Bob Keller, former US Army Special Forces and Delta Force operator, rates 10 Army special operations scenes in movies and TV, such as "Black Hawk Down," for realism.

Keller breaks down the accuracy of special operations scenes, such as the depiction of the first Special Forces team in Afghanistan — nicknamed "Horse Soldiers" — in "12 Strong," starring Chris Hemsworth; the Delta Force mission to capture high-value targets in "Black Hawk Down," with Josh Hartnett, Ewan McGregor, Eric Bana, and Tom Sizemore; and the collaboration of Delta Force operators with law enforcement, as well as the accuracy of tactics and weapons handling, in "Sicario," with Emily Blunt and Benicio del Toro. He discusses the depiction of Special Forces soldiers in Vietnam War movies in "Apocalypse Now," with Marlon Brando and Martin Sheen; the unconventional warfare strategies that Rambo, played by Sylvester Stallone, demonstrates in "First Blood"; and the nighttime raid scene from "The Green Berets," starring John Wayne. Keller also breaks down Delta Force operations and skills, as depicted in the hostage rescue scenes in "White House Down," starring Channing Tatum and Jamie Foxx; and "Land of Bad," starring Liam Hemsworth and Russell Crowe; the close-quarter combat and motorcycle riding skills demonstrated by Chuck Norris in "The Delta Force"; and the selection process in "The Unit" S1E1 + S2E8 (2008).

Keller has more than 20 years of experience in US Army special operations. He started with the 75th Ranger Regiment, then moved into Special Forces — nicknamed the Green Berets — and later was selected to be a part of the 1st Special Forces Operational Detachment— Delta (Airborne) — also known as Delta Force. He provides tactics instruction across the country through his company Gamut Resolutions, and he owns Range Werx, a shooting range in Fort Meade, Florida.

• Special operations forces have a fast and flexible weapons acquisition process.
• It's critical to keeping operators ahead of the curve on what capabilities are needed.
• There are lessons for the larger Joint Force and Pentagon, officials said.

US Special Operations Forces know how to get new technologies and weapons to the warfighter quickly, and there are potential lessons in their approach for the broader military.

At a recent symposium in Washington, DC, speakers argued that the Pentagon needs to move faster.

"The biggest thing we need to do is really fundamentally change the culture of the Pentagon and Congress," Rep. Adam Smith, a Washington Democrat and the ranking member of the US House Armed Services Committee, said last month at the National Defense Industrial Association's US Special Operations Symposium.

"We need to speed up the pace of innovation," he said.

Special operations forces have flexible acquisition processes which not only bring operators and industry partners together but also encourage adaptations in real time.

At the recent symposium, special operations leadership, other military officials, and industry partners spoke about what works and what doesn't in acquiring new weapons and capabilities. 

SOF's agile acquisition process means that it's able to work with industry partners to get its hands on and adjust both hardware and software faster than others. Officials said its approach was a model for how to solve broader issues within the Pentagon. 

Melissa Johnson, a Senior Executive Service member and acquisition executive for Special Operations Command (SOCOM), said the strength in the process is that decision-making on what systems to acquire and when is made through close coordination with the operator, creating a stronger relationship between what the individual operator sees as necessary and what industry partners can provide. 

"I think the recipe is really simple," Johnson said at the symposium, adding that "it's the mindset and culture of being able to take the magic that happens at SOCOM, the way we do business, and how do we scale that and get that across the department."

What slows down DoD acquisition? There are a range of different factors.

As officials said recently, many of the problems are due to the way funding is appropriated and how contracting works across the services and Congress. The other complication is the requirements piece and whether some are too complicated and arbitrary for certain systems. Smith referenced lengthy and sometimes unnecessary requirements for some things, such as paint on the littoral combat ship.

It is not as though US special operations forces are not without their own acquisition problems. For instance, special operations commanders told the House Armed Services Committee last week that US adversaries are modernizing faster than they can, telling congressional leaders that sometimes technology is already obsolete by the time it's fielded.

Lt. Gen. Michael Conley, the commander of Air Force Special Operations Command, said "it's this constant loop of trying to catch up with the enemy threat."

Still, special operations forces tend to move faster than the rest of the military, which is feeling the pressure to modernize for a higher-end conflict amid the emergence of newer combat technologies like uncrewed systems and artificial intelligence and the greater focus on great power competition with China and Russia.

There are lessons to be learned, SOCOM officials said, from the Ukraine war, where drone manufacturers are creating hardware and software solutions to problems on the battlefields even when countermeasures arise.

Chris Brose, the chief strategy officer at Anduril Industries, said that one of the benefits of working with SOCOM is that its work with industry partners is run differently than the requirements for building the next attack submarine or destroyer.

Brose pointed to Anduril's work with SOCOM on counter-drone systems, noting that feedback from operators on threats that outpace new technologies was key to adjusting in real time.

Others have tried this approach with industry, such as US Army Futures Command, which relied on immersive testing and feedback soldier touch points. Still, there is room for improvement in innovation and acquisition within DoD.

Adopting SOCOM's way of doing things comes down to having greater flexibility in the budget. But there's wariness from appropriators, Smith said, and that's been a big battle with questions on oversight. Not every solution presented, officials said, is going to apply to the entire military, as special operations forces purchase smaller quantities of cutting-edge technology with a smaller, flexible budget. But a general focus on problem-solving that's closer to industry could be beneficial.

• Trump and others have floated sending US special operations forces to Mexico to combat cartels.
• Experts told Business Insider that intervention in Mexico could create instability.
• SOF missions like foreign internal defense could be prudent, but only to augment nonmilitary approaches.

Trump world is kicking around the idea of sending special operations forces into Mexico to combat drug cartels. There's a risk these operations could make things worse, experts said.

While designating Mexican cartels as "foreign terrorist organizations" on Monday, President Donald Trump was asked by reporters whether he would consider sending US special operations personnel to Mexico.

"Could happen," the president said, noting that "stranger things have happened."

Experts on the cartels and warfare said that sending any military troops into Mexico risks stirring instability, which could then spill over the border into US territory.

"I don't think that the American people have the stomach for what's going to happen if we start messing around down there," a senior active-duty special operator told Business Insider, speaking on condition of anonymity because he wasn't authorized to speak to the media.

"Just throwing any military mechanism at this problem for the purpose of just killing cartel leaders is not going to change anything," he said. "It's only going to make things worse."

Trump floated the idea of military intervention in Mexico in his first term, but his team now appears to be considering the idea more seriously.

"How much should we invade Mexico?" a transition team member told Rolling Stone in November 2024 for a report on Trump's musings about combating cartels in Mexico. "That is the question."

Trump's new national security advisor, Mike Waltz, a former Green Beret, has pushed the idea of using special operators. And Trump's "border czar," Tom Homan, has said that special operations forces could be used to take the cartels out, or "take them off the face of the Earth."

Direct action raids — hard-hitting missions US special operations is known for and which Trump appears inclined to pursue — on Mexican soil would bring disastrous consequences, especially if conducted without an invitation from Mexico, the operator and other experts BI spoke with warned. But other, less kinetic missions, like training foreign troops or improving foreign internal defense, could prove worthwhile, they said.

Such missions have long been the bread and butter of forces like the Army's Green Berets. With Trump's formal designation of cartels as foreign terrorist organizations, those kinds of missions could augment other government efforts to more effectively stem the flow of drugs into the US, sources told BI.

An idea that keeps coming up

The idea of using special operators to combat cartels in Mexico has gained traction among leading Republicans, particularly military veterans. Before Florida Gov. Ron DeSantis, a former naval officer, ended his bid for the White House, he told CNN that if elected president, he would deploy US special operations forces into Mexico "on day one."

In 2023, Waltz, then a congressional representative from Florida, and Dan Crenshaw, a Texas congressman and former Navy SEAL, introduced new Authorization of Military Force legislation aimed at Mexican cartels. Such legislation is notably not often quickly reversed — both of the AUMFs that allowed the Global War on Terror to balloon in scope are still in place.

Wanting to send special operations forces into Mexico is understandable, said Bruce Hoffman, a senior fellow for counterterrorism and homeland security at the Council on Foreign Relations. Other measures have failed to curb the flow of drugs into the US, though some of the efforts at home appear to be working, as deaths from fentanyl overdoses are finally on the decline.

But special operations is much smaller than conventional military forces, he said, and isn't designed to solve every problem that might warrant military intervention.

"Despite the public imagination, SOF is not on a regular basis engaged in the kinds of operations that people often imagine, that are depicted in Hollywood," Hoffman said.

"They're engaged in less glamorous things like training indigenous forces, gathering intelligence, psychological operations, [and] civil affairs," he said.

Bolstering Mexico's internal defenses could be a worthwhile endeavor, the active-duty special operator told BI, but prioritizing military intervention over non-violent approaches, like empowering the State and Treasury departments to apply pressure on the financial institutions used by cartels, would be foolhardy.

The dangers of getting it wrong

Violence against cartels could trigger a humanitarian crisis and spur more immigration to the US, said Guadalupe Correa-Cabrera, a professor at George Mason University who has extensively studied cartels.

Mexican civilians caught in the crossfire would likely flee communities, which could create a refugee crisis, she said. "They are going to apply for asylum in a desperate situation," she said, calling the idea of immediate military intervention illogical.

It's not as simple as killing top leaders either. Complicating the grip cartels have on Mexican society is their seemingly infinite complexity, she said.

"We're not talking about businesses that operate vertically, like El Chapo and El Mayo, and all these guys that provide orders to everyone," she said, referring to two infamous drug kingpins. Most cartels operate with less centralized command structures and are splintered into smaller cells. Some of these focus on drug movements and production, while others focus on kidnapping, extortion, and human smuggling.

If the goal is to limit the reach of the cartels and the violence and the destruction that comes with them, "you are going to get the exact opposite effect" if you start killing leaders, said Carolyn Gallaher, a professor at American University who studies cartels, in an interview with BI.

Top leaders can be easily replaced by others zealously vying for power, creating an even more complex battlefield for American troops and Mexican civilians.

"When you start fighting an army that is not behaving like a regular military, you are basically in the middle of civilian life," Gallaher said. "And you don't have an accurate way to differentiate between civilian and soldier."

Doug Livermore, vice president of the Special Operations Association of America and a senior Green Beret officer in the National Guard who has written about narcoterrorism, said special operations is just one tool in the vast US government toolbox, and can't be the main effort.

"A military approach by itself will not be sufficient. It will not solve the problem," Livermore told BI.

He suggested a broader approach involving US special operations-provided intelligence or efforts to bolster internal security. However, Livermore said rampant corruption in Mexico's government agencies could complicate these efforts.

He also recommended a closer examination and targeting of China's role in the US drug crisis, pointing to the supply of chemical and financial support to cartels.

It's unclear what endstates the Trump administration desires to achieve to define success, said the SOF operator. Lacking such parameters could lead to another quagmire. It seems likely, however, that any effective operation to dismantle them will take years, he said.

"It's not done in a short amount of time; it takes consistent effort and partnership," the operator said. "It's going to take a generation or two; it's not going to be done in four years."

• US special operators are shifting away from counterterrorism toward peer-adversary conflict.
• There are five areas the US special operations community can focus on to best do that, new research says.
• These areas harken back to the strengths of special ops in the Cold War and the War on Terror.

As the US shifts its priorities toward countering near-peer adversaries like Russia and China, its special operations forces are adapting to new challenges.

Best practices for that ongoing adaptation may lie in Cold War lessons, new research on how the US can best leverage the skills of the special operations community says.

An Atlantic Council's report on ways the US can use special operations forces in the next decade was released Tuesday and notes that "three realities" facing the Department of Defense lend themselves to leveraging American special operations forces "more in strategic competition."

US special operations forces offer critical flexibility amid stagnation in defense spending and force size and can counter aggressors elsewhere while the military prioritizes the Indo-Pacific and Europe. Special operators can also use irregular capabilities to prevent competition from turning into armed conflict.

The report's authors, Clementine Starling-Daniels and Theresa Luetkefend, argue that US special operations should return to their "roots" and Cold War practices.

"USSOF's unconventional warfare support of resistance groups in Europe; its support of covert intelligence operations in Eastern Europe, Asia, and Latin America; its evacuation missions of civilians in Africa; and its guerrilla and counterguerrilla operations helped combat Soviet influence operations worldwide," they wrote.

"During that era, special operations became one of the US military's key enablers to counter coercion below the threshold of armed conflict," the authors added, noting they can do the same again now.

Keeping an eye on non-priority regions

Rivals and foes around the world are pulling the US military in different directions. It's facing threats from an aggressive Russia, a rising and often confrontational China, and joint challenges from increased cooperation between China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran. Threats from non-state actors also remain.

So where do special operations come in?

"While traditional elements of the Joint Force are likely to focus on the Indo-Pacific region and Europe, the DoD can mitigate risks and extend its global reach by leveraging USSOF for persistent, low-footprint operations in under-addressed regions," the new Atlantic Council's report says.

These areas include the Middle East, Central Asia, Africa, Latin America, the Caribbean, and the Arctic as prime examples.

US adversaries like Russia and China look to extend their presence and influence in these areas, meaning the Pentagon could use special ops to protect US interests and preserve situational awareness.

Preventing full-blown conflict with unconventional, irregular warfare tactics

To deter conflict, the US military can use special ops to up activities in the cyberspace and information environment that expend adversary resources. Some of SOF's biggest strengths are in this area, including intelligence campaigns, warping information and communications spaces, unconventional tactics that target US adversaries and create narratives favorable to Washington, sabotage, and deception.

Two prime examples could include supporting Taiwan's resilience against a potential Chinese invasion or blockade and Eastern European resistance to Russia's hybrid warfare and disinformation tactics.

During the Cold War, special operations forces conducted similar operations against the Soviet Union, bolstering resistance groups in Europe and undermining Soviet campaigns.

Skills from the Global War on Terror can be applied as well. Over the past 20 years, the US has relied on special operations for unconventional and difficult missions, including running shadowy helicopter assaults to kill or capture enemy leaders. These activities advance national security objectives.

Building connections with key allies and partners

Christopher Maier, the assistant secretary of defense for special operations and low-intensity conflict, said earlier this week that the other strength of special ops comes with its widespread global footprint and cultural awareness, which helps build connections between the US and its allies and partners.

Special ops leaders have long recognized that language and cultural sensitivity are absolutely critical to the force's success, but a recent watchdog report raised concerns about those skills.

Between 2018 and 2022, most Army and Marine Corps Special Operations Forces didn't meet the necessary foreign language proficiency goals.

Such skills have been vital for US military cooperation with allies in the past. Us Army Special Forces, the Green Berets, have been training and advising foreign armies and guerrillas since the early 1960s.

Similarly, US special operations cooperation with foreign SOFs is critical, the Atlantic Council paper says, and vital to building resilient relationships with partners that can help deter and deny the influence of US adversaries.

Putting the "integration" in integrated deterrence

US government and military responses to crises and conflict often need to be integrated responses, something special operations forces can help provide, the report argues.

"USSOF operations often bridge the activities of interagency and intelligence community partners, allied and partner militaries, and the rest of the joint force," the paper says, adding that special operations could be the "connective tissue."

That special operations "tissue" could connect US government departments like State, Justice, and Treasury Departments, as well as the Central Intelligence Agency and National Security Agency.

Using SOF's technological prowess to US advantage

Future warfare is expected to span across all domains, including information and cyber. As technological capabilities, such as artificial intelligence, develop at breakneck speed, special operations can play a pivotal role as a "pathfinder for technological solutions that can be scaled across the Joint Force," the report says.

Such a "pathfinder" role could include facilitating data sharing across the military and government and identifying and fielding cutting-edge technologies, especially in unmanned systems.

SOF's procurement process and culture has given it the opportunity to quickly develop and deploy innovative technologies and systems before the larger joint force.

That also sets special ops up for focusing on what the demand of future warfare could be, which could "support DoD's information and decision advantage over its competitors," the Atlantic Council report adds.

• NATO pit elite divers against new sensors to protect undersea cables from sabotage.
• Foreign adversaries have increasingly targeted undersea cables and underwater infrastructure.
• The training marks another shift in how NATO countries are preparing for future warfare.

NATO sent special operations divers to test new systems designed to help shield critical underwater infrastructure from damage and sabotage, growing problems.

Underwater cables and pipelines providing internet connectivity and energy have been damaged in a string of alarming incidents in recent years, with accusations of sabotage being thrown around about several just in the past couple of months.

These incidents highlight the vulnerability of these lines, but the NATO alliance is looking for answers.

Last fall, elite special operations divers from within the NATO alliance practiced bypassing underwater electronic detection sensors as part of an effort to boost protection for critical underwater infrastructure. NATO shared footage this week of the November training event — Exercise Bold Machina 2024 in La Spezia, Italy — as well as commentary from leadership.

The 13-nation event was the first of its kind, said US Navy Capt. Kurt Muhler, the maritime development director at the NATO Special Operations Headquarters, and was designed to test new sensors that could be used to defend against underwater sabotage attempts. This exercise, which Defense News first reported on, also tested allied special operations divers and their abilities to operate in increasingly transparent battlespaces.

Divers on offensive operations may not always be able to rely on dark, opaque waters to conceal their movements, Muhler, who has held SEAL team leadership positions, said, citing increased advancements in underwater detection system technologies.

"It's not knowing if somebody knows, or if you're being detected," Muhler told Defense News last fall. "It is understanding that there is a system that has the capability to detect you, but that you know nothing about it and don't know exactly what the capability is."

Undersea cables, pipelines, and other critical underwater infrastructure are at risk

The joint exercise in Italy came as damage to critical underwater infrastructure has become increasingly worrisome to Western officials who are scrambling to deter more damage to cables from vessels often quietly linked to Russian and Chinese governments.

Several underwater cables have been damaged in the past two months, including one telecommunications line linking Finland and Germany and another connecting Finland and Estonia.

Finnish officials said that they found a 60-mile seabed trail suggesting a tanker linked to Russia might be responsible for cutting cables. And around the same time, cables linking Germany and Finland and Sweden and Estonia were damaged with a Chinese vessel detected nearby when the damage occurred.

Such damage has spurred British defense officials to create a new joint operation with 10 European countries throughout the Baltic Sea area, using artificial intelligence to monitor potential threats from ships.

Undersea cables are critical components of international telecommunication infrastructure and the global economy — around 745,000 miles of cables span global seabeds and help transmit 95% of international data, including around $10 trillion in financial transactions daily.

NATO officials highlighted growing threats to cables from Russia last year, noting surveillance activity from Russian units specializing in undersea sabotage. But the barrier to entry for sabotage isn't particularly high. Russia has submarine units known to specialize in underwater sabotage, but cables have also been damaged by commercial vessels simply dragging their anchors along the sea floor.

And the concerns about the risk of underwater cable and infrastructure damage are not limited to European waters. Damage just last week to cables off the coast of Taiwan left that island's officials suspecting intentional damage from China.

"The underwater domain is hard both to protect and hard to attack," said Alberto Tremori, a NATO Centre for Maritime Research and Experimentation scientist who helped oversee the November NATO exercise. "It's not easy to protect because it's a complex environment, it's a vast environment."

• US special operations forces are shifting their focus after decades of counterterrorism.
• Competition with China and Russia is reshaping how SOF supports the joint force.
• A senior Pentagon official said that special operations is also returning to its "roots."

A senior Pentagon official said this week that the role of US special operations is changing as the US faces increasing competition and challenges from China and Russia.

With the threat of a conflict against a powerful and advanced adversary looming, special operations forces are returning to their "roots," Christopher Maier, the assistant secretary of defense for special operations and low-intensity conflict, said.

The direction of special operations forces (SOF) is adapting to the largest challenges facing the US — a rapidly growing Chinese military and Russian state set on expansion by force.

Maier said during a conversation with the Center for Strategic and International Studies think tank on Tuesday that SOF is "still doing counterterrorism, crisis response, those have been the persistent missions," but the priority is shifting towards "increasingly where we can support other elements, largely in a support role, for those strategic competition elements."

That means playing a big role in solving challenges facing the joint force, like more modern adaptations to using artificial intelligence, as well as the traditional functions of SOF, such as "being that sensor out there and providing the necessary input to decision makers to better understand a situation," noted Maier, who previously led the Pentagon's Defeat-ISIS Task Force overseeing the campaign across Iraq and Syria that relied heavily on American special operators.

Special operators are the US military's most highly trained troops, the go-to teams for small raids and secretive missions, but they lack the numbers and firepower to go up against larger conventional forces for long.

Much of the US' special operations presence in over 80 countries around the world is focused on working closely with foreign militaries, law enforcement, and embassies to keep a finger on the pulse. For the past 20 years, the US has relied on these forces for some the most unconventional and difficult missions, like teaming with partner forces to fight enemies or running shadowy helicopter assaults to kill or capture key leaders.

Maier said he views it as both a continuation of the counterterrorism and crisis response that SOF has been doing for decades and also a step back to its origins.

"We're going back to the proverbial roots of supporting the joint force with some of the hardest problems against peer adversaries," Maier said.

With the so-called War on Terror, SOF has spent over 20 years operating in counterterrorism and unconventional warfare roles, fighting quietly in a variety of environments across the world and maintaining relationships that provide the US with information on tactics of specific groups and deeper understandings of regional and security issues.

That role is now changing, albeit just as important. In a 2023 article for the Royal United Services Institute, a British think tank, David Ucko, a professor and expert on irregular warfare, argues that leaders in Washington need to examine how to best use SOF for newer challenges against Russia and China. That includes irregular warfare, which is "highly relevant" to strategic competition with China.

But, Ucko notes, special operators fill a particular role in military operations and shouldn't be given missions that other US agencies or groups can also do.

One of the deepest challenges these secretive forces face is the widening surveillance by spy satellites and recon drones.

SOF missions often have multiple objectives like foreign internal defense and unconventional warfare; special operators can, for example, help boost a US ally's defense tactics against a foreign aggressor, such as Taiwan and China.

Allied special forces played critical roles in World War II, shaped by the need for specialization in unconventional missions and innovative tactics, such as sabotage behind enemy lines and disrupting German supply lines. In North Africa, British Special Air Services and Commonwealth Long Range Desert Group commandos aided in disrupting Axis troops deployments and airpower.

During the Cold War, special operators played a role in deterring the Soviet Union's influence, maintaining presence in and relationships with Western Europe and other areas.

All of that historical context is informing SOF's priorities today, as the US faces similar challenges against China and Russia and their activities across the world, Maier said.

"The differences, I think, here are some of the fundamental changes in adversaries' ability to access technology," he added, and their ability to "use different types of techniques than maybe we saw in the Cold War."

Both China and Russia are actively engaged in bolstering their irregular warfare tactics, including reconnaissance, disinformation, electronic warfare, cyberspace and space efforts, and psychological warfare.

In its report on China's military growth over the course of 2023, the Pentagon noted that China is expanding its capabilities towards a vision of future conflict it calls "intelligentized warfare" focused on AI, data, and controlling information spaces.

Other elements, such as China's campaigns in Taiwan to influence domestic politics and opinions on unification, are also notable.

• China's special forces have serious problems that would limit their effectiveness in a Taiwan war.
• Chinese manuals suggest these forces would perform the most dangerous missions before landings.
• China lacks units with the highest levels of training but their bigger challenge would be coordination.

If China invades Taiwan, China's special forces would be key to its success, the first forces ashore to clear obstacles for inbound troops and then to scout for command centers and air defenses for airstrikes.

China has expanded the ranks of its special operators, but they lack the combat experience and esprit de corps that defines the world's most elite operators — raising questions about their utility in a major operation. Indeed, some commando units have been brought to strength by conscripts.

Special operations forces, or SOF, "likely would play important supporting roles in an amphibious assault on Taiwan," according to analysts John Chen and Joel Wuthnow in a new book published by the China Maritime Studies Institute at the US Naval War College.

Special forces have long been integral to amphibious warfare. In World War II, US Navy Underwater Demolition Teams scouted beaches and removed obstacles prior to an invasion. In the 1982 Falklands War, the main landing wasn't authorized until British special forces could assess Argentine defenses, even if this required the Royal Navy to sail into the teeth of Argentine air attacks to get within helicopter range of the islands.

China's SOF comprises 20,000 to 30,000 personnel, according to a 2023 U.S. Department of Defense report; US Special Operations Command, by contrast, has 70,000 active and reserve personnel. China's SOF includes 15 army brigades, as well as special operations units in the People Liberation Army Marine Corps, Airborne Corps, and Rocket Force. Even the People's Armed Police (PAP) — a paramilitary organization tasked with internal security — has counterterrorist special operations units that could be used to spearhead an invasion or suppress Taiwanese guerrillas afterwards.

Chinese military manuals suggest that these elite forces would perform the most dangerous missions that start before the main landings. These include "monitoring weather and hydrological conditions; scouting enemy positions and movements, as well as enemy obstructions in the main landing approaches; tracking high-value enemy targets; identifying and illuminating targets for conventional precision-guided missile strikes; and conducting battle-damage assessments," Chen and Wuthnow wrote.

Chinese special forces seem fairly well-trained and have better equipment than regular formations. They have "priority access to modern equipment, such as individual-soldier communications systems and night-vision equipment," wrote Chen and Wuthnow. "They also are likely to have access to special-mission equipment that would be vital in an amphibious assault on Taiwan," such as underwater transport vehicles.

While Western special forces would be horrified at the thought of being assigned conscripts, China does select the better draftees. "Their SOF units do use some conscripts to fill the enlisted ranks as with other parts of the PLA," Wuthnow told Business Insider. "That said, they use rigorous screening and selection procedures to weed out less capable troops. For the PLANMC SOF Brigade, their attrition rate is advertised at 50% or higher in the first three months due to the rigorous training. So it would be considered an honor in their system to be selected and make it through the initial onboarding."

But China's special forces have serious problems that would limit their effectiveness in an assault on Taiwan. Chinese SOF have many differences from their Western counterparts: some brigades converted from conventional formations into commando units as China expanded its special operations capabilities, which lack the elite teams that train for the most complex and difficult missions.

"PLA SOF brigades are similar to our Green Berets, who do conduct unconventional operations, such as direct raids or deep reconnaissance behind enemy lines," Wuthnow said. "What the PLA lacks is what we call Tier One SOF Forces such as Delta Force or Seal Team 6, which conduct exceptionally difficult operations abroad, often in very small or clandestine teams."

"I think they look on our ability to conduct those types of operations with a certain envy, especially because their troops have no similar experience," Wuthnow added.

Special forces units are also supposed to attract soldiers who can take initiative. But Chinese special forces suffer from the same rigid command and control, as well as political monitoring, that hampers China's regular military units, and Russian forces in Ukraine.

"Generally, there is a tension between the Leninist emphasis on centralization and the need to grant autonomy to lower-level PLA commanders," according to Chen and Wuthnow. "This could be especially problematic in special operations; centralized command could lead to poor performance if small units fail to act because of a lack of explicit authorization, or if they are forced to maintain radio communications and thus reveal their positions to the enemy."

Perhaps the biggest problem with Chinese special forces is lack of integration. A proper amphibious invasion is like a Hollywood musical: an intricate, coordinated mix of ground, naval and aerial forces, as well as missiles, drones and information operations. The US military emphasizes joint operations, and China has taken a step toward that by creating five multiservice theater commands.

But for lightly armed commandos infiltrating Taiwan before the main assault on the beaches, tactical integration is key. "The lack of permanent joint structures below the theater level could diminish the effectiveness of joint operations involving special forces, potentially leading to catastrophic results similar to the failed U.S. hostage-rescue attempt in Iran during Operation Eagle Claw," wrote Chen and Wuthnow.

Still, despite their limitations, Chinese special forces could disrupt Taiwanese defenses enough to enable an amphibious assault to succeed. "Even partly effective special operations could hamper Taiwan's defenses and thus should be addressed explicitly in defensive concepts," Chen and Wuthnow warned. The authors recommend that Taiwan "identify PLA weaknesses, such as a lack of technical proficiency, limited jointness, and potential overreliance on radio communications for command and control, and tailor responses accordingly."

"PLA SOF would be integral to any amphibious invasion of Taiwan," said Wuthnow. "They could also be employed in smaller-scale island seizure campaigns such as we might see in the South China Sea. That being said, it's also the case that these troops have essentially no real-world experience and as an untested force would face difficulties in these high-risk missions."

Michael Peck is a defense writer whose work has appeared in Forbes, Defense News, Foreign Policy magazine, and other publications. He holds an MA in political science from Rutgers Univ. Follow him on Twitter and LinkedIn.