• Perceptions of weakness dogged Jimmy Carter's presidency and legacy.
• Carter inherited a struggling economy and a US military adrift after Vietnam.
• But his administration played key parts in countering the Soviets and rising extremism.

When the Soviet Union dissolved in 1991, the man who received the most credit was Ronald Reagan. The Republican president's bellicose policies and tough rhetoric — he called it an "evil empire" — were seen as ultimately forcing the Soviets into an arms race they couldn't afford. And Reagan seemed particularly strong compared to his predecessor, Jimmy Carter.

Almost from the start of his Democratic administration in 1977, Carter was criticized for being weak on national security. Never mind that he was an Annapolis graduate who served as a US Navy submarine officer, including being selected for duty on new nuclear-powered submarines. But these perceptions of his supposed weakness bear revisiting after his December 29 death, as Carter played key roles in countering the Soviets and Islamist extremists in the Middle East.

Carter — along with his predecessor Gerald Ford — had the misfortune of inheriting a national security mess. The US military of the late 1970s was called the "hollow force:" Strong on paper but crippled by poor readiness, racial tensions, and unmotivated recruits who dabbled in drugs as the armed forces shifted to an all-volunteer force.

Battered by inflation, soaring gas prices, and the lingering trauma of Vietnam, the American public was not inclined toward more war or defense spending. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union appeared to be at the height of its power, as Moscow fielded new missiles and tanks, and Soviet and Cuban forces intervened in the Angolan Civil War.

Carter entered the White House with a moralist vision of foreign policy, the polar opposite of Richard Nixon's and Henry Kissinger's realpolitik. He wanted to emphasize human rights and international cooperation. But like previous high-minded presidents such as Harry S. Truman, he evolved into more of a hawk.

Though he had campaigned in 1976 on a pledge to cut the defense budget, Carter oversaw a defense buildup that by 1980 called for a 14% annual budget increase (actually closer to 5% after inflation). This included new M1 tanks, cargo planes, a new ICBM (the MX, which was eventually canceled), and higher pay for military personnel.

He also canceled what he saw as boondoggles, such as the B-1 bomber. He also ended the controversial neutron bomb project, a small nuclear weapon that produced more radiation than blast, and which detractors saw as the ultimate capitalist weapon (it "seems desirable to those who worry about property and hold life cheap," warned science-fiction author Isaac Asimov).

In the pre-green energy days of the 1970s, securing the West's oil supply was paramount. Worried that 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan created a springboard for a Soviet invasion through Iran and Afghanistan to the oil-rich Persian Gulf, Carter laid down the "Carter Doctrine."

"Let our position be absolutely clear," Carter warned in his State of the Union address on Jan. 23, 1980. "An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force."

The Carter administration created the Rapid Deployment Force, which could be dispatched to any crisis zone in the world (though it was really aimed at the Persian Gulf). On paper, it seemed a powerful force: the 82nd Airborne and 101st Airmobile Divisions, a Marine division and "light" Army divisions, all backed by Navy carriers and Air Force fighter wings. Yet critics questioned how rapid the RDF could be given limited transport capacity, and wondered how lightly armed paratroopers and Marines would fare in the desert against Soviet armor.

Carter sought strategic arms control through the SALT II treaty with the Soviet Union (he asked the Senate not to ratify the treaty after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan). Yet after Moscow deployed SS-20 intermediate-range ballistic missiles in Eastern Europe, Carter responded by calling for both diplomacy — and US Pershing II missiles to be stationed in Western Europe.

Carter's critics lambasted his emphasis on human rights, such as the Helsinki Accords, as hopelessly naive. Yet a focus on human rights spurred dissidents, such as the Solidarity movement in Poland, that ultimately weakened the Soviet empire. The Camp David Accords, which brokered peace between Israel and Egypt, dampened Soviet influence in the Middle East and turned Moscow's former client Egypt into an American ally.

In the end, Carter fell victim to the perception that he was a weak president. His biggest albatross was Iran's 444-day seizure of the US Embassy in Tehran: even when Carter authorized a risky rescue mission, the botched operation to free 52 Americans failed.

Against a vigorous and masterful communicator like Ronald Reagan, who touted military strength and confrontation with the Soviet Union as more than a necessity but a virtue, Carter appeared lacking. He was defeated by a landslide in the 1980 election.

There were many reasons why the Soviet Union collapsed. The biggest cause was the decrepit Soviet economy; Mikhail Gorbachev and the new generation of Soviet leaders recognized it was not sustainable, but failed to reform it in time.

To say that Jimmy Carter — or Ronald Reagan — were instrumental by themselves in defeating the Soviet Union would be an exaggeration. It is more accurate to say that Carter continued a tradition — dating back to Truman and the early days of the Cold War — of confronting the Soviet threat. Carter doesn't deserve all the credit, but he deserves his share.

Michael Peck is a defense writer whose work has appeared in Forbes, Defense News, Foreign Policy magazine, and other publications. He holds an MA in political science from Rutgers Univ. Follow him on Twitter and LinkedIn.

• The US military's war plan for fighting zombies began from a training scenario.
• It focuses on identifying the enemy, designating vital infrastructure, and coordinating forces.
• The US military has real-world experience in responding to disasters and outbreaks.

If zombies attack, the US military has a plan. Really.

Upon authorization from the president or the defense secretary, US Strategic Command will begin preparations for safeguarding the civilian population, protecting vital infrastructure, and eradicating the zombie menace.

And all without violating the rights of threatened humans and possibly the zombies themselves.

"This plan was not actually designed as a joke," explains CONPLAN 8888-11 ("Counter Zombie Dominance"), issued on April 30, 2011 by USSTRATCOM, whose normal responsibilities include overseeing America's strategic nuclear weapons, global strike capabilities and missile defense.

It originated as a scenario to train junior officers in the Department of Defense's Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES), by which the US military devises contingency plans. Instructors discovered that a zombie apocalypse scenario was a better teaching tool than using fictional scenarios about Tunisia or Nigeria as was customary at the time, which also risked being misunderstood by the public as real scenarios.

"We elected to use a completely impossible scenario that could never be mistaken as a real plan," explained the CONPLAN 8888-11 document. "Because the plan was so ridiculous, our students not only enjoyed the lessons; they actually were able to explore the basic concepts of plan and order development (fact, assumptions, specified and implied tasks, references etc.) very effectively."

With tongue in cheek — or shot to the head — the plan lays out how USSTRATCOM will handle a global uprising of the undead. When the US military goes on Zombie Condition (ZombieCon) alert, Strategic Command will begin defensive operations to protect the human population, and offensive operations to neutralize zombies by "denial, deception, disruption, degradation or destruction."

Those looking for tactical tips on killing flesh-eating monsters will be disappointed. CONPLAN 8888-11 is a staff plan that focuses on identifying the enemy, designating vital infrastructure such as food, power and medical care, and coordinating friendly forces.

Taking full advantage of abundant open-source intelligence on the undead, planners mined classic movies and popular video games, such as "World War Z," "Night of the Living Dead," and "Plants vs Zombies," to devise a typology of zombies. These include those infected by a virus or mutated by radiation, as well as those caused by magic, extraterrestrials, and human engineering ("Weaponized Zombies"). There are also vegetarian zombies, which consume grain and thus threaten the US food supply.

Like any predator, zombies will go where their prey can be found. Undead armies are expected to focus on cities, as well as water sources (humans need water, but zombies don't). While zombies don't drive vehicles, preferring walking or running with outstretched arms, roads will be crucial transportation arteries for human soldiers as well as crowds of refugees.

CONPLAN 8888-11 is a multiphase plan to put down a zombie outbreak. Preparations will begin prewar with USSTRATCOM and intelligence agencies surveillance to detect "disease vectors that could cause zombieism."

The US government will also try to deter anyone from creating zombies. "It is important to note that zombies are not cognizant life-forms," USSTRATCOM pointed out. "As such, they cannot be

deterred or reasoned with in any way. However, there are zombie-inducing forces that can be deterred from further action. These forces include but are not limited to nation states and terrorist groups with [weapons of mass destruction] programs, and unethical bio-research companies."

Once the outbreak begins, American forces will mobilize, though CONPLAN 8888-11 cautions that to avoid rattling Russia and China, there must be "confidence-building measures to ensure leaders within these nations do not construe USSTRATCOM preparations to counter zombie-dominance as preparations for war."

Within 40 days after the outbreak, the US military will on the offensive. Once the zombies have been wiped, USSTRATCOM will assess the damage and begin reestablishing civil authority. Though some other organization will have to provide the zombie-busting boots on the ground to hold off the Zombie horde far so the military can strike it with overwhelming firepower. "USSTRATCOM has no ground combat forces capable of repelling a zombie assault," CONPLAN 8888-11 notes. "USSTRATCOM can only deliver synchronized fires against a zombie threat via strategic air, space and maritime forces."

This could include nuclear weapons. USSTRATCOM must "maintain emergency plans to employ nuclear weapons within CONUS [continental United States] to eradicate zombie hordes," according to the plan.

One potential hurdle to deploying the US military is lawfare. Laws such as the Insurrection and the Posse Comitatus Acts strictly limit the deployment of the US military in domestic affairs. Though martial law would almost certainly be declared in the event of a mass zombie plague, deployment against undead who were formerly living US citizens could raise questions of Constitutional rights, as well as various international treaties and UN charters governing human rights and the conduct of war.

The question is whether zombies are still US citizens or pathogens who can be killed. "US and international law regulate military operations only insofar as human and animal life are concerned," CONPLAN 8888-11 argued. "There are almost no restrictions on hostile actions that may be taken either defensively or offensively against pathogenic life forms, organic-robotic entities, or 'traditional' zombies."

Though meant as a fun training exercise, would USSTRATCOM's plan actually work? The US military obviously lacks experience in counter-zombie operations but has been involved in infectious disease response like the 2014 Ebola outbreak in West Africa. It has also gained a lot of experience in responding to natural catastrophes and manmade disasters, as well as reestablishing civil authority in devastated places such as post-World War II Europe and the Middle East.

Fictional movies and books about zombies abound. We can only hope this is one real-life contingency plan that never gets dusted off.

Michael Peck is a defense writer whose work has appeared in Forbes, Defense News, Foreign Policy magazine, and other publications. He holds an MA in political science from Rutgers Univ. Follow him on Twitter and LinkedIn.

• A drone pilot argues a massive drone swarm could clear a path through enemy lines.
• Ukraine's Illya Sekirin calls for 40,000 drones to barrage at 6-mile wide sector.
• His vision calls for using drones similar to how tanks were employed a century ago.

Behind the minefields and obstacles, the enemy waits in their entrenchments, poised to strike at tanks and infantry trying to advance through the treacherous ground. Instead, tens of thousands of drones descend on their positions, blowing up vehicles, artillery, and bunkers and clearing a path for friendly ground troops.

This is the vision of a Ukrainian combat drone pilot who believes that armies need to create a separate branch for uncrewed aircraft system (UAS) and electromagnetic warfare — and go on the attack.

"Breakthroughs with large mechanized formations are becoming a thing of the past and static warfare, like the positional stalemate in Ukraine, appears to be the new norm," wrote Illya Sekirin in an article for the British Army Review, "As a result, the role of the UAS and electromagnetic warfare branch would be particularly useful in breaching enemy fortified positions through the use of massed offensive actions."

Drones — along with artillery — have become the dominant weapons in the Ukraine war. In particular, while tanks are still a major weapon on the battlefield, they no longer enjoy the dominance they once had. Hordes of small first-person-view (FPV) drones have made life hazardous for hulking, expensive weapons such as armored vehicles and artillery pieces, which now operate cautiously and under the protection of air defense and electronic warfare systems.

"FPV drones (also known as loitering munitions) have become so effective that they, at a cost of around $350 to $450 per asset, can now be described as the Ukrainian army's principal anti-tank weapon," wrote Sekirin, who has combat experience operating the DJI Mavic 3, a piloted drone popular with hobbyists as well as Ukrainian soldiers.

Sekirin wants to take this to the next level. Breaching fortified lines, as both the Russians and Ukrainians have learned the hard way, is a complex and fraught operation that often results in heavy casualties to the assault troops. Sekirin's alternative: using immense numbers of drones to blast a hole in enemy defenses that creates breathing room for assault troops.

"For example, 40,000 drones that would attack in waves to destroy enemy forces in a frontline area 10 kilometers [6 miles] and 20 kilometers [12 miles] deep, with a resulting drone attack density of 200 UASs per square kilometer," Sekirin wrote. "This drone attack would simultaneously provide accurate covering fire to friendly mine-clearing vehicles and advancing mechanized infantry units tasked with capturing the area. Through the resulting breach of the frontline, conventional maneuver forces could then enter to gain the operational initiative."

Sekirin argues that using drones for breaching operations saves money and reduces friendly casualties. "If the price of an average attack drone is presumed to be $500, drones would cost $20 million, which is roughly equivalent to the price of just two Ml Abrams tanks. 40,000 UASs would also constitute only 0.8 percent of worldwide consumer drone shipments (five million units were shipped in 2020), suggesting that production and supply issues would not be an issue."

This goes well beyond drone use in the nearly three-year war, which has mostly been to try to disable vehicles and to stalk small groups of soldiers. Making drones into a massive strike force would require enhanced communication and tactics to limit friendly fire on advancing troops, who can resemble those of their enemy on grainy video or infrared feeds.

What is ironic is that a century ago, tanks were invented precisely as a means to breach the fortified trench lines of the First World War that had largely been closely defended by machine guns. World War II saw armies rely on masses of tanks not just to penetrate defense lines, but also to use their mobility and firepower to smash enemy forces and capture vast amounts of territory.

Thus, Sekirin's concept would have drones assume the historical role of tanks. But that raises questions in itself. As soon as tanks made their debut in 1916, it quickly became clear that they were not a miracle solution for battlefield problems. Armored vehicles then and now are vulnerable to a variety of weapons, which means they must use combined arms tactics in which they coordinate with other arms such as infantry, artillery, engineers and aircraft.

Because they are cheap and easy to manufacture in quantity, it would be tempting for armies — and penny-pinching politicians — to rely on a massive fleet of drones at the expense of traditional breaching systems such as combat engineers and mine-clearing tanks. But just as tanks became vulnerable to mines, anti-tank rockets and now drones, the drones themselves will likely fall prey to countermeasures such as jamming (which already is disrupting UAV operations in the Ukraine war), as well as projectile weapons and intercept drones.

A horde of 40,000 drones would be an impressive and scary sight. But it is no panacea.

Michael Peck is a defense writer whose work has appeared in Forbes, Defense News, Foreign Policy magazine, and other publications. He holds an MA in political science from Rutgers Univ. Follow him on Twitter and LinkedIn.

• Expendable troops are essential to Russia's costly advance in Ukraine.
• Criminals allow Russia to expand its army without resorting to a larger mobilization.
• Convict troops may be more useful in urban warfare than in open terrain or mechanized warfare.

To Westerners, the solution was inhuman. To compensate for the dismal performance of its troops in the early months of the Ukraine war, Russia formed assault units of convicts and other "expendables" in 2023.

But for Vladimir Putin's government — to whom only victory mattered — sending waves of suicide troops who can absorb real bullets has enabled more valued Russian regulars to seize more ground from Ukraine.

The laboratory for this ruthless approach came at the Battle of Bakhmut in late 2022 and early 2023, when the Wagner Group — a mercenary outfit — employed assault units mostly composed of convicts pardoned in return for fighting in Ukraine. This approach combined with area-battering of glide-bombing has outlasted Wagner Group's involvement, allowing Russian forces to seize more land without triggering the unrest back home that could threaten Putin's rule.

"Wagner — and the battle for Bakhmut, to some extent — became a test bed for Russian forces to determine how best to exploit convicts as an expendable force," researcher Michael Kofman wrote in a study of Russian military adaptation for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace think tank in Washington, D.C. "Wagner's methods were brutal and coercive, but effective. The Russian military was interested in the latter and less concerned with the former."

Turning criminals into soldiers isn't a new idea. Judges in America routinely offered defendants a choice between going to jail or going into the service (today's US military frowns on applicants with criminal records, though waivers are possible). But Russia has taken this to a new level out of deep need. After suffering an estimated 700,000 troops to death, injury or desertion in the nearly three years of its war in Ukraine, Russia should be resorting to mass conscription to replace its losses.

Criminals provide an easy pool of expendable manpower without sparking popular discontent among the Russian public over the draft. As for the criminals, the fact that many volunteer for suicide squads says much about conditions in Russian prisons.

Not that Russia has ever been particularly solicitous about the lives of its soldiers. In World War II, the Red Army frequently used penal battalions for tasks such as clearing minefields under fire. But even by those standards, Wagner was ruthless. Its tactics "depended on simplicity and severe punishment to enforce compliance," Kofman wrote. Soldiers who refused to advance, or retreated without orders, were simply executed.

Wagner warfare was waged on the cheap. "Convict units were given cheap commercial cell phones without SIM cards," wrote Kofman. "The phones had offline maps installed with numerically indicated waypoints and GPS. Wagner commanders would order assault groups to move forward with these preset waypoints over cheap, unencrypted radios, and the convict assault groups would pass back their locations with code words."

One of the tragedies of the Ukraine war is that these tactics have some efficacy for nations willing to treat their citizens as disposable. After nearly a year of bitter combat, Bakhmut was captured in May 2023. Russia may have suffered as many as 100,000 dead and wounded, according to the US government.

"The attrition ratio was favorable to Ukraine, at an average rate of one to four in terms of those killed or seriously wounded, with the bulk of Russian casualties coming from convict-staffed formations employed by Wagner," Kofman wrote. "Publicly available sources suggest that 88 percent of Wagner's losses over the course of the battle for Bakhmut were among convicts."

Ukrainian losses were smaller but more keenly felt. "The fight drained experienced personnel on the Ukrainian side, while the Russian military could concentrate artillery, and expendable infantry formations around Bakhmut in a grinding attritional battle," Kofman noted.

Ironically, while the Russian military has been criticized for rigid tactics, the Wagner convict units proved adaptable under desperate circumstances. For example, the selection of its leaders was impromptu. "Wagner regulars determined who the best convicts were during training, and they would be appointed as the commanders of assault groups," wrote Kofman.

In some cases, the convict units infiltrated and enveloped Ukrainian positions. In others, they attempted to overwhelm the Ukrainians with multiple waves coming from different directions. Ukrainians returning fire disclosed their positions and repeated Wagner attacks aimed to expend their ammunition. Once the convicts had worn down the Ukrainians, Wagner regular (non-convict) troops would go to finish the job.

"Execution was tactically flexible, with units changing course of action depending on the conditions," the report said. "If a position was too strong, they could switch to another."

"The main factors enabling Wagner's operations were availability of expendable convicts from Russia's prison system, artillery support from the Russian army which provided a fires advantage, and the presence of supporting Russian units holding Wagner's flanks to secure their campaign."

Wagner's power in Russia ebbed after its leader, Yevgeny Prigozhin, died in a mysterious plane crash in 2023 after mutinying against the Putin regime. Its mercenaries have found profitable employment overseas, especially in mineral-rich and human rights-challenged countries in Africa whose governments need military support against Islamist groups and other insurgents.

But Wagner's legacy lives on in what Kofman calls the "Wagnerization" of the Russian military. The Russian army now relies on Storm-Z (now Storm-V) assault units manned by ill-trained and ill-equipped convicts. Soldiers complain their chance of surviving the war is no more than 25%, according to the BBC.

The question is whether the convict-soldier concept is effective. The Carnegie study suggests they are in some cases, especially in urban warfare, where structures provide more cover for small units of lightly armed infantry to get within striking distance of enemy strongpoints and armor. But convict units haven't fared well in open terrain and in mechanized warfare where tanks and other heavy weapons are needed. As such, they are best used as auxiliaries for regular troops. Wave assaults over open ground fed to the soaring toll as Russia advanced in November.

Either way, the Russian people pay the price. Those convicts who survive the war come home to their communities as free citizens, where some commit the same crimes — such as murder — that got them jailed in the first place.

Michael Peck is a defense writer whose work has appeared in Forbes, Defense News, Foreign Policy magazine, and other publications. He holds an MA in political science from Rutgers Univ. Follow him on Twitter and LinkedIn.

• The Ukraine war is a wake-up call for NATO to stockpile more ammunition.
• NATO states need more ammo and defense production to replace losses in a long war.
• Powers like Russia and China have invested in huge numbers of artillery.

The Ukraine war shows that the theory behind NATO's combat doctrine is sound. The problem is that Britain and many other NATO allies lack the resources to implement it, a new report argues.

There is not "compelling evidence to suggest that the war necessitates fundamental changes to key ideas and terms in UK or Allied joint operational-level doctrine, such as the maneuverist approach, the comprehensive approach or mission command," according to the RAND Europe think tank, which reviewed open-source literature on the Ukraine war at the behest of the United Kingdom's Ministry of Defense. The report counters other experts who've argued that the West's maneuver strategy for ground combat faces increasing threats.

But to win a large conflict like Ukraine, NATO lacks sufficient equipment and ammunition. The Ukraine war has been marked by heavy losses of armored vehicles and artillery, as well as massive expenditure of munitions that have strained the economies of the combatants. NATO stockpiles and defense manufacturing capacity had already dwindled after the end of the Cold War: providing a steady supply of armaments to Ukraine while replenishing their stockpiles has proven extremely challenging.

"The published literature on Ukraine suggests that the most pressing question is not whether NATO and the UK's joint doctrine is appropriate, but rather whether sufficient resources are available to credibly implement those ideas and principles as envisaged, especially over the course of a long war," RAND warned.

Ukraine is a conflict of contradictions, where 21st-century technologies such as drones exist alongside artillery barrages and trench warfare straight from 1917. While militaries want to learn the lessons for future wars, distinguishing what's old from what's new — and what are specific features of the Ukraine war versus permanent trends — isn't easy.

For example, what is the future of airpower? Crewed aircraft have had a surprisingly limited impact on the Ukraine war, as have helicopters. "The deployment of [ground-based air defenses] has underscored the poor survivability of rotary-wing assets on both sides, with a reduced use of platforms including helicopters for tactical air mobility maneuvers and [casualty evacuation], compared with operations in Afghanistan and Iraq," RAND said. The sheer numbers and accuracy of air defenses like the Patriot (Ukraine) or S-300 and S-400s (Russia) force jets to fly at a remove from the battlefield, one of the reasons the battlefield's lines are largely static.

These issues are hardly academic for NATO militaries. They operate the world's most numerous and advanced air forces, outgrowths from the Cold War strategy of using tactical airpower to stall and fracture the Soviet Union's numerically superior ground forces. If their use is now much more limited, it suggests NATO armies will face a much more difficult ground fight.

Drones have largely replaced crewed aircraft for reconnaissance and attack missions. And, small, expendable drones have replaced larger UAVs such as the Turkish-made Bayraktar 2 strike drone that Ukraine used with devastating effect in the early days of the war. Yet massive use of drones has failed to provide either side with victory.

Ukraine has tried to shed its Soviet-era doctrine in favor of Western-style maneuver warfare, with limited but not decisive success. Russia has used massive artillery barrages and human-wave assaults — the same tactics the Red Army used against the Germans in World War II — to achieve steady but incremental gains at ferocious cost; by one estimate, November was the highest month for Russian soldiers killed and wounded in the entire war.

"Without airpower, neither maneuver nor positional warfare have led to a decisive strategic outcome, but claims in the literature about the demise of such approaches are premature," said RAND.

The apparent neutralization of airpower is bad news for NATO. Western nations have tended to invest in aircraft rather than building huge numbers of artillery pieces, as Russia and China have done.

RAND does see several enduring lessons of the Ukraine war for NATO. One is having adequate quantities of personnel and material to absorb and replenish the constant drain of combat losses in a long war. "While the efficiency afforded by new technology can offset the need for mass in certain situations, it cannot replace the general need for mass. We have not yet observed any game-changing technology or tactic that negates the need for critical mass in personnel, infrastructure, materiel and stockpiles."

These issues are especially acute for the UK. The British Army is shrinking to 72,000 soldiers — its lowest level since the Napoleonic Wars — while the Royal Navy and Air Force are also a fraction of their Cold War strength. In the event of a war with Russia, such as an invasion of Poland or Eastern Europe, the UK might barely be able to scrape together a full-strength mechanized division.

The RAND study also examines how military power emerges from more than just weapons and strategy. For example, the Kremlin's worst error was to underestimate the resolve of the Ukrainian people and government to preserve their independence as a nation. "The war has re-emphasized the importance of a narrative and audience-centric approaches. This includes the crucial but often overlooked role of a national will to fight — a topic extensively analyzed at RAND but often overlooked, especially in Western defense establishments.^"

Perhaps the biggest lesson of the Ukraine war is the importance of adaptability. Ukraine and Russia have proven rigid in some ways, but quite adaptable in others, such as mastering the use of drones. "Technological trends towards automation, process optimization and a more transparent, networked and data-rich battlespace aside, the war has for example reiterated the enduring impact of uncertainty and friction in complicating operations," RAND said.

This means NATO must constantly reassess its doctrine. The Ukraine war "emphasizes the crucial distinction between innovation (combining old with new) vs adaptation (to counter the enemy's new tactics) and the need to promote both (not necessarily prioritizing the new)," RAND concluded.

Michael Peck is a defense writer whose work has appeared in Forbes, Defense News, Foreign Policy magazine, and other publications. He holds an MA in political science from Rutgers Univ. Follow him on Twitter and LinkedIn.

• Israel invoked a WWII precedent in trying to justify its pre-emptive strikes in Syria.
• During WWII, the Royal Navy attacked the fleet of its former ally to keep it from Nazi control.
• Both operations were borne in atmospheres of fear and crisis.

When Israel sank six Syrian warships at the port of Latakia this week amid larger attacks on the military remnants of the ousted Assad regime, Israel's leader invoked a precedent from World War II.

"This is similar to what the British Air Force did when it bombed the fleet of the Vichy regime, which was cooperating with the Nazis, so that it would not fall into the Nazis' hands," Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said.

Though Netanyahu's history was faulty — it was the Royal Navy rather than the RAF that struck the French fleet — his analogy was revealing. The attack on the port of Mers-el-Kebir on July 3, 1940, has gone down as either a courageous decision that saved Britain — or a treacherous and needless backstab of an ally.

At the least, it is one of Britain's most controversial decisions of the Second World War. Like Israel today, the British acted amid an atmosphere of crisis, haste and uncertainty. The Israeli goal is to keep the now-deposed Syrian government's huge arsenal — which includes chemical weapons and ballistic missiles — from falling into the hands of rebel groups, which are dominated by Islamic militants. For Britain, the goal was to keep Adolf Hitler's hands off the French fleet, the fourth-largest navy in the world in 1940.

In that chaotic summer of 1940, the situation looked grim. The German blitzkrieg had just conquered France and Western Europe, while the cream of the British Army had barely been evacuated — minus their equipment — from Dunkirk. If the Germans could launch an amphibious assault across the English Channel, the British Army was in no condition to repel them.

However, Operation Sealion — the Nazi German plan to invade Britain — had its own problems. The Kriegsmarine — the German Navy — was a fraction of the size of the Royal Navy, and thus too small to escort vulnerable troop transports. But Britain's Prime Minister Winston Churchill had to contemplate a situation he had never expected: a combined German-French battlefleet.

Technically, France had only agreed to an armistice — a permanent cease-fire — with Germany rather than surrender. France would be divided between German-occupied northern zone, and a nominally independent rump state of Vichy comprising southern France and the colonies of the French Empire. Vichy France would be allowed a meager army, and the French Navy would be confined to its home ports.

The British didn't trust French promises that its ships would be scuttled if the Germans tried to seize them. Why had France signed a separate peace with Germany after earlier pledging not to? Why didn't the French government choose to go into exile, and continue the war from its North African colonies as the British urged? London was well aware that the right-wing Vichy government — under Field Marshal Philippe Pétain, hero of the First World War — had more affection for the Third Reich than it did for Britain. With Germany master of Europe, Pétain sneered that Britain would soon "have its neck wrung like a chicken."

After Vichy rebuffed pleas to send the fleet to British ports, Churchill and his ministers decided the risk was too great. In late June 1940, the Royal Navy received orders for Operation Catapult. A task force — including the aircraft carrier Ark Royal and three battleships and battlecruisers — would be dispatched to the French naval base at Mers-el-Kebir, near the Algerian port of Oran. A powerful French squadron of four battleships and six destroyers were docked there, including the new battleships Dunkerque and Strasbourg.

The French were to be given six hours to respond to an ultimatum: sail their ships to British ports and fight the Germans, sail them to French Caribbean ports and sit out the war, demilitarize their ships at Mers-el-Kebir, or scuttle their vessels. When the local French commander tried to delay while summoning reinforcements, the British opened fire.

The ensuing battle was not the Royal Navy's most glorious. Caught in every admiral's nightmare — unprepared ships anchored in port — the French were simply smothered by British gunfire. The battleship Bretagne and two destroyers were sunk, two other battleships damaged, and 1,297 French sailors perished. The British suffered two dead.

This was no repeat of the Battle of Trafalgar, when the Royal Navy smashed a Franco-Spanish fleet off Spain in 1805. Most ships at Mers-el-Kebir were damaged rather than sunk, and the French fleet quickly relocated its scattered vessels to the heavily defended French port at Toulon (where they were scuttled in November 1942 when German troops occupied Vichy). Though Vichy didn't declare war on Britain — and only retaliated with a few minor attacks on British bases — it confirmed old French prejudices about British treachery and "perfidious Albion."

Britain's attack on Mers-el-Kebir was political as much as military. In the summer of 1940, many people — including some in the United States — believed that the British would be conquered or compelled to make peace with a victorious Germany. Churchill argued that Britain had to show its resolve to keep on fighting, not least if it hoped to persuade America to send tanks, ships and war materials via a Lend-Lease deal. Attacking a former ally may have been a demonstration of British resolve.

Israel's situation does not resemble that of Britain in 1940. Syria has never been an ally of Israel. The two nations have had an armistice since 1949, punctuated by multiple wars and clashes over the years. Britain acted out of a sense of weakness, while Israel is confident enough of its strength to hit targets in Syria.

Yet by citing Mers-el-Kebir as a precedent, Netanyahu proved a golden rule of international relations that applied in 1940 and still applies today: Nations always act in their own interests. Faced with a choice between respecting a former ally and defending Britain from invasion, Churchill chose the latter. Netanyahu didn't hesitate to do the same.

Michael Peck is a defense writer whose work has appeared in Forbes, Defense News, Foreign Policy magazine, and other publications. He holds an MA in political science from Rutgers Univ. Follow him on Twitter and LinkedIn.

• China's special forces have serious problems that would limit their effectiveness in a Taiwan war.
• Chinese manuals suggest these forces would perform the most dangerous missions before landings.
• China lacks units with the highest levels of training but their bigger challenge would be coordination.

If China invades Taiwan, China's special forces would be key to its success, the first forces ashore to clear obstacles for inbound troops and then to scout for command centers and air defenses for airstrikes.

China has expanded the ranks of its special operators, but they lack the combat experience and esprit de corps that defines the world's most elite operators — raising questions about their utility in a major operation. Indeed, some commando units have been brought to strength by conscripts.

Special operations forces, or SOF, "likely would play important supporting roles in an amphibious assault on Taiwan," according to analysts John Chen and Joel Wuthnow in a new book published by the China Maritime Studies Institute at the US Naval War College.

Special forces have long been integral to amphibious warfare. In World War II, US Navy Underwater Demolition Teams scouted beaches and removed obstacles prior to an invasion. In the 1982 Falklands War, the main landing wasn't authorized until British special forces could assess Argentine defenses, even if this required the Royal Navy to sail into the teeth of Argentine air attacks to get within helicopter range of the islands.

China's SOF comprises 20,000 to 30,000 personnel, according to a 2023 U.S. Department of Defense report; US Special Operations Command, by contrast, has 70,000 active and reserve personnel. China's SOF includes 15 army brigades, as well as special operations units in the People Liberation Army Marine Corps, Airborne Corps, and Rocket Force. Even the People's Armed Police (PAP) — a paramilitary organization tasked with internal security — has counterterrorist special operations units that could be used to spearhead an invasion or suppress Taiwanese guerrillas afterwards.

Chinese military manuals suggest that these elite forces would perform the most dangerous missions that start before the main landings. These include "monitoring weather and hydrological conditions; scouting enemy positions and movements, as well as enemy obstructions in the main landing approaches; tracking high-value enemy targets; identifying and illuminating targets for conventional precision-guided missile strikes; and conducting battle-damage assessments," Chen and Wuthnow wrote.

Chinese special forces seem fairly well-trained and have better equipment than regular formations. They have "priority access to modern equipment, such as individual-soldier communications systems and night-vision equipment," wrote Chen and Wuthnow. "They also are likely to have access to special-mission equipment that would be vital in an amphibious assault on Taiwan," such as underwater transport vehicles.

While Western special forces would be horrified at the thought of being assigned conscripts, China does select the better draftees. "Their SOF units do use some conscripts to fill the enlisted ranks as with other parts of the PLA," Wuthnow told Business Insider. "That said, they use rigorous screening and selection procedures to weed out less capable troops. For the PLANMC SOF Brigade, their attrition rate is advertised at 50% or higher in the first three months due to the rigorous training. So it would be considered an honor in their system to be selected and make it through the initial onboarding."

But China's special forces have serious problems that would limit their effectiveness in an assault on Taiwan. Chinese SOF have many differences from their Western counterparts: some brigades converted from conventional formations into commando units as China expanded its special operations capabilities, which lack the elite teams that train for the most complex and difficult missions.

"PLA SOF brigades are similar to our Green Berets, who do conduct unconventional operations, such as direct raids or deep reconnaissance behind enemy lines," Wuthnow said. "What the PLA lacks is what we call Tier One SOF Forces such as Delta Force or Seal Team 6, which conduct exceptionally difficult operations abroad, often in very small or clandestine teams."

"I think they look on our ability to conduct those types of operations with a certain envy, especially because their troops have no similar experience," Wuthnow added.

Special forces units are also supposed to attract soldiers who can take initiative. But Chinese special forces suffer from the same rigid command and control, as well as political monitoring, that hampers China's regular military units, and Russian forces in Ukraine.

"Generally, there is a tension between the Leninist emphasis on centralization and the need to grant autonomy to lower-level PLA commanders," according to Chen and Wuthnow. "This could be especially problematic in special operations; centralized command could lead to poor performance if small units fail to act because of a lack of explicit authorization, or if they are forced to maintain radio communications and thus reveal their positions to the enemy."

Perhaps the biggest problem with Chinese special forces is lack of integration. A proper amphibious invasion is like a Hollywood musical: an intricate, coordinated mix of ground, naval and aerial forces, as well as missiles, drones and information operations. The US military emphasizes joint operations, and China has taken a step toward that by creating five multiservice theater commands.

But for lightly armed commandos infiltrating Taiwan before the main assault on the beaches, tactical integration is key. "The lack of permanent joint structures below the theater level could diminish the effectiveness of joint operations involving special forces, potentially leading to catastrophic results similar to the failed U.S. hostage-rescue attempt in Iran during Operation Eagle Claw," wrote Chen and Wuthnow.

Still, despite their limitations, Chinese special forces could disrupt Taiwanese defenses enough to enable an amphibious assault to succeed. "Even partly effective special operations could hamper Taiwan's defenses and thus should be addressed explicitly in defensive concepts," Chen and Wuthnow warned. The authors recommend that Taiwan "identify PLA weaknesses, such as a lack of technical proficiency, limited jointness, and potential overreliance on radio communications for command and control, and tailor responses accordingly."

"PLA SOF would be integral to any amphibious invasion of Taiwan," said Wuthnow. "They could also be employed in smaller-scale island seizure campaigns such as we might see in the South China Sea. That being said, it's also the case that these troops have essentially no real-world experience and as an untested force would face difficulties in these high-risk missions."

Michael Peck is a defense writer whose work has appeared in Forbes, Defense News, Foreign Policy magazine, and other publications. He holds an MA in political science from Rutgers Univ. Follow him on Twitter and LinkedIn.

• A Chinese invasion of Taiwan must focus on seizing a port to bring in tanks and supplies.
• Commercial or industrial ports are prime targets that would allow for rapid offloading.
• Taiwan may have the weapons and obstacles to turn its ports into fortresses.

There are two requirements for a major amphibious invasion. The first is storming the beach.

The second is no less important — seizing a port. Without docks and cranes to unload reinforcements — especially armored vehicles — and supplies, everything has to be brought in over the open beach or flown in by helicopter. This can result in a race against time: can the invaders reinforce a large enough beachhead before the defenders try to push them into the sea?

As it contemplates an invasion of Taiwan, China is well aware of this problem. It knows full well that Taiwan will desperately defend its ports.

Chinese military journals "argue that the success or failure of an invasion of Taiwan likely would hinge on whether Chinese amphibious-landing forces are able to seize, hold, and exploit the island's large port facilities," naval analyst Ian Easton wrote in a new book published by the China Maritime Studies Institute at the US Naval War College.

"By themselves, Taiwan's beaches and coastal airports are too small to land enough [People's Liberation Army] troops, tanks, and supplies to secure a solid lodgment ashore," Easton wrote. "Because these sites lack purpose-built infrastructure for unloading large transports and because they occupy inherently exposed positions, PLA researchers fear that Chinese landing forces could be encircled on the beaches, showered with defensive fires, and overrun by Taiwanese counterattacks.^"

Chinese analysts worry that Taiwan will turn its ports into fortresses against sea assault, including mines and obstacles, sink containerships to block shipping channels, and set the waters alight by pouring oil into them.

The People's Liberation Army, as China's military is officially known, sees six options for taking Taiwan's ports, all of which have disadvantages, according to Easton. A direct assault runs into the teeth of port defenses. Landing on either side of a port with armor in a pincer attack is time-consuming. Quick surprise attacks with troops in hovercraft and sea-skimming helicopters suffer from limited transport capacity. Large air assaults with helicopter-carrying troops are threatened by Taiwanese air defenses. Special operations forces may be too lightly armed to seize ports. And beach assaults like D-Day come with the risk that Taiwanese troops could bottle up the attackers.

Based on Chinese military writings, Chinese planners seem to be leaning towards a mix of these options, per Easton. An invasion would begin with heavy air, missile and naval bombardment, followed by commandos to knock out coastal defenses. "After beach obstacles and coastal fortifications have been destroyed using direct fires, large amphibious forces will make landings from the sea, supported by troops arriving by helicopters, hovercraft, and ultralights," Easton wrote. "Once ashore, amphibious-assault units will conduct pincer movements from the beaches, surrounding port zones and isolating defenders into pockets of resistance."

Once ashore, PLA troops will attack areas near the port from two sides at the same time as other assault units in low-flying helicopters and hovercraft strike at the port directly. Once it is captured, Chinese forces will dig in to resist a counterattack, while engineers repair the docks and clear the shipping lanes.

The ports most likely to be attacked are those "that could support the rapid off-loading of main battle tanks and other heavy equipment. The ideal candidates for attack would be well-developed commercial or industrial ports flanked by beaches and river deltas in relatively flat and lightly urbanized areas," wrote Easton. The port of Taichung on the west coast of Taiwan is the most probable candidate, followed by Kaohsiung, Mailiao, Anping and Taiwan's capital Taipei.

Would this Chinese strategy work? Historically, armies and navies have avoided attacking heavily defended ports directly ("A ship's a fool to fight a fort," said the legendary British admiral Horatio Nelson). The most infamous example is the disastrous raid on the port of Dieppe in northern France by 10,000 Allied troops (the majority of them Canadian) in August 1942. Intended as a test operation for D-Day, the attackers suffered 5,000 dead and wounded, or about the half of the assault force. The lesson was so stinging that the Allies opted to make the Normandy invasion over the beaches, and then go on to capture a port.

The challenge isn't just seizing a port, but also getting it in usable enough condition to allow tanks to be unloaded. As the Allies discovered while taking fortified ports such as Brest and Cherbourg in 1944, the Germans made such effective use of demolitions that the port facilities were inoperative for months.

Easton suggests that Taiwan can beef up its port defenses, including missiles and mines, as well as units specially trained in urban warfare. Easton also believes that a first step could be removing the Chinese presence from Taiwanese ports, despite China accounting for 40% of Taiwan's exports. "Taiwanese leaders could close [Chinese Communist Party]-controlled representative offices," Easton wrote. "They could remove and replace critical port infrastructure that is linked to the Chinese military."

In the end, the fate of an invasion of Taiwan turns on which side controls the ports. "The imagination-crushing dimensions of a PLA amphibious operation against Taiwan — the moving of millions of humans and machines — all rely on robust logistics lines," Easton wrote. "Without them, everything else quickly crumbles and falls apart."

Michael Peck is a defense writer whose work has appeared in Forbes, Defense News, Foreign Policy magazine, and other publications. He holds an MA in political science from Rutgers Univ. Follow him on Twitter and LinkedIn.

• Israel's potent air defenses are increasingly threatened by low-flying drones.
• Two retired Israeli generals say it needs new defenses against this "low sky" layer.
• Israel pioneered targeting air defenses with drones in a stunning victory four decades ago.

Israel's air and missile defense system is arguably the best in the world, having proven this year it can down Iranian ballistic missiles and Hamas-fired rockets. Its Iron Dome is the epitome of this success and is only one of many systems. But while these can protect Israeli cities, they have an increasingly glaring problem — they can't protect themselves from low-flying drones, two retired Israeli brigadier generals warn.

"We have to defend our air defense," wrote Eran Ortal and Ran Kochav in a blog for the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Defense at Bar-Ilan University near Tel Aviv, Israel.

Ortal and Kochav fear that enemy drones could knock out air defense systems such as the vaunted Iron Dome, enabling ballistic missiles, manned aircraft and artillery rockets to strike Israel without being intercepted. "The Israeli Air Force does continue to rule the skies, but under the noses of the advanced fighter jets, a new air layer has been created."

The authors call this the "low sky" layer. "The enemy has found a loophole here. The Air Force (and, within it, the air defense corps) is required to defend against the combined and coordinated threats of missiles, unmanned aircraft systems and rockets."

Over the past year, Israel's air and missile system has achieved remarkable success against a range of projectiles launched by Iran, Hamas and other Iranian proxies, including ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, artillery rockets and mortar shells. For example, Israel — with the assistance of the US, Britain and other nations — reportedly intercepted 99% of some 300 ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and large attack drones launched by Iran in April 2024.

However, Israel has struggled against small exploding drones launched by Hezbollah, the Iran-backed militia in Lebanon. More than a hundred Israeli soldiers and civilians have been killed or wounded by these UAVs, including 67 who were wounded when a drone hit a building in northern Israel in October. Still, the situation is a far cry from the Ukraine war, where hordes of small drones have rendered battlefield maneuver almost impossible.

Nonetheless, Ortal and Kochav worry that Israeli air defenses were designed in the pre-drone era, when the threat to Israel came from aircraft and ballistic missiles, a critique that also applies to Western- and Russian-made systems. "This array was built over the years under the premise of Israeli air superiority. The air defense itself was not supposed to be hunted."

"The enemy is able to penetrate deep into Israel and engage the air defense system in one lane while other aircraft take advantage of the diversion and penetrate in another, more covert lane. It can identify targets and strike immediately using armed or suicide UAS. Above all, it strives to locate, endanger, and destroy key elements of the air defense system itself."

Israel relies on a multilayer defense system, with long-range Arrow interceptors targeting ballistic missiles above the Earth's atmosphere, the medium-range David's Sling handling ballistic and cruise missiles about 10 miles high, and the short-range Iron Dome stopping cruise missiles, short-range rockets and artillery and mortar shells at low altitude. All depend on the production and reloading of missiles adequate to the threat.

The problem is that these three systems can't protect each other. "The degree of mutual assistance and protection between the layers is relatively limited," Ortal and Kochav wrote. To optimize the allocation of a limited supply of interceptor missiles, "each tier was designed to deal with a specific type of missile or rocket. Iron Dome can't really assist Arrow batteries or support their missions. This limitation is equally true among the other layers."

Nor are Israel's air defenses built for survivability, such as creating decoy missile batteries and radars to protect the real ones or frequently relocating systems. "The degree of mobility, protection and hiding ability of the Israeli air defense system is inadequate. Unlike similar systems in the world, our air defense system was not built with synchronization as a critical goal."

Their solution? The creation of a fourth layer focused on point protection of the radar, missile launchers and troops that operate them against rockets and drones that have penetrated the first three layers. Air defenses must be camouflaged and should be mobile enough to change location before the enemy can target them.

Ironically, Israel itself was one of the pioneers of using drones to suppress air defenses. Stung by heavy losses from Soviet-made surface-to-air missiles in the 1973 Yom Kippur War, Israel used drones in during the 1982 Lebanon War. By using unmanned aerial vehicles that mimicked manned aircraft, Israel lured Syrian air defense radars into coming online so they could be destroyed by anti-radiation missiles. The Israeli Air Force destroyed 29 out of 30 anti-aircraft missile batteries in the Bekaa Valley without loss and downed more than 60 Syrian aircraft.

Israel's Air Force became so dominant that the ground forces discarded their tactical anti-aircraft weapons (though the IDF recently reactivated the M61 Vulcan gatling cannon for counter-UAV defense on the northern border). Meanwhile, the IDF's air defense corps switched its focus from anti-aircraft to missile defense.

"The working assumption was, and remains to this day, that Israel's Air Force rules the skies," wrote Ortal and Kochav. "The job of air defense, therefore, is to focus on missiles and rockets. This assumption is no longer valid."

Michael Peck is a defense writer whose work has appeared in Forbes, Defense News, Foreign Policy magazine, and other publications. He holds an MA in political science from Rutgers Univ. Follow him on Twitter and LinkedIn.

• China's marines are preparing for global operations similar to the US Marine Corps.
• China is building amphibious flattops whose scale rivals those of the US.
• US Marines are also shifting strategies, in their case away from storming beaches.

"Send in the Marines" is an old American quip for when things get rough. It may become a Chinese one too.

Instead of merely guarding Chinese naval bases and supporting an invasion of Taiwan, China's Marine Corps appears to be preparing for amphibious operations around the world — just as US Marines do. China is building a force of amphibious flattops that can launch Marine helicopters and possibly the fighting vehicles that motor to shore.

"The investment in large amphibious-assault ships indicates that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) envisions a future in which it can deploy expeditionary strike groups similar to those the United States has employed for the past fifty years," wrote Sam Tangredi in a new book published by the China Maritime Studies Institute at the US Naval War College "A globally deployable amphibious/expeditionary group is a far cry from the humble origins of the PLA [People's Liberation Army] amphibious force and a considerable leap from the PLAN [People's Liberation Army Navy] capabilities that existed in the first years of this century."

Established in 1953, the People's Liberation Army Navy Marine Corps, as it's officially known, was formed to seize Taiwan and other Nationalist-held islands. Like the US Marine Corps, the PLANMC is a branch of the navy. Its missions have been those of traditional naval infantry: guarding naval bases, garrisoning island outposts in the South China Sea, and supporting an amphibious invasion of Taiwan by the Chinese army, which retains its own amphibious assault force.

But the PLANMC has grown to the point where some experts wonder whether it will become an independent service. From two brigades and 12,000 personnel in 2017, the PLANMC has expanded to eight brigades, with a goal of 100,000 personnel; that compares to about 170,000 active-duty US Marines.

Tangredi, who is director of the Naval War College's Institute for Future Warfare Studies, says that there is no direct evidence that China has plans for global amphibious warfare. Yet, "if the Taiwan scenario is the primary purpose in mind, why is the PLA building amphibious warships that are optimized for global operations?" he asks.

Invading Taiwan doesn't require big amphibious assault ships similar to the Wasp-class vessels, 840-foot-long floating airports for Marine helicopters and jump-jets like the AV-8B Harrier II and the F-35B Lightning II and concentrating its assault force into small numbers of large ships comes with risks. Yet China is building 36,000-ton Type 075 amphibious assault ships that can carry up to 30 helicopters as well as 1,200 marines and their heavy equipment, including tanks. The upcoming 50,000-ton Type 076 will be the world's largest amphibious assault vessel.

"For an invasion of Taiwan across a strait of approximately a hundred nautical miles (nm), LHDs are not necessarily the optimal (or the most cost-effective) platforms when numerous smaller warcraft are available (including civilian commercial craft)," Tangredi wrote. "They are, however, optimal for spearheading the transport of marines to conduct operations at distances out to the Horn of Africa, islands in the eastern Pacific, or — with suitable future logistics support — the Mediterranean."

Back to their roots

The US Marine Corps is also adapting. It is switching from an emphasis on storming beaches — the US has not attempted a major beach assault under fire since the Korean war — to supporting the US Navy with missile-equipped units to hunt Chinese ships from island bases. This is transforming the US Marine Corps into "an archipelagic maneuver force designed to conduct littoral, sea-denial operations," Tangredi said.

The Corps devised a new force layout to operate in an age of drones and anti-ship missiles. In this new structure, Marine littoral units "would not be optimized for amphibious assaults or combat against enemy forces ashore but would use previously unoccupied territory to conduct attacks on warships and aircraft — essentially, naval combat from the land," wrote Tangredi. Retired senior Marine commanders were aghast.

Thus the USMC has given all its tanks to the US Army, while it creates mobile units that can quickly turn small Pacific islands into missile bases from which to strike Chinese ships. The 3rd Littoral Regiment was stood up in 2022, and two more regiments are planned.

These littoral units would "assist the Navy in asserting sea control in the East and South China Seas," Tangredi wrote. "Marines would operate as part of a littoral combat group, with the Navy having overall command, supplying the warships (and necessary support vessels), and providing most of the group's firepower. Armed with land versions of the Navy's antiship missiles, Marine units would maneuver constantly while ashore by ground vehicles or from island to island using the proposed LAW [light amphibious warship]."

Ironically, the US Marine Corps is returning to its historical roots. Marines have always had an ambiguous role, neither quite army nor navy (poet Rudyard Kipling called them "soldier an' sailor too"). Back to the days of the Roman Empire, marines have been naval infantry tasked with seizing and guarding naval bases, boarding enemy vessels, and acting as shipboard military police to put down mutinies.

This is what the US Marine Corps did for most of its history since its founding in 1775. But in World War II and afterwards, it became more like a scaled-down version of the US Army, conducting massive multi-division amphibious invasions and fighting conventional ground campaigns in Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan. Small, light units flitting from Pacific island to island would be more in line with traditional USMC roles.

As for Chinese marines, their historical purpose was to storm Taiwan, not garrison tiny atolls on behalf of the navy. For China and America, their marines are switching roles.

Michael Peck is a defense writer whose work has appeared in Forbes, Defense News, Foreign Policy magazine, and other publications. He holds an MA in political science from Rutgers Univ. Follow him on Twitter and LinkedIn.