For example, what is the future of airpower? Crewed aircraft have had a surprisingly limited impact on the Ukraine war, as have helicopters. "The deployment of [ground-based air defenses] has underscored the poor survivability of rotary-wing assets on both sides, with a reduced use of platforms including helicopters for tactical air mobility maneuvers and [casualty evacuation], compared with operations in Afghanistan and Iraq," RAND said. The sheer numbers and accuracy of air defenses like the Patriot (Ukraine) or S-300 and S-400s (Russia) force jets to fly at a remove from the battlefield, one of the reasons the battlefield's lines are largely static.

These issues are hardly academic for NATO militaries. They operate the world's most numerous and advanced air forces, outgrowths from the Cold War strategy of using tactical airpower to stall and fracture the Soviet Union's numerically superior ground forces. If their use is now much more limited, it suggests NATO armies will face a much more difficult ground fight.

Drones have largely replaced crewed aircraft for reconnaissance and attack missions. And, small, expendable drones have replaced larger UAVs such as the Turkish-made Bayraktar 2 strike drone that Ukraine used with devastating effect in the early days of the war. Yet massive use of drones has failed to provide either side with victory.

Ukraine has tried to shed its Soviet-era doctrine in favor of Western-style maneuver warfare, with limited but not decisive success. Russia has used massive artillery barrages and human-wave assaults — the same tactics the Red Army used against the Germans in World War II — to achieve steady but incremental gains at ferocious cost; by one estimate, November was the highest month for Russian soldiers killed and wounded in the entire war.

"Without airpower, neither maneuver nor positional warfare have led to a decisive strategic outcome, but claims in the literature about the demise of such approaches are premature," said RAND.

The apparent neutralization of airpower is bad news for NATO. Western nations have tended to invest in aircraft rather than building huge numbers of artillery pieces, as Russia and China have done.

RAND does see several enduring lessons of the Ukraine war for NATO. One is having adequate quantities of personnel and material to absorb and replenish the constant drain of combat losses in a long war. "While the efficiency afforded by new technology can offset the need for mass in certain situations, it cannot replace the general need for mass. We have not yet observed any game-changing technology or tactic that negates the need for critical mass in personnel, infrastructure, materiel and stockpiles."

These issues are especially acute for the UK. The British Army is shrinking to 72,000 soldiers — its lowest level since the Napoleonic Wars — while the Royal Navy and Air Force are also a fraction of their Cold War strength. In the event of a war with Russia, such as an invasion of Poland or Eastern Europe, the UK might barely be able to scrape together a full-strength mechanized division.

The RAND study also examines how military power emerges from more than just weapons and strategy. For example, the Kremlin's worst error was to underestimate the resolve of the Ukrainian people and government to preserve their independence as a nation. "The war has re-emphasized the importance of a narrative and audience-centric approaches. This includes the crucial but often overlooked role of a national will to fight — a topic extensively analyzed at RAND but often overlooked, especially in Western defense establishments.^"

Perhaps the biggest lesson of the Ukraine war is the importance of adaptability. Ukraine and Russia have proven rigid in some ways, but quite adaptable in others, such as mastering the use of drones. "Technological trends towards automation, process optimization and a more transparent, networked and data-rich battlespace aside, the war has for example reiterated the enduring impact of uncertainty and friction in complicating operations," RAND said.

This means NATO must constantly reassess its doctrine. The Ukraine war "emphasizes the crucial distinction between innovation (combining old with new) vs adaptation (to counter the enemy's new tactics) and the need to promote both (not necessarily prioritizing the new)," RAND concluded.

Michael Peck is a defense writer whose work has appeared in Forbes, Defense News, Foreign Policy magazine, and other publications. He holds an MA in political science from Rutgers Univ. Follow him on Twitter and LinkedIn.

• Israel invoked a WWII precedent in trying to justify its pre-emptive strikes in Syria.
• During WWII, the Royal Navy attacked the fleet of its former ally to keep it from Nazi control.
• Both operations were borne in atmospheres of fear and crisis.

When Israel sank six Syrian warships at the port of Latakia this week amid larger attacks on the military remnants of the ousted Assad regime, Israel's leader invoked a precedent from World War II.

"This is similar to what the British Air Force did when it bombed the fleet of the Vichy regime, which was cooperating with the Nazis, so that it would not fall into the Nazis' hands," Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said.

Though Netanyahu's history was faulty — it was the Royal Navy rather than the RAF that struck the French fleet — his analogy was revealing. The attack on the port of Mers-el-Kebir on July 3, 1940, has gone down as either a courageous decision that saved Britain — or a treacherous and needless backstab of an ally.

At the least, it is one of Britain's most controversial decisions of the Second World War. Like Israel today, the British acted amid an atmosphere of crisis, haste and uncertainty. The Israeli goal is to keep the now-deposed Syrian government's huge arsenal — which includes chemical weapons and ballistic missiles — from falling into the hands of rebel groups, which are dominated by Islamic militants. For Britain, the goal was to keep Adolf Hitler's hands off the French fleet, the fourth-largest navy in the world in 1940.

In that chaotic summer of 1940, the situation looked grim. The German blitzkrieg had just conquered France and Western Europe, while the cream of the British Army had barely been evacuated — minus their equipment — from Dunkirk. If the Germans could launch an amphibious assault across the English Channel, the British Army was in no condition to repel them.

However, Operation Sealion — the Nazi German plan to invade Britain — had its own problems. The Kriegsmarine — the German Navy — was a fraction of the size of the Royal Navy, and thus too small to escort vulnerable troop transports. But Britain's Prime Minister Winston Churchill had to contemplate a situation he had never expected: a combined German-French battlefleet.

Technically, France had only agreed to an armistice — a permanent cease-fire — with Germany rather than surrender. France would be divided between German-occupied northern zone, and a nominally independent rump state of Vichy comprising southern France and the colonies of the French Empire. Vichy France would be allowed a meager army, and the French Navy would be confined to its home ports.

The British didn't trust French promises that its ships would be scuttled if the Germans tried to seize them. Why had France signed a separate peace with Germany after earlier pledging not to? Why didn't the French government choose to go into exile, and continue the war from its North African colonies as the British urged? London was well aware that the right-wing Vichy government — under Field Marshal Philippe Pétain, hero of the First World War — had more affection for the Third Reich than it did for Britain. With Germany master of Europe, Pétain sneered that Britain would soon "have its neck wrung like a chicken."

After Vichy rebuffed pleas to send the fleet to British ports, Churchill and his ministers decided the risk was too great. In late June 1940, the Royal Navy received orders for Operation Catapult. A task force — including the aircraft carrier Ark Royal and three battleships and battlecruisers — would be dispatched to the French naval base at Mers-el-Kebir, near the Algerian port of Oran. A powerful French squadron of four battleships and six destroyers were docked there, including the new battleships Dunkerque and Strasbourg.

The French were to be given six hours to respond to an ultimatum: sail their ships to British ports and fight the Germans, sail them to French Caribbean ports and sit out the war, demilitarize their ships at Mers-el-Kebir, or scuttle their vessels. When the local French commander tried to delay while summoning reinforcements, the British opened fire.

The ensuing battle was not the Royal Navy's most glorious. Caught in every admiral's nightmare — unprepared ships anchored in port — the French were simply smothered by British gunfire. The battleship Bretagne and two destroyers were sunk, two other battleships damaged, and 1,297 French sailors perished. The British suffered two dead.

This was no repeat of the Battle of Trafalgar, when the Royal Navy smashed a Franco-Spanish fleet off Spain in 1805. Most ships at Mers-el-Kebir were damaged rather than sunk, and the French fleet quickly relocated its scattered vessels to the heavily defended French port at Toulon (where they were scuttled in November 1942 when German troops occupied Vichy). Though Vichy didn't declare war on Britain — and only retaliated with a few minor attacks on British bases — it confirmed old French prejudices about British treachery and "perfidious Albion."

Britain's attack on Mers-el-Kebir was political as much as military. In the summer of 1940, many people — including some in the United States — believed that the British would be conquered or compelled to make peace with a victorious Germany. Churchill argued that Britain had to show its resolve to keep on fighting, not least if it hoped to persuade America to send tanks, ships and war materials via a Lend-Lease deal. Attacking a former ally may have been a demonstration of British resolve.

Israel's situation does not resemble that of Britain in 1940. Syria has never been an ally of Israel. The two nations have had an armistice since 1949, punctuated by multiple wars and clashes over the years. Britain acted out of a sense of weakness, while Israel is confident enough of its strength to hit targets in Syria.

Yet by citing Mers-el-Kebir as a precedent, Netanyahu proved a golden rule of international relations that applied in 1940 and still applies today: Nations always act in their own interests. Faced with a choice between respecting a former ally and defending Britain from invasion, Churchill chose the latter. Netanyahu didn't hesitate to do the same.

Michael Peck is a defense writer whose work has appeared in Forbes, Defense News, Foreign Policy magazine, and other publications. He holds an MA in political science from Rutgers Univ. Follow him on Twitter and LinkedIn.

• China's special forces have serious problems that would limit their effectiveness in a Taiwan war.
• Chinese manuals suggest these forces would perform the most dangerous missions before landings.
• China lacks units with the highest levels of training but their bigger challenge would be coordination.

If China invades Taiwan, China's special forces would be key to its success, the first forces ashore to clear obstacles for inbound troops and then to scout for command centers and air defenses for airstrikes.

China has expanded the ranks of its special operators, but they lack the combat experience and esprit de corps that defines the world's most elite operators — raising questions about their utility in a major operation. Indeed, some commando units have been brought to strength by conscripts.

Special operations forces, or SOF, "likely would play important supporting roles in an amphibious assault on Taiwan," according to analysts John Chen and Joel Wuthnow in a new book published by the China Maritime Studies Institute at the US Naval War College.

Special forces have long been integral to amphibious warfare. In World War II, US Navy Underwater Demolition Teams scouted beaches and removed obstacles prior to an invasion. In the 1982 Falklands War, the main landing wasn't authorized until British special forces could assess Argentine defenses, even if this required the Royal Navy to sail into the teeth of Argentine air attacks to get within helicopter range of the islands.

China's SOF comprises 20,000 to 30,000 personnel, according to a 2023 U.S. Department of Defense report; US Special Operations Command, by contrast, has 70,000 active and reserve personnel. China's SOF includes 15 army brigades, as well as special operations units in the People Liberation Army Marine Corps, Airborne Corps, and Rocket Force. Even the People's Armed Police (PAP) — a paramilitary organization tasked with internal security — has counterterrorist special operations units that could be used to spearhead an invasion or suppress Taiwanese guerrillas afterwards.

Chinese military manuals suggest that these elite forces would perform the most dangerous missions that start before the main landings. These include "monitoring weather and hydrological conditions; scouting enemy positions and movements, as well as enemy obstructions in the main landing approaches; tracking high-value enemy targets; identifying and illuminating targets for conventional precision-guided missile strikes; and conducting battle-damage assessments," Chen and Wuthnow wrote.

Chinese special forces seem fairly well-trained and have better equipment than regular formations. They have "priority access to modern equipment, such as individual-soldier communications systems and night-vision equipment," wrote Chen and Wuthnow. "They also are likely to have access to special-mission equipment that would be vital in an amphibious assault on Taiwan," such as underwater transport vehicles.

While Western special forces would be horrified at the thought of being assigned conscripts, China does select the better draftees. "Their SOF units do use some conscripts to fill the enlisted ranks as with other parts of the PLA," Wuthnow told Business Insider. "That said, they use rigorous screening and selection procedures to weed out less capable troops. For the PLANMC SOF Brigade, their attrition rate is advertised at 50% or higher in the first three months due to the rigorous training. So it would be considered an honor in their system to be selected and make it through the initial onboarding."

But China's special forces have serious problems that would limit their effectiveness in an assault on Taiwan. Chinese SOF have many differences from their Western counterparts: some brigades converted from conventional formations into commando units as China expanded its special operations capabilities, which lack the elite teams that train for the most complex and difficult missions.

"PLA SOF brigades are similar to our Green Berets, who do conduct unconventional operations, such as direct raids or deep reconnaissance behind enemy lines," Wuthnow said. "What the PLA lacks is what we call Tier One SOF Forces such as Delta Force or Seal Team 6, which conduct exceptionally difficult operations abroad, often in very small or clandestine teams."

"I think they look on our ability to conduct those types of operations with a certain envy, especially because their troops have no similar experience," Wuthnow added.

Special forces units are also supposed to attract soldiers who can take initiative. But Chinese special forces suffer from the same rigid command and control, as well as political monitoring, that hampers China's regular military units, and Russian forces in Ukraine.

"Generally, there is a tension between the Leninist emphasis on centralization and the need to grant autonomy to lower-level PLA commanders," according to Chen and Wuthnow. "This could be especially problematic in special operations; centralized command could lead to poor performance if small units fail to act because of a lack of explicit authorization, or if they are forced to maintain radio communications and thus reveal their positions to the enemy."

Perhaps the biggest problem with Chinese special forces is lack of integration. A proper amphibious invasion is like a Hollywood musical: an intricate, coordinated mix of ground, naval and aerial forces, as well as missiles, drones and information operations. The US military emphasizes joint operations, and China has taken a step toward that by creating five multiservice theater commands.

But for lightly armed commandos infiltrating Taiwan before the main assault on the beaches, tactical integration is key. "The lack of permanent joint structures below the theater level could diminish the effectiveness of joint operations involving special forces, potentially leading to catastrophic results similar to the failed U.S. hostage-rescue attempt in Iran during Operation Eagle Claw," wrote Chen and Wuthnow.

Still, despite their limitations, Chinese special forces could disrupt Taiwanese defenses enough to enable an amphibious assault to succeed. "Even partly effective special operations could hamper Taiwan's defenses and thus should be addressed explicitly in defensive concepts," Chen and Wuthnow warned. The authors recommend that Taiwan "identify PLA weaknesses, such as a lack of technical proficiency, limited jointness, and potential overreliance on radio communications for command and control, and tailor responses accordingly."

"PLA SOF would be integral to any amphibious invasion of Taiwan," said Wuthnow. "They could also be employed in smaller-scale island seizure campaigns such as we might see in the South China Sea. That being said, it's also the case that these troops have essentially no real-world experience and as an untested force would face difficulties in these high-risk missions."

Michael Peck is a defense writer whose work has appeared in Forbes, Defense News, Foreign Policy magazine, and other publications. He holds an MA in political science from Rutgers Univ. Follow him on Twitter and LinkedIn.

• A Chinese invasion of Taiwan must focus on seizing a port to bring in tanks and supplies.
• Commercial or industrial ports are prime targets that would allow for rapid offloading.
• Taiwan may have the weapons and obstacles to turn its ports into fortresses.

There are two requirements for a major amphibious invasion. The first is storming the beach.

The second is no less important — seizing a port. Without docks and cranes to unload reinforcements — especially armored vehicles — and supplies, everything has to be brought in over the open beach or flown in by helicopter. This can result in a race against time: can the invaders reinforce a large enough beachhead before the defenders try to push them into the sea?

As it contemplates an invasion of Taiwan, China is well aware of this problem. It knows full well that Taiwan will desperately defend its ports.

Chinese military journals "argue that the success or failure of an invasion of Taiwan likely would hinge on whether Chinese amphibious-landing forces are able to seize, hold, and exploit the island's large port facilities," naval analyst Ian Easton wrote in a new book published by the China Maritime Studies Institute at the US Naval War College.

"By themselves, Taiwan's beaches and coastal airports are too small to land enough [People's Liberation Army] troops, tanks, and supplies to secure a solid lodgment ashore," Easton wrote. "Because these sites lack purpose-built infrastructure for unloading large transports and because they occupy inherently exposed positions, PLA researchers fear that Chinese landing forces could be encircled on the beaches, showered with defensive fires, and overrun by Taiwanese counterattacks.^"

Chinese analysts worry that Taiwan will turn its ports into fortresses against sea assault, including mines and obstacles, sink containerships to block shipping channels, and set the waters alight by pouring oil into them.

The People's Liberation Army, as China's military is officially known, sees six options for taking Taiwan's ports, all of which have disadvantages, according to Easton. A direct assault runs into the teeth of port defenses. Landing on either side of a port with armor in a pincer attack is time-consuming. Quick surprise attacks with troops in hovercraft and sea-skimming helicopters suffer from limited transport capacity. Large air assaults with helicopter-carrying troops are threatened by Taiwanese air defenses. Special operations forces may be too lightly armed to seize ports. And beach assaults like D-Day come with the risk that Taiwanese troops could bottle up the attackers.

Based on Chinese military writings, Chinese planners seem to be leaning towards a mix of these options, per Easton. An invasion would begin with heavy air, missile and naval bombardment, followed by commandos to knock out coastal defenses. "After beach obstacles and coastal fortifications have been destroyed using direct fires, large amphibious forces will make landings from the sea, supported by troops arriving by helicopters, hovercraft, and ultralights," Easton wrote. "Once ashore, amphibious-assault units will conduct pincer movements from the beaches, surrounding port zones and isolating defenders into pockets of resistance."

Once ashore, PLA troops will attack areas near the port from two sides at the same time as other assault units in low-flying helicopters and hovercraft strike at the port directly. Once it is captured, Chinese forces will dig in to resist a counterattack, while engineers repair the docks and clear the shipping lanes.

The ports most likely to be attacked are those "that could support the rapid off-loading of main battle tanks and other heavy equipment. The ideal candidates for attack would be well-developed commercial or industrial ports flanked by beaches and river deltas in relatively flat and lightly urbanized areas," wrote Easton. The port of Taichung on the west coast of Taiwan is the most probable candidate, followed by Kaohsiung, Mailiao, Anping and Taiwan's capital Taipei.

Would this Chinese strategy work? Historically, armies and navies have avoided attacking heavily defended ports directly ("A ship's a fool to fight a fort," said the legendary British admiral Horatio Nelson). The most infamous example is the disastrous raid on the port of Dieppe in northern France by 10,000 Allied troops (the majority of them Canadian) in August 1942. Intended as a test operation for D-Day, the attackers suffered 5,000 dead and wounded, or about the half of the assault force. The lesson was so stinging that the Allies opted to make the Normandy invasion over the beaches, and then go on to capture a port.

The challenge isn't just seizing a port, but also getting it in usable enough condition to allow tanks to be unloaded. As the Allies discovered while taking fortified ports such as Brest and Cherbourg in 1944, the Germans made such effective use of demolitions that the port facilities were inoperative for months.

Easton suggests that Taiwan can beef up its port defenses, including missiles and mines, as well as units specially trained in urban warfare. Easton also believes that a first step could be removing the Chinese presence from Taiwanese ports, despite China accounting for 40% of Taiwan's exports. "Taiwanese leaders could close [Chinese Communist Party]-controlled representative offices," Easton wrote. "They could remove and replace critical port infrastructure that is linked to the Chinese military."

In the end, the fate of an invasion of Taiwan turns on which side controls the ports. "The imagination-crushing dimensions of a PLA amphibious operation against Taiwan — the moving of millions of humans and machines — all rely on robust logistics lines," Easton wrote. "Without them, everything else quickly crumbles and falls apart."

Michael Peck is a defense writer whose work has appeared in Forbes, Defense News, Foreign Policy magazine, and other publications. He holds an MA in political science from Rutgers Univ. Follow him on Twitter and LinkedIn.

• Israel's potent air defenses are increasingly threatened by low-flying drones.
• Two retired Israeli generals say it needs new defenses against this "low sky" layer.
• Israel pioneered targeting air defenses with drones in a stunning victory four decades ago.

Israel's air and missile defense system is arguably the best in the world, having proven this year it can down Iranian ballistic missiles and Hamas-fired rockets. Its Iron Dome is the epitome of this success and is only one of many systems. But while these can protect Israeli cities, they have an increasingly glaring problem — they can't protect themselves from low-flying drones, two retired Israeli brigadier generals warn.

"We have to defend our air defense," wrote Eran Ortal and Ran Kochav in a blog for the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Defense at Bar-Ilan University near Tel Aviv, Israel.

Ortal and Kochav fear that enemy drones could knock out air defense systems such as the vaunted Iron Dome, enabling ballistic missiles, manned aircraft and artillery rockets to strike Israel without being intercepted. "The Israeli Air Force does continue to rule the skies, but under the noses of the advanced fighter jets, a new air layer has been created."

The authors call this the "low sky" layer. "The enemy has found a loophole here. The Air Force (and, within it, the air defense corps) is required to defend against the combined and coordinated threats of missiles, unmanned aircraft systems and rockets."

Over the past year, Israel's air and missile system has achieved remarkable success against a range of projectiles launched by Iran, Hamas and other Iranian proxies, including ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, artillery rockets and mortar shells. For example, Israel — with the assistance of the US, Britain and other nations — reportedly intercepted 99% of some 300 ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and large attack drones launched by Iran in April 2024.

However, Israel has struggled against small exploding drones launched by Hezbollah, the Iran-backed militia in Lebanon. More than a hundred Israeli soldiers and civilians have been killed or wounded by these UAVs, including 67 who were wounded when a drone hit a building in northern Israel in October. Still, the situation is a far cry from the Ukraine war, where hordes of small drones have rendered battlefield maneuver almost impossible.

Nonetheless, Ortal and Kochav worry that Israeli air defenses were designed in the pre-drone era, when the threat to Israel came from aircraft and ballistic missiles, a critique that also applies to Western- and Russian-made systems. "This array was built over the years under the premise of Israeli air superiority. The air defense itself was not supposed to be hunted."

"The enemy is able to penetrate deep into Israel and engage the air defense system in one lane while other aircraft take advantage of the diversion and penetrate in another, more covert lane. It can identify targets and strike immediately using armed or suicide UAS. Above all, it strives to locate, endanger, and destroy key elements of the air defense system itself."

Israel relies on a multilayer defense system, with long-range Arrow interceptors targeting ballistic missiles above the Earth's atmosphere, the medium-range David's Sling handling ballistic and cruise missiles about 10 miles high, and the short-range Iron Dome stopping cruise missiles, short-range rockets and artillery and mortar shells at low altitude. All depend on the production and reloading of missiles adequate to the threat.

The problem is that these three systems can't protect each other. "The degree of mutual assistance and protection between the layers is relatively limited," Ortal and Kochav wrote. To optimize the allocation of a limited supply of interceptor missiles, "each tier was designed to deal with a specific type of missile or rocket. Iron Dome can't really assist Arrow batteries or support their missions. This limitation is equally true among the other layers."

Nor are Israel's air defenses built for survivability, such as creating decoy missile batteries and radars to protect the real ones or frequently relocating systems. "The degree of mobility, protection and hiding ability of the Israeli air defense system is inadequate. Unlike similar systems in the world, our air defense system was not built with synchronization as a critical goal."

Their solution? The creation of a fourth layer focused on point protection of the radar, missile launchers and troops that operate them against rockets and drones that have penetrated the first three layers. Air defenses must be camouflaged and should be mobile enough to change location before the enemy can target them.

Ironically, Israel itself was one of the pioneers of using drones to suppress air defenses. Stung by heavy losses from Soviet-made surface-to-air missiles in the 1973 Yom Kippur War, Israel used drones in during the 1982 Lebanon War. By using unmanned aerial vehicles that mimicked manned aircraft, Israel lured Syrian air defense radars into coming online so they could be destroyed by anti-radiation missiles. The Israeli Air Force destroyed 29 out of 30 anti-aircraft missile batteries in the Bekaa Valley without loss and downed more than 60 Syrian aircraft.

Israel's Air Force became so dominant that the ground forces discarded their tactical anti-aircraft weapons (though the IDF recently reactivated the M61 Vulcan gatling cannon for counter-UAV defense on the northern border). Meanwhile, the IDF's air defense corps switched its focus from anti-aircraft to missile defense.

"The working assumption was, and remains to this day, that Israel's Air Force rules the skies," wrote Ortal and Kochav. "The job of air defense, therefore, is to focus on missiles and rockets. This assumption is no longer valid."

Michael Peck is a defense writer whose work has appeared in Forbes, Defense News, Foreign Policy magazine, and other publications. He holds an MA in political science from Rutgers Univ. Follow him on Twitter and LinkedIn.

• China's marines are preparing for global operations similar to the US Marine Corps.
• China is building amphibious flattops whose scale rivals those of the US.
• US Marines are also shifting strategies, in their case away from storming beaches.

"Send in the Marines" is an old American quip for when things get rough. It may become a Chinese one too.

Instead of merely guarding Chinese naval bases and supporting an invasion of Taiwan, China's Marine Corps appears to be preparing for amphibious operations around the world — just as US Marines do. China is building a force of amphibious flattops that can launch Marine helicopters and possibly the fighting vehicles that motor to shore.

"The investment in large amphibious-assault ships indicates that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) envisions a future in which it can deploy expeditionary strike groups similar to those the United States has employed for the past fifty years," wrote Sam Tangredi in a new book published by the China Maritime Studies Institute at the US Naval War College "A globally deployable amphibious/expeditionary group is a far cry from the humble origins of the PLA [People's Liberation Army] amphibious force and a considerable leap from the PLAN [People's Liberation Army Navy] capabilities that existed in the first years of this century."

Established in 1953, the People's Liberation Army Navy Marine Corps, as it's officially known, was formed to seize Taiwan and other Nationalist-held islands. Like the US Marine Corps, the PLANMC is a branch of the navy. Its missions have been those of traditional naval infantry: guarding naval bases, garrisoning island outposts in the South China Sea, and supporting an amphibious invasion of Taiwan by the Chinese army, which retains its own amphibious assault force.

But the PLANMC has grown to the point where some experts wonder whether it will become an independent service. From two brigades and 12,000 personnel in 2017, the PLANMC has expanded to eight brigades, with a goal of 100,000 personnel; that compares to about 170,000 active-duty US Marines.

Tangredi, who is director of the Naval War College's Institute for Future Warfare Studies, says that there is no direct evidence that China has plans for global amphibious warfare. Yet, "if the Taiwan scenario is the primary purpose in mind, why is the PLA building amphibious warships that are optimized for global operations?" he asks.

Invading Taiwan doesn't require big amphibious assault ships similar to the Wasp-class vessels, 840-foot-long floating airports for Marine helicopters and jump-jets like the AV-8B Harrier II and the F-35B Lightning II and concentrating its assault force into small numbers of large ships comes with risks. Yet China is building 36,000-ton Type 075 amphibious assault ships that can carry up to 30 helicopters as well as 1,200 marines and their heavy equipment, including tanks. The upcoming 50,000-ton Type 076 will be the world's largest amphibious assault vessel.

"For an invasion of Taiwan across a strait of approximately a hundred nautical miles (nm), LHDs are not necessarily the optimal (or the most cost-effective) platforms when numerous smaller warcraft are available (including civilian commercial craft)," Tangredi wrote. "They are, however, optimal for spearheading the transport of marines to conduct operations at distances out to the Horn of Africa, islands in the eastern Pacific, or — with suitable future logistics support — the Mediterranean."

Back to their roots

The US Marine Corps is also adapting. It is switching from an emphasis on storming beaches — the US has not attempted a major beach assault under fire since the Korean war — to supporting the US Navy with missile-equipped units to hunt Chinese ships from island bases. This is transforming the US Marine Corps into "an archipelagic maneuver force designed to conduct littoral, sea-denial operations," Tangredi said.

The Corps devised a new force layout to operate in an age of drones and anti-ship missiles. In this new structure, Marine littoral units "would not be optimized for amphibious assaults or combat against enemy forces ashore but would use previously unoccupied territory to conduct attacks on warships and aircraft — essentially, naval combat from the land," wrote Tangredi. Retired senior Marine commanders were aghast.

Thus the USMC has given all its tanks to the US Army, while it creates mobile units that can quickly turn small Pacific islands into missile bases from which to strike Chinese ships. The 3rd Littoral Regiment was stood up in 2022, and two more regiments are planned.

These littoral units would "assist the Navy in asserting sea control in the East and South China Seas," Tangredi wrote. "Marines would operate as part of a littoral combat group, with the Navy having overall command, supplying the warships (and necessary support vessels), and providing most of the group's firepower. Armed with land versions of the Navy's antiship missiles, Marine units would maneuver constantly while ashore by ground vehicles or from island to island using the proposed LAW [light amphibious warship]."

Ironically, the US Marine Corps is returning to its historical roots. Marines have always had an ambiguous role, neither quite army nor navy (poet Rudyard Kipling called them "soldier an' sailor too"). Back to the days of the Roman Empire, marines have been naval infantry tasked with seizing and guarding naval bases, boarding enemy vessels, and acting as shipboard military police to put down mutinies.

This is what the US Marine Corps did for most of its history since its founding in 1775. But in World War II and afterwards, it became more like a scaled-down version of the US Army, conducting massive multi-division amphibious invasions and fighting conventional ground campaigns in Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan. Small, light units flitting from Pacific island to island would be more in line with traditional USMC roles.

As for Chinese marines, their historical purpose was to storm Taiwan, not garrison tiny atolls on behalf of the navy. For China and America, their marines are switching roles.

Michael Peck is a defense writer whose work has appeared in Forbes, Defense News, Foreign Policy magazine, and other publications. He holds an MA in political science from Rutgers Univ. Follow him on Twitter and LinkedIn.