• A US-Saudi arms agreement may get complicated when it comes to Lockheed Martin's F-35
• The F-35 could put Saudi Arabia's military on par with Israel in what may be a dealbreaker.
• The Saudis may also buy advanced US drones and missile defenses as part of the agreement.

During his visit to Saudi Arabia, President Donald Trump signed what the White House described as "the largest defense sales agreement in history," valued at almost $142 billion, that will provide the kingdom "state-of-the-art warfighting equipment and services." The offer, the final value of which may ultimately prove much less than $142 billion, is expected to include Lockheed Martin's C-130 Hercules transport aircraft and other unspecified missiles and radars. Neither the White House nor administration officials have provided further details about which specific systems the deal may include, such as the advanced fighter Riyadh has wanted.

The two sides discussed a potential Saudi purchase of the F-35 Lightning II stealth strike fighter and Israel's qualitative military edge came up, Reuters reported Tuesday. The Saudis have sought the F-35 for years since it's one of the world's top fighter jets that could put the kingdom's armed forces on par with Israel, the only Middle Eastern country currently flying that fifth-generation combat aircraft. Washington is legally obligated to preserve Israel's military advantage by, among other things, not selling military hardware to regional countries that are as or more advanced than Israel's arsenal. Unlike the neighboring United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia has not joined the Abraham Accords by normalizing ties with Israel and refuses to do so amid the ongoing war in Gaza.

"I think an F-35 deal could be agreed upon even absent Saudi-Israeli normalization," Ryan Bohl, a senior Middle East and North Africa analyst at the risk intelligence company RANE, told Business Insider. "However, to proceed with the F-35 package, it would have to be significantly downgraded to preserve Israel's qualitative military edge."

"Such downgrades might diminish the overall sale's attractiveness to the Saudis."

Israel took delivery of three F-35s in March, bringing its total fleet strength to 42. It will field 75 eventually. Washington may not agree to sell Riyadh a comparable number, and it may impose limits on their use.

"I don't think numbers alone will be sufficient, as the Israelis will be concerned that such systems could eventually end up in the hands of adversaries," Bohl said. "Rather, I think we would likely see technical restrictions and end-use requirements that would severely limit the usage of F-35s by the Saudis and reduce their capabilities against the Israelis."

Israel's F-35I Adir is a unique version of the stealth aircraft that Israel modifies with indigenous weapons and systems. Therefore, the Adir is arguably already more advanced than any standard F-35A model Saudi Arabia might acquire.

Ultimately, it is Israel's arch-rival Iran that may have more concerns over the prospect of Saudi F-35s.

Any F-35 acquisition could give Saudi Arabia the "ability to conduct deep strikes in Iran" in ways far greater than presently possible with their current fleet of non-stealthy 4.5-generation F-15s, noted Sebastien Roblin, a widely published military-aviation journalist. Such an acquisition could also "substantially enhance" Saudi airpower and enable Riyadh to participate in any US or Israeli bombing campaign against Iran.

"I can see such an acquisition affecting the perceived regional balance of power vis-à-vis Tehran," Roblin told BI.

"That said, in a large-scale conflict, questions would arise about the vulnerability of these aircraft to Iranian strikes when they landed," Roblin said. "And whether these countries could acquire enough F-35s with enough munitions and muster sufficient professionalism and support assets to minimize risks of combat losses."

Riyadh may not prioritize acquiring the F-35 and seek other advanced American armaments.

The US is much more open to exporting advanced drones to Middle Eastern countries than just a few years ago, when Washington largely followed the range and payload limitations suggested by the Missile Technology Control Regime for exported systems.

Before Trump's trip, Washington green-lighted a potential sale of MQ-9B drones to Qatar. General Atomics is expected to offer Saudi Arabia MQ-9B SeaGuardians as part of a "huge" package deal.

"I think the weakening of end-use restrictions will certainly make the Americans more eager to strike deals to sell their drones to the region," RANE's Bohl said. "American drones will still need to compete against Turkish and Chinese drones that may be cheaper and have fewer political strings attached."

When Washington previously declined Middle East requests for advanced American drones, China stepped in and supplied its drones throughout the region in the 2010s. In the 2020s, Saudi Arabia and the UAE signed lucrative contracts with Turkey for its indigenous Bayraktar drones.

"I wouldn't expect a major surge in American drone exports to the region at this point, but rather for them to become part of this region's drone diversification strategy," Bohl said. "Certainly, there will be notable deals struck in the coming years, but China and Turkey will continue to be formidable competitors in the drone arena in the Arab Gulf states."

The White House mentioned that the $142 billion agreement includes "air and missile defense."

"If we are looking at recent trends, they should be focusing on air defenses, including deeper stocks of interceptor missiles, and diversification of air defenses to cost-efficiently combat lower-end threats as well as high-end ones," Roblin said.

Saudi Arabia already operates advanced US Patriot air defense missiles and the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system, which can target ballistic missiles outside the atmosphere. It completed its first locally manufactured components of the latter system mere days before Trump's visit. Riyadh may seek similar co-production deals to aid in developing its domestic arms industry.

"There's a need for more long-distance precision strike weapons in the form of missiles and drones, which can be used without risking expensive manned combat aircraft," Roblin said. "There should be some parallel interest at sea, where we've seen Ukraine and the Houthis successfully execute sea denial strategies, one that Iran might seek to imitate in the confined waters of the Gulf."

"Thus, the homework of Gulf navies is to ensure their vessels have the sensors and self-defense weapons to cope with small boat threats and cruise and ballistic missiles."

Saudi Arabia has already taken steps to expand its navy with more advanced warships in recent years. RANE's Bohl believes Trump may persuade the kingdom to "purchase big-ticket items like warships" as he attempts to "revitalize the manufacturing sector" in the US.

Only a fraction of this $142 billion agreement may result in completed deals — as was the case with the series of letters of intent for $110 billion worth of arms sales Trump signed with Riyadh in 2017.

"These deals involve optioning huge defense sales, but Trump will present these to his supporters as done deals," Roblin said. "So, the Gulf states can gift Trump a large number as a political victory without actually having to pay anywhere near the whole bill."

"For the 2017 defense deal, by the following year, Riyadh reportedly had bought only $14.5 billion out of $110 billion optioned."

Paul Iddon is a freelance journalist and columnist who writes about Middle East developments, military affairs, politics, and history. His articles have appeared in a variety of publications focused on the region.

• The US is withdrawing roughly 1,000 troops from Syria in the coming months.
• The Trump administration believes the new Syrian government and Kurdish partners can contain ISIS.
• The US is "well-served" by keeping some forces in Syria to counter ISIS, a retired colonel told BI.

The United States will begin withdrawing hundreds of troops from northeast Syria in coming months, a sign that it believes its Kurdish partners and the new Syrian government can keep ISIS extremists from reorganizing.

The US troops in Syria have assisted its local partner, the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces, in the fight against ISIS since 2015. The presence was always relatively small, never exceeding 2,500, and is being reduced to below 1,000.

"This consolidation reflects the significant steps we have made toward degrading ISIS' appeal and operational capability regionally and globally," Chief Pentagon spokesperson Sean Parnell said in a Friday statement. "This deliberate and conditions-based process will bring the US footprint in Syria down to less than a thousand US forces in the coming months."

"The US is likely to keep a small residual force in Syria to conduct targeted raids against ISIS," Nicholas Heras, senior director of strategy and innovation at the New Lines Institute, told Business Insider. "The US is also likely to keep the base in Erbil (Iraqi Kurdistan) as a hub to surge forces into Syria, as needed."

"These factors would mean that a phased US withdrawal from Syria would be less likely to be chaotic, and more likely to adhere to a typical reduction in force."

In October 2019, two years after ISIS lost its self-styled caliphate's de-facto capital to the US-led coalition, President Donald Trump ordered an abrupt withdrawal, triggering a brief but destructive and destabilizing cross-border Turkish operation against the SDF. Trump ultimately postponed that hasty withdrawal and the US maintained a smaller deployment of about 900 personnel.

The latest drawdown takes place under significantly different circumstances.

"The 2019 withdrawal was so chaotic because it was a snap decision that the US administration wasn't adequately prepared for, and which senior officials in the administration were outraged by," Aron Lund, a fellow with Century International and a senior analyst at the Swedish Defense Research Agency, told BI.

"You don't have that situation today," Lund said, adding that, unlike the previous Trump administration, there are no officials who would likely resign in protest as Defense Secretary Jim Mattis did.

In December, after the overthrow of long-time Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad, the US disclosed that it had 2,000 troops in Syria. It clarified that those additional 1,100 were "temporary rotational forces" and the remaining 900 "core" assets.

Myles B. Caggins III, a senior nonresident fellow at the New Lines Institute, retired US Army colonel, and former spokesman for the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS, believes Washington would be "well-served" in continuing its Syria deployment.

"During the first Trump administration, the US-led global Coalition defeated ISIS by supporting the Kurdish-led SDF," Caggins told BI. "It is important for President Trump to preserve that victory and support the SDF while they continue raids on ISIS remnants and hold 10,000 ISIS detainees."

"The 2,000 US troops in Syria continue to blast and capture ISIS and Hurras al-Din leaders, as well as preventing Iranian-backed militants from having a land bridge to Lebanon and ultimately Israel," Caggins said; Hurras al-Din is an al-Qaeda-affiliated group in Syria.

These continued counter-terrorism efforts coincide with improving relations between Turkey and the SDF. A ceasefire recently ended months of skirmishes between the SDF and Turkey's Syrian militia allies.

"The situation now in eastern Syria is more fortuitous than it has been before for this type of US reduction of force," Heras said.

The SDF also signed a landmark deal with Damascus in March that will eventually see the SDF integrated into Syria's national armed forces. Until that deal, the US still has a crucial role to play in supporting its Kurdish-led partner.

"The new transitional Syrian government is not able to fund or staff the ISIS detention centers and Damascus tacitly welcomes the presence of US troops because they know that the well-trained, well-equipped SDF is a critical part of the future composition of the Syrian Ministry of Defense," Caggins said.

Thousands of ISIS fighters and their families remain in prisons and open-air camps in SDF-held areas. The most notable is the sprawling Al-Hol camp near the Iraqi border in northeast Syria. The camp is an indefinite detention for an estimated 40,000 people, primarily Iraqi and Syrian nationals, many with suspected links or sympathies to ISIS. ISIS prisoners and sleeper cells have attempted to free fellow captives and regroup, most notably in January 2022 through an attempted prison break in Hasaka that took the US-backed Kurdish authorities 10 days to suppress.

Efforts to rehabilitate foreign ISIS fighters at al-Hol are ongoing. So far, an estimated half of Iraqi nationals in the camp have been repatriated, with the majority rehabilitated.

Shortly before he returned to the White House in January, Trump said that America should have nothing to do with Syria or its conflict.

Century International's Lund believes it remains to be seen if "a more extensive pullout" of US troops from Syria and Syria's reabsorption of SDF territories and institutions could be smoothly coordinated with Damascus and Ankara.

"If everyone shows a bit of goodwill, you could have a handover of areas and prisons and other things" from the US and SDF to the Syrian government, Lund said. "But if there's not a deal in place when US troops start a final exit, or if there's a deal that doesn't hold up when tested, things could go haywire very quickly."

"Even if we end up with just a partial reduction of forces this time, I believe the United States will probably quit Syria in Trump's second mandate," Lund added. "And if so, it will probably be sooner rather than later."

Paul Iddon is a freelance journalist and columnist who writes about Middle East developments, military affairs, politics, and history. His articles have appeared in a variety of publications focused on the region.

• The Trump-ordered airstrikes are an intensified campaign against the Houthi rebels in Yemen.
• The ramped-up campaign goes beyond the Biden administration's "defensive posture," an expert said.
• It's likely to take months to see whether airstrikes — without other forces — deter the Houthis.

The Trump administration's airstrikes against the Houthi rebels in Yemen — discussed by top officials in the unclassified Signal chat group — are a dramatic escalation of the US's confrontation with the group for its attacks on commercial ships and naval vessels, regional experts told Business Insider.

"The Trump-era strikes are broader in scale and formed as part of a sustained campaign targeting not only Houthi infrastructure — such as hideouts, stockpiles, and military assets — but also the group's leadership," Freddy Khoueiry, a global security analyst for the Middle East and North Africa at the risk intelligence company RANE, told Business Insider.

"This mirrors Israel's approach during its conflict with Hezbollah, where efforts to degrade military capabilities were accompanied by systematic strikes on field commanders, eventually reaching senior leadership figures and the upper echelon."

This focus bears out from the Atlantic's bombshell reporting on the Signal group: "The first target - their top missile guy - we had a positive ID of him walking into his girlfriend's building and it's now collapsed," National Security Adviser Michael Waltz texted. "Excellent," Vice President JD Vance replied.

Regional experts cautioned it is likely to take months to see whether more airstrikes and targeting the Houthi movement's leaders will end its attacks on Israel and merchant ships. The Houthis may also end these attacks with a new Gaza ceasefire or an Israeli return to the existing one.

The Houthis began a campaign targeting and hijacking commercial ships transiting the Red Sea shortly after the October 2023 Gaza war began; Hamas, like the Houthis, are armed and trained by Iran. The Yemeni militants also launched intermittent drone and missile strikes against Israel.

The Biden administration responded by dispatching the US Navy to protect commercial shipping near the Bab al-Mandab strait and repeatedly struck military targets in Yemen like missile launchers, underground storage facilities, radars, and air defenses. These efforts failed to end the attacks. The State Department redesignated the Houthis a foreign terrorist group in March.

The Houthis halted attacks targeting Israel and commercial shipping following the January ceasefire in Gaza. On March 12, the group announced they would resume attacks if Israel did not stop blocking aid to the coastal Palestinian enclave. Three days later, the Trump administration ordered the intensified campaign.

In the private group chat on Signal that, in an extraordinary turn, accidentally included the editor-in-chief of The Atlantic, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth pressed for the strikes over Vance's qualms, in part by arguing that only a tougher air campaign would deter the Iran-backed rebel group.

"I see it as two things: 1) Restoring Freedom of Navigation, a core national interest; and 2) Reestablishing deterrence, which Biden cratered," Hegseth texted

In an interview with ABC's "This Week" show, Hegseth contrasted Biden's "pinprick, back-and-forth — what ultimately proved to be feckless attacks" with Trump's "overwhelming response that actually targeted multiple Houthi leaders and took them out."

The US is only the latest force to confront the Houthis. Saudi Arabia led a multinational coalition against the Houthis in a war that began in 2014 after the Houthis captured Yemen's capital, Sanaa, from the internationally recognized government and ended with a ceasefire in 2022 that's still in place.

The new US campaign bears similarities to the Israeli approach. After the Houthis successfully hit Tel Aviv in a drone attack last July, Israel also launched several long-range airstrikes against the group and threatened to hunt down its leadership. Since beginning its current campaign on March 15, the US has asked Israel not to respond to the latest Houthi missile attacks, which Israeli air defenses successfully intercepted, by stating: "Leave it to us."

Compared to Hezbollah in Lebanon, Israel has relatively little intelligence on the more distant Houthis, a deficiency it has recently sought to rectify. This is in stark contrast with how deeply it infiltrated Hezbollah. In addition to injuring over 3,000 Hezbollah members with booby-trapped pagers and walkie-talkies in September, Israel also assassinated the group's long-time leader, Hassan Nasrallah.

Israel's strikes sought to inflict economic damage on the Houthis through strikes on energy facilities and ports controlled by the group.

"The Biden administration largely adopted a defensive posture, engaging in reactive, tit-for-tat operations," Mohammed Al-Basha of the Basha Report, a Virginia-based Risk Advisory, told BI. "The Trump administration, however, is not pursuing regime change or aiming to topple the Houthis. It has deliberately avoided targeting infrastructure that would harm the civilian population."

"It is an offensive posture designed to reestablish deterrence," Al-Basha said. "President Trump has made it clear that continued Houthi attacks on US naval vessels in the Arabian and Red Seas will no longer be tolerated."

"While it is still too early to fully assess the campaign's effectiveness, even the Houthis have acknowledged that they are suffering losses and casualties from the ongoing airstrikes."

The airstrike campaign faces similar problems to those that came before.

The Houthis are "deeply entrenched in Yemen's challenging terrain" and may have prepared for a protracted campaign, said RANE's Khoueiry, who thinks only a long-term air campaign could deter the Houthis.

Independent Middle East analyst Kyle Orton believes it's "too early to tell" if Trump's overall approach will ultimately yield any more than the Biden administration achieved.

"The strikes in themselves have done little to damage the Houthis, and it remains to be seen if this was, as some administration rhetoric has suggested, the opening volley in a sustained campaign," Orton told BI.

A significant shift in US policy towards Yemen, in Orton's view, would entail a sustained air campaign that coordinated action with Arab allies and the recognized Yemeni government to recapture territory held by the Houthis.

"There is, however, little indication Trump is willing to get 'entangled' in the Middle East so seriously," Orton said.

Paul Iddon is a freelance journalist and columnist who writes about Middle East developments, military affairs, politics, and history. His articles have appeared in a variety of publications focused on the region.

• Israel would need US help if it set out to destroy Iran's underground nuclear sites.
• The operation would require repeated cruise missile strikes and heavy, bunker-busting bombs.
• There are limits to what the US and Israel could accomplish in a short air campaign.

Iran can enrich enough uranium for a nuclear weapon within weeks. The options to stop Iran from getting a bomb, if it so chooses, are through a nuclear deal like the one President Donald Trump withdrew from in 2018 or with overwhelming military force.

"There are two ways Iran can be handled, militarily or you can make a deal. I would prefer to make a deal," Trump said in a March 6 interview with Fox News. The US, he said, has "a situation with Iran that's going to happen very soon, very, very soon."

Early signs of a deal were inauspicious. Trump dialed up the pressure on Iran after US strikes on the Iran-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen over the weekend, warning in a Monday Truth Social post that "every shot fired by the Houthis will be looked upon, from this point forward, as being a shot fired from the weapons and leadership of IRAN."

Israel could attempt pre-emptive strikes, but they would likely need US airpower in what would be a major escalation if they aimed to demolish Iran's underground facilities for weapons-grade uranium, according to military analysts.

To wipe out Iran's nuclear facilities, US and Israel would need to carry out repeated strikes with stand-off weapons like cruise missiles, Ryan Bohl, a senior Middle East and North Africa analyst at the risk intelligence company RANE, told Business Insider.

Such strikes could also require the Northrop B-2 Spirit stealth bomber. The B-2 is the only aircraft that can carry the US's 15-ton GBU-57 Massive Ordnance Penetrator, the largest US bunker buster, and one of the most powerful non-nuclear bombs. A B-2 notably bombed hardened underground weapon sites belonging to the Iran-backed Houthis in Yemen in October.

"It would be a major milestone in the history of warfare should we see a joint Israeli-US strike on Iran," Bohl said. "It would give us insight into how such (American-made) systems might also perform against, say, Russia and China, whose systems are in some ways similar to that of Iran's."

The United Nations Security Council discussed Iran's enrichment of uranium near weapons-grade level in a closed meeting on Wednesday. The US accused Iran of "flagrantly" defying the council over its rapid uranium enrichment.

Amid the back and forth between the Trump administration and Iran, a US Air Force B-52 Stratofortess bomber drilled with Israeli Air Force F-35 stealth jets and F-15 fighters. Both air forces have drilled on numerous occasions in recent years in preparation for a possible attack against Iran.

The largest-ever exercise was Juniper Oak in January 2023, when American and Israeli F-35 stealth jets, drones, and US strategic bombers dropped over 180,000 pounds of live munitions.

"Juniper Oak gave us insight into how a maximum escalation scenario might play out with joint Israel-US operations," Bohl said.

Why Israel would likely need US bombers

Israel's fighter fleet consists of fourth-generation American-made F-15 and F-16 jets and more advanced fifth-generation F-35s made by Lockheed Martin. Israel doesn't have heavy bombers capable of carrying large bunker-buster munitions.

The two primary targets of any strikes would be the Natanz and Fordow underground enrichment facilities. Natanz is deep underground and shielded by reinforced concrete in the central Isfahan province. Satellite imagery taken in 2023 indicated Iran has dug tunnels near the site too deep for even the GBU-57 to damage effectively. Fordow is the country's second uranium enrichment facility, which Iran dug inside a mountain to build near the holy city of Qom.

US-Israeli airstrikes would have to be part of a larger, complex campaign that also targets Iranian air defenses and ballistic missiles with air and ship-launched munitions, drones, cyberattacks, and possibly limited special operations raids, according to Nicholas Heras, senior director of strategy and innovation at the New Lines Institute.

Israel already inflicted widespread damage on Iran's Russian-made S-300 air defenses during its October 26 airstrikes. Another round of strikes, especially with American participation, could prove much more devastating.

"Iran is on the back foot defending its airspace," RANE's Bohl said.

While Iran's antiquated air force is outclassed and outgunned by the USAF and IAF, there are still limits to what the latter's cutting-edge airpower can achieve, especially if America and Israel are reluctant to conduct a long campaign. And if a US-Israeli campaign does not broadly target Iran's military arsenal, Tehran could mount substantial retaliation.

For years, the country has possessed the largest arsenal of ballistic missiles in the region. While these missiles failed to inflict significant damage during Iran's April and October 2024 attacks against Israel, they could still menace US bases in the Middle East or force Israel to expend more of its expensive and finite high-altitude Arrow anti-ballistic missile interceptors in order to fend them off.

Iran has had decades to prepare for such an attack.

It's possible "Iran is able to weather the worst of it and rebuild," since bombs and missiles can fail to destroy all of the Iranian centrifuges used to enrich uranium, Bohl said.

Either way, a joint air assault against Iran could prove unprecedented.

"Without a doubt, a joint US-Israel military campaign against Iran's nuclear program would be one of the largest, and certainly the most technologically advanced, in human history," New Lines Institute's Heras said.

Paul Iddon is a freelance journalist and columnist who writes about Middle East developments, military affairs, politics, and history. His articles have appeared in a variety of publications focused on the region.

• The US has 2,000 troops in Syria backing Kurdish-led forces to contain ISIS militants.
• The Trump admin is weighing withdrawing these forces, and the Russian military is losing its access.
• "Russia now hangs on by its fingertips," a Syria expert told BI.

Syria has been one of the world's most complex proxy fights since its civil war broke out in 2011, but who holds power and where is now shifting rapidly.

The biggest change came from the dramatic toppling of Bashar al-Assad's regime in December. It was driven out by the Islamist group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, who are no friends of Russia or Iran.

HTS holds territory from Aleppo in the northwest to Damascus, the seat of the Assad regime. But Syria remains fractured by competing armies. Turkish forces and militants it backs hold pockets near its northern border. The US-partnered Syrian Democratic Forces occupy the large triangle of northeastern Syria, an area that has oilfields and prison camps holding ISIS fighters. Russia is reducing its military footprint as Israel seizes new positions near the Golan Heights. But the newest question mark is the US.

The US has 2,000 troops in Syria backing the Kurdish-led SDF to contain ISIS. It also controls the strategically located al-Tanf base in southern Syria. But the longevity of those deployments is unclear. The Department of Defense is reportedly drafting contingency plans to withdraw all troops should President Donald Trump order it.

"Presently, the HTS-led government is seeking to create the conditions for a US withdrawal from the country that would undermine the SDF coalition, which represents an impediment to the emerging regime's ability to control all of the country," Nicholas Heras, senior director of strategy and innovation at the New Lines Institute, told Business Insider.

US forces in Syria safeguard oilfields and assist the SDF in strikes to defeat remnants of ISIS. These forces are potential leverage that Trump risks losing if he withdraws them before talks with the new government under interim president Ahmed al-Sharaa.

"It seems likely that the Trump administration will keep troops in Syria over the short term and speak about a step-by-step policy of loosening sanctions based on President Sharaa's willingness to develop a constitution and move toward a representative government that does not threaten its neighbors," Joshua Landis, Director of the Centre of Middle East Studies and the Farzaneh Family Center for Iranian and Persian Gulf Studies at the University of Oklahoma, told BI.

The easier chip in bargaining could be the US base at al-Tanf in Syria's southern desert. Controlled by the US-allied, anti-ISIS Syrian Free Army group, the base is situated near the Jordanian border and the important Baghdad-Damascus highway. The US enforced a 34-mile de-confliction zone around al-Tanf which Iranian-backed forces and Assad's regime weren't allowed to access.

"The US presence at al-Tanf was pretty dubious before Assad fell and it serves no discernible purpose now, except possibly as a point of leverage vis-à-vis the new Damascus government," Aron Lund, Middle East analyst with the Swedish Defence Research Agency and fellow with Century International, told BI. "So, al-Tanf could be a place they'll withdraw from first, perhaps after getting some little thing in return from Sharaa's government."

The SDF-controlled regions present a "thornier issue" with much higher stakes. The Kurds guard prisons with thousands of ISIS fighters, but they'd be hard-pressed to maintain these faced with a major offensive by a rival. While HTS has not attacked the SDF, the Turkish-backed militias have done so repeatedly since late 2024.

"There are some real political risks involved, related to an ISIS revival and the fate of Kurdish groups in that area," Lund said. "Even Trump could perhaps be persuaded that these things are worth negotiating over if only to limit the fallout before withdrawing."

Israel expanded its presence along the Golan Heights as Assad's regime collapsed, seizing Mount Hermon. Satellite images show it is building bases there.

"Israel does not trust the HTS-led government and the Israeli posture suggests that Jerusalem could play a strong role in Syrian affairs for years to come," Heras said.

The outside power that stands the most to gain is Turkey. Ahead of his recent visit to Turkey, reports indicated Sharaa would discuss Turkey potentially establishing bases in Syria's central desert region.

"Turkey already has a forward operating military presence in northwest Syria, and it is unlikely that it will withdraw its forces from the country in the near future," Heras said. "The HTS-led government wants to leverage Turkey to have a patron state to support the development of its security forces."

Russia, by contrast, stands to lose the most. Syria canceled an Assad-era contract with Russia to manage Tartus naval base but Syria's defense minister also said it might let Russia keep this port and the Hmeimim airbase "if we get benefits for Syria."

"Russia now hangs on by its fingertips, but we'll see how that turns out," Lund said. "In five years, they could still have Tartus, perhaps also Hmeimim."

Moscow has had access to Tartus since 1971. Today, these bases are essential to supporting Russian military and mercenary operations across the Middle East and Africa.

"The new Syrian government is obviously no friend of the Russians. It needs to be mindful of the views of its political base, which is made up of ex-rebel factions that hate Putin almost as much as they hate Assad," Lund said. He noted that Russia still has "important leverage" over Syria. Rebuilding the Syrian military without Russian arms could prove challenging, even if Syria aims to have Turkey replace Russia's traditional role as its main arms supplier.

"There's so much legacy Soviet and Russian equipment and training, you can't just throw all that out," Lund said.

Syria's new rulers have little to fear from Russia since the days of Russia relentlessly bombing HTS's Idlib stronghold in support of Assad are gone.

"The Russian bases are there at their mercy, and they seem fairly harmless for the new government," Lund said.

"Letting them stay could even provide a point of leverage."

Paul Iddon is a freelance journalist and columnist who writes about Middle East developments, military affairs, politics, and history. His articles have appeared in a variety of publications focused on the region.

• Iran looks to finally be getting the Su-35 fighters it has long sought.
• New and well-armed Su-35s won't replace the capabilities of Iran's degraded air defenses.
• The Su-35 is a jolt for Iran's airpower, especially if it comes with a beyond-visual-range missile.

Iran may finally get the advanced Russian fighter jets it has sought for years, but analysts are skeptical that a few dozen Su-35 Flankers will make up for the damage Israel recently inflicted on Iran's air defenses.

Ali Shadmani, a senior commander in Iran's powerful Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps paramilitary, confirmed the Su-35 order on January 27. Iranian state-run media have repeatedly reported imminent deliveries of these 4.5-generation Russian jets in recent years, which have invariably proven premature or downright false but there's reason to believe they're finally going through. Shadmani's statement did not reveal how many Su-35 Flankers Tehran ordered or when it expects deliveries in what's seen as a quid pro quo for the Iranian Shahed attack drones Russia has used in the thousands against Ukraine since 2022.

Iran's aging air force has long needed newer aircraft and the Su-35 brings significant capabilities to threaten enemy aircraft near Iranian airspace. But Arash Azizi, senior lecturer in history and political science at Clemson University, believes even an imminent delivery of Su-35s would still be "a case of too little, too late" for Tehran.

"This is still a meaningful upgrade for Iran's beleaguered air force and one that it has waited for for a long time," Azizi told Business Insider. "But it doesn't do much to fill the gaps that Iran will have against adversaries such as Israel."

"It will be a drop in the bucket."

Previous reports suggested Iran would receive at least 24 Flankers originally built for Egypt or up to 50 Su-35s ordered and paid for under a previous presidential administration.

IRGC commander Shadmani's remarks come two weeks after Iran and Russia signed a 20-year strategic partnership and in the wake of a devastating Israeli air and drone campaign that destroyed most of Iran's strategic, long-range S-300 air defense systems.

A timely delivery of these jets — possible but far from certain — could enhance Iran's "overall defensive and deterrent" capabilities, said Freddy Khoueiry, a global security analyst for the Middle East and North Africa at the risk intelligence company RANE. Their delivery could also make Israel "cognizant of the threat of advanced fighters" in Iranian hands.

Iran's current fighter fleet is badly outdated compared to most of its neighbors in the Middle East. It consists of F-14A Tomcats and F-4 Phantom IIs from the pre-1979 rule of the last shah, when Tehran was an American ally. Tehran's only notable fighter acquisitions since were a fleet of MiG-29 Fulcrums from the Soviet Union in 1990. Tehran also confiscated Iraqi aircraft, including French-made Mirage F1s, flown to Iran to evade destruction in the 1991 Persian Gulf War.

While factory-fresh Su-35s would be Iran's most significant fighter acquisition in a generation, they won't replace the capabilities of Iran's degraded air defenses. For example, Khoueiry noted they could not "directly replace the persistence coverage, area denial, and wide-area protection" offered by ground-based systems like the Russian-made S-300.

"Iran would also need time to train crews and integrate the Su-35 into its existing network of sensors, command-and-control nodes, and other defensive assets," Khoueiry told BI.

"While modern fighters can deter hostile operations and bolster interception capabilities, they work most effectively when combined with robust surface-to-air defenses," Khoueiry said. "Therefore, replacing lost S-300 systems remains crucial for any comprehensive and layered Iranian air defense strategy."

Federico Borsari, a defense expert at the Centre for European Policy Analysis, believes the Su-35 will significantly improve Iran's air defense and offensive capabilities.

At the same time, he anticipates that Iran will try to acquire the more advanced Russian S-400 to replace the S-300s it lost.

"However, it's not clear how long it might take to create a highly layered air defense network," Borsari said. "Likewise, it will take a few years for Iran to get a fully operational squadron of Su-35s (time for training, infrastructure adaptation, integration of the system in the doctrine and concept of operations, etc)."

"So, Israel retains an important advantage for the time being."

The Su-35 is a significant jolt for Iran's airpower. Borsari noted the aircraft's significant maneuverability provided by its Saturn AL-41FS turbofan engines. These engines give the jet a high climb rate, acceleration, and "superior kinematics performance," even at speeds up to Mach 2.25. And its Irbis-E radar can simultaneously scan the ground and air over a wide area.

"As a whole, the capabilities of the Su-35, in particular the combination of the Irbis-E radar and beyond visual range R-77-1 missiles with active radar guidance, would definitely improve the Iran air deterrent's combat air patrol capabilities and make it much more dangerous for Western fourth and even 4.5-generation aircraft, including Israeli F-16s and F-15s," Borsari told BI.

It's possible that Russia will also deliver the R-77-1 missiles to powerfully arm the Su-35. Moscow similarly provided beyond-visual-range air-to-air missiles with the MiG-29A fighters it provided Tehran in the early 1990s.

While it remains "inferior from a technical standpoint" to Israel's stealthy fifth-generation F-35I jets, Borsari said, the Su-35 could still pose dangers to the premier Israeli aircraft — some of which likely entered Iranian airspace during the October 26 strikes.

"The Su-35 can become a threat by both using long-range R-77-1 air-to-air missiles or by getting within visual range and employing its better air-superiority characteristics against the F-35."

"Against this backdrop, Israel will do its best to avoid [within visual range] engagements and use the F-35 in its comfort zone."

It's likely that future Israeli strikes, should they come, could use F-35 stealth fighters to target Su-35s on the tarmac, not unlike how they struck air defenses in October. Israel may again use its standoff air-launched ballistic missiles to destroy these aircraft from a distance.

"With Israel having demonstrated its advanced stealth capabilities in the past year with its effective attacks against the Iranians, there is a decent chance the Israelis could launch a preemptive attack that at least grounds a portion of these Russian-built fighters and prevents the Iranians from effectively using them," RANE's Khoueiry said.

Paul Iddon is a freelance journalist and columnist who writes about Middle East developments, military affairs, politics, and history. His articles have appeared in a variety of publications focused on the region.

• Iraq looms as a key test of the US's priorities for countering Iranian power in the region.
• About 2,500 US troops remain in Iraq with a focus on assisting partners with countering ISIS.
• Iran holds tremendous sway with Iraqi armed groups and government leaders.

Iraq looms as a complex test for the new Trump administration.

Will it be a hawk that pries loose a weakened Iran's grip or an isolationist that withdraws the remaining American troops, whose presence dates to the war that President Donald Trump once called a "big, fat mistake?"

Iraqi officials recognized the new administration could be a turning point. The prime minister has called for strengthening ties with the US and stalled calls for a phased withdrawal of US troops from the country following the sudden collapse of Bashar al-Assad's regime in neighboring Syria.

"The major changes in the balance of power within the region — coupled with President Trump's reappointment — mean that Iraq's government wants the reassurance of US troop presence in Syria and facing Syria from Al-Asad," Michael Knights, an Iraq expert at the Washington Institute think tank, told Business Insider.

Al-Asad is an enormous airbase in Iraq's western border province of Anbar that hosts US troops. Pulling them out strengthens Iran's hand and risks giving ISIS remnants a chance to resurge.

"Everyone remembers how the rise of ISIS began with the withdrawal of US forces from Iraq last time in 2011," Knights said. "The Iraqi leadership also wants to be a good partner to the US, and evicting US forces is not a good way to start."

Iraq proved a pivotal flashpoint in Trump's first term. He ordered the assassination of a top Iranian general there, who was killed along with the commander of the Iran-backed Kataib Hezbollah militia. Iran retaliated by firing ballistic missiles at US troops at Al-Asad, injuring over 100 American personnel.

Upon Trump's inauguration this week, Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani sent his congratulations and said his country seeks strengthened relations. But that overture faces hard realities: Sudani leads a pro-Iran coalition that may have little appetite or power to disarm Iran-backed militias.

"No one can honestly say Iraq is today balanced between Iran and the US when the government of Iraq was appointed by Iran-backed militias who won a minority of seats in the 2021 elections," Knights said. "Iraq's government, intelligence services, and economy are now riddled with Iran-backed militias — and that has to change before President Trump's team sees Iraq as a trusted friend again."

Iraqi Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein recently told Reuters that Baghdad is trying to convince powerful Shiite militias in the country to disarm or join the Iraqi Security Forces. He noted it would have been "impossible to discuss this topic" in Iraq two years ago.

The PMF is an umbrella of predominantly Shiite Iraqi militias formed in 2014 to fight ISIS. It includes powerful factions loyal to Iran, such as Kataib Hezbollah, that serve Tehran's interests in the region first and foremost.

"There is a genuine need to rein in the Popular Mobilization Forces before it gets too rich and powerful to control — as the Revolutionary Guard did inside Iran," Knights said.

Many of these pro-Iran militias have operated under the umbrella of the self-styled Islamic Resistance of Iraq since the current Middle East conflict began in October 2023. They have attacked US troops in Iraq and Syria and targeted Israel with cruise missiles and drones. The US blamed them for a deadly drone attack on a US outpost in Jordan.

"I believe disarming these groups affiliated with Tehran is not a decision the Iraqi government can make independently," Lawk Ghafuri, an independent Iraq analyst based in Erbil, told BI. "It is a far more complex issue, as these groups are entirely controlled by Tehran, leaving Iraq with limited influence over their future."

The PMF have good relations with Sudani's ruling Coordination Framework, further complicating any serious effort to disarm them or bring them firmly under state control. However, doing so may become necessary if Iraq wants better US relations or a powerful ally to check ISIS's attempts to regroup.

"The Iraqi media is awash in reports that the ruling Coordination Framework is worried that Iraq will be punished by the Trump administration for its ties to Iran," Joel Wing, author of the authoritative Musings on Iraq blog, told BI. "There is talk of sanctions and military strikes against pro-Iran PMF factions."

"Even before that, the Sudani government was talking about extending the stay of US troops in Iraq because of fears of what might happen in Syria after the fall of Assad," Wing said. "Baghdad would like American military support if things went bad."

In September 2024, the US announced a "two-phase transition plan" to wrap up the counter-ISIS coalition operations in Iraq, which began in 2014. US troops will withdraw from certain parts of Iraq by September 2025 under the first phase but continue supporting anti-ISIS operations in Syria from Iraqi soil until at least September 2026.

"I think Baghdad might settle for simply removing the Coalition wrapper or label but leaving US troops in place as a bilateral mission, even in Al-Asad and Baghdad," Knights said. "It is worth remembering that US forces in Baghdad airport allow the US embassy, NATO and other diplomatic missions to keep operating because they have an assured line of supply and evacuation."

The pro-Iran factions are already part of the PMF, receive government paychecks, and have members in parliament yet still resist Baghdad's authority. Options include disarmament or integrating them into the Iraqi military.

"None of these moves will have any meaningful impact upon the Resistance as they have always followed their own leaders and Iran rather than Baghdad," Wing said.

Assad's fall and Israel's recent offensive against its main proxy, Hezbollah in Lebanon, were major strategic setbacks for Iran. Tehran undoubtedly wants to avoid a similar setback in neighboring Iraq.

"While Tehran's influence may have weakened regionally, it remains strong in Iraq," Ghafuri said. "Disarming or integrating these groups into the Iraqi national army would not diminish Tehran's power."

Knights anticipates Tehran will try to hold onto Iraq since Baghdad serves as a "cash cow" for its various regional militias and Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.

Wing also pointed out that Iraq is dependent on Iran for crucial imports such as natural gas and electricity, making it almost impossible to separate the neighbors.

"The Iranian regime cannot afford another domino to fall after Hamas and Hezbollah and Assad," Knights said.

"This is why the US needs to fight hard to keep up the momentum and continue to roll back Iran's influence in Iraq in the coming years, one official and one institution and one dollar at a time."

Paul Iddon is a freelance journalist and columnist who writes about Middle East developments, military affairs, politics, and history. His articles have appeared in a variety of publications focused on the region.

• Israel has used its Air Force to strike its enemies with impunity.
• Syria's collapse now gives it unprecedented power in the air, right up to Iran's border.
• "Israel now has open skies to Iran," a Middle East analyst told BI.

The Israeli Air Force has long been regarded as the Middle East's premier aerial fleet, supplied in large part with US-made aircraft and munitions. But in the past year it has gone further, showing its aircraft can strike any of its adversaries with impunity and establishing unprecedented air superiority across wide stretches of the region.

It gutted Russian and Iranian-made air defenses in Iran, daring Iranian leaders to strike back with fewer defenses. It destroyed stocks of Hezbollah's missile arsenal in southern Lebanon and killed its top leader with a precision airstrike on his underground headquarters.

Its power was so formidable in Syria that the Assad regime and Russia secretly asked Israel to spare Assad's military, according to allegedly classified documents found in the country after that brutal regime collapsed in December.

In the wake of that collapse, Israel seized the opportunity. The Israeli Air Force (IAF) destroyed the country's vast majority of air defenses and Syrian military stockpiles.

Across 15 months of war, instigated by the Oct. 7, 2023 terrorist massacre by Hamas into Israel, the IAF has emerged supreme and is basking in its moment.

"Fighter pilots, if they wanted, could now merrily fly in pairs, with visible operating systems, at any altitude, to any range, to any spot in Israel's first circle of defense," reported the Israeli news site Ynet in late December.

Israel has long possessed the most powerful air force in the Middle East and one of the most powerful and technologically advanced anywhere in the world. It boasts over 600 aircraft and over 30,000 active personnel, with no less than 50,000 in reserve. It operates the second-largest fleet of F-16s in the world and is the only regional country that currently flies the F-35 stealth jet. Furthermore, Israel has its own version of that fifth-generation aircraft, a privilege no other country enjoys.

The IAF overwhelmingly consists of American-made aircraft that also include Apache and Black Hawk helicopters. Israel also flies a large fleet of F-15s and recently signed a $5.2 billion deal for 25 highly advanced F-15IA variants.

The IAF plays a pivotal role in the defense of Israel. It gave the small country a critical qualitative edge over its larger Arab adversaries in historical conflicts, most notably the June 1967 Six Day War.

The IAF's newfound supremacy goes beyond previous wars. For example, it previously destroyed several Soviet-built Syrian surface-to-air missile batteries in Lebanon's Beqaa Valley in a complex operation in 1982 and shot down over 80 Syrian fighter jets without incurring any losses in return. While December's operation saw the IAF strike all across Syria, the operation wasn't nearly as sophisticated or dangerous as that historical episode; many of the air defenses in the latest operation were abandoned or in low states of readiness.

"We know one reason possibly restraining Israel was a recently exposed secret agreement with Russia and Syria in which Israel agreed to refrain from wider targeting of Syria's military," said Sebastien Roblin, a widely published military aviation journalist.

Israel launched an enormous long-range air and drone attack against Iran on the night of October 26 in retaliation for an Iranian missile barrage against it on October 1. The IAF targeted some Syrian air defenses in the lead-up to the attack.

The IAF also used Iraqi airspace that October night and reportedly targeted early warning radars and sensors in both Syria and Iraq, which were part of a network Iran established in the region to detect incoming Israeli attacks. While the IAF used standoff munitions, including air-launched ballistic missiles, some Israeli aircraft are believed to have penetrated Iranian airspace.

"From what we currently know, some Israeli aircraft did reportedly breach Iranian airspace, though not, from what I've seen, very far," Ryan Bohl, a senior Middle East and North Africa analyst at the risk intelligence company RANE, told BI.

"That was in part a demonstration of capability and in part an operational necessity to effectively hit deep targets," Bohl said.

Israel stated some aircraft entered Iranian airspace, which were likely stealthy Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II jets and newly revealed long-range drones. Roblin said it's unclear if these aircraft released weapons over Iran. They could have been there to help "precisely locate key targets" and guide weapons fired by other aircraft over significant distances.

"The strike certainly had the effect of dispelling deterrence benefits of Iran's more advanced air defenses (Russian S-300 systems)," Roblin said. However, as in the case with Syria before December, Iran's remaining air defenses "still have some value in compelling use of more expensive standoff munitions and perhaps absorbing a percentage of incoming weapons."

Israel's campaign against the remnants of the Syrian military has major implications for Iran. Should Syria's airspace remain permissive to Israeli aircraft, Israel can fly its tanker aircraft closer to Iranian airspace than previously possible.

"If medium/high-altitude air defenses were truly fully destroyed, then Israel's ordinarily vulnerable tanker aircraft could indeed theoretically access Syrian airspace and refuel fighters, which could enable higher volume attacks on Iran," Roblin said.

With Syrian air defenses eliminated, Bohl believes that "Israel now has open skies to Iran."

It will likely take years before Syria manages to reestablish significant air defenses.

"The one-two-punch of Assad regime's collapse followed by Israeli strikes on surviving equipment mean Syria will require a much longer time-frame to reconstitute an air- and ground-based defense capability through expensive new equipment purchases," Roblin said. "So, Israel's ability to attack targets at will has been improved, though it was already more than adequate."

Airpower, of course, has its limits. Israel's aerial bombing has damaged roughly two-thirds of all buildings in Gaza, but it was a foot patrol that found and killed Hamas' hardline leader, who orchestrated the 10/7 attacks. Similarly, waves of Israeli airstrikes have failed to stop Iran from nuclear weapons development and uranium enrichment.

With Russia's influence diminishing, Turkey appears destined to become the new Syria's main military backer. Ankara has already offered to help Damascus rebuild the Syrian military.

"For now, Israel can ignore Syria as a defensive layer for Iran; it's just geography to fly over now," RANE's Bohl said. "But that is unlikely to be a permanent condition, and eventually, Syria's air defenses will, in some capacity, return."

"And should Turkey provide them, (that) might complicate Israel's regional strategy in a new way."

Paul Iddon is a freelance journalist and columnist who writes about Middle East developments, military affairs, politics, and history. His articles have appeared in a variety of publications focused on the region.

• Turkey offered to rebuild Syria's demolished military.
• It's an opening to grow its influence with its southern neighbor and counter Iran.
• "Turkey will likely try to fill Russia's role," a Middle East analyst told BI.

Turkey offered to help rebuild the Syrian military shattered by the fall of the long-ruling Assad regime and Israeli airstrikes, potentially filling a void left by Russia's diminishing forces.

Limited Turkish arms are inroads to bolstering the victorious Hayat Tahrir al-Sham Islamist movement in Syria, but Turkey will likely need financial support to pay for more extensive military rebuilding that could allow it to become the dominant foreign power in Syria, regional experts said.

"Turkey will likely try to fill Russia's role, including in relation to Israel," said Aron Lund, a fellow with Century International and a Middle East analyst at the Swedish Defense Research Agency. "A Turkish contingent in the Golan Heights, or even just a military liaison of some sort, could back up UN missions and serve as a buffer and facilitator between Israeli and Syrian leaders."

"It's exactly the kind of role Turkey would want. It would institutionalize Ankara's role not just in Syria, but in Arab-Israeli peacemaking."

Russia and the former Soviet Union were long the leading suppliers of military hardware to Syria under the rule of recently deposed President Bashar al-Assad and his father Hafez, who died in 2000. Much of the former regime's remaining military stockpiles were destroyed by Israeli airstrikes in December.

"While Turkey may play an important role in providing military hardware, it is unlikely to fully become the primary supplier of the new Syrian Army," Suleyman Ozeren, a lecturer at the American University and senior fellow at the Orion Policy Institute, told Business Insider.

"With Western reluctance to arm HTS's military and Turkey's limited capacity, Syria will likely need to diversify its sources of heavy weaponry, potentially increasing its dependence on Gulf Cooperation Council countries" — Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. These countries share an interest in countering Iran's influence.

HTS leader Ahmed al-Sharaa recently said it could take up to four years before holding elections. Turkey may have an opportunity to extend its influence in Syria by backing a viable government whose immediate needs are likely to center on guns, vehicles and drones to consolidate internal control.

"Syria is awash in arms, ministries and state agencies are largely staffed by people appointed under Assad's rule, and there's no apparent economic base for any of this," Lund told BI. "So, I would caution that Syria's next government is still pretty much a hypothetical thing."

"The new government will need military support and equipment," Lund said. "The old military, or what was left of it, imploded when Assad's regime collapsed."

Turkey is well-positioned to fulfill the new regime's likely needs. In Libya, in the wake of the Gaddafi regime's 2011 collapse, it equipped the UN-recognized government in Tripoli with Turkish-built Bayraktar TB2 drones and Kipri armored vehicles, replacing the former regime's destroyed arsenal. The TB2 drones played a decisive role in pushing back the militia forces of General Khalifa Haftar in 2020 after they had besieged Tripoli.

Building up a large conventional army to compete with foreign rivals will not likely be a priority for Damascus anytime soon, and a ground-up rebuilding will take years and large expenditures.

"The primary needs of Syria's next government won't be to wage major conventional wars. Rather, they'll need the kind of stuff that helps them overwhelm local rivals, keep order in the chaotic rural periphery, hunt down Islamic State remnants, and patrol the borders," Lund said.

Despite having the second-largest army in NATO and a formidable domestic arms industry, Turkey could still struggle to build a conventional Syrian military from the ground up.

"In so far as that can't already be found in Syria, Turkey seems well placed to provide it," Lund said. "The question, of course, is who would pay for it. Qatar might be willing to step in to fund some purchases."

Turkey could train Syria's new military, host its officers for military studies in Turkey, and eventually hold joint exercises that could pave the way for a deeper alliance, Lund said.

But standing up a military in a devastated country may prove more challenging than fueling an insurgency.

"Turkey will likely pursue defense and security agreements with Syria while carefully navigating its relationships with Arab states to avoid diplomatic isolation," Ozeren said. "However, creating an army is very much different than supporting or creating a proxy force which could risk long-term instability in the region."

"Ultimately, the question remains whether Turkey has the capacity to provide the necessary training and hardware to establish a fully functioning standard army in Syria," Ozeren added. "The experiences in Libya and with the [Syria National Army opposition group] do not provide a definitive answer to this challenge."

Paul Iddon is a freelance journalist and columnist who writes about Middle East developments, military affairs, politics, and history. His articles have appeared in a variety of publications focused on the region.

• The Syrian Democratic Forces, a US partner in Syria, downed an MQ-9 Reaper drone.
• The incident shows the SDF has acquired air defenses of some sort.
• It's very possible that the SDF downed a low-flying Reaper with a shoulder-fired missile.

America's ally in Syria accidentally shot down an advanced US drone, suggesting these Kurdish-led forces have acquired some kind of air defenses.

A $30 million MQ-9 Reaper drone wasn't the only victim. A day later, the Syrian Democratic Forces — who partnered with the US to fight the Islamic State in Syria a decade ago — purposely shot down a Turkish drone.

A US official confirmed to Defense News that the SDF misidentified the MQ-9 as a threat on December 9 and shot it down, without specifying what kind of weapon was used; the SDF hasn't publicly acknowledged the incident. However, the SDF did release footage purportedly showing its forces shooting down Turkey's Aksungur drone.

"The SDF would need more capable air defense systems than older MANPADs (man-portable air defense system) like the Strela-2 to shoot down an MQ-9 Reaper unless the drone was flying far below its typical operating ceiling, possibly due to mission requirements or technical issues," Freddy Khoueiry, a global security analyst for the Middle East and North Africa at the risk intelligence company RANE, told Business Insider.

A Reaper drone has a 66-foot wingspan and can fly up to 50,000 feet in altitude, beyond the range of shoulder-fired Strela-2 missiles. The remotely piloted aircraft frequently carry Hellfire ground-attack missiles.

"A SHORAD (short-range air defense) or medium-range radar-guided SAM (surface-to-air missile) system would be required to effectively engage a Reaper drone operating at its standard altitude," Khoueiry said.

It is more likely that the SDF has shoulder-fired missiles due to their proliferation, which also have the benefit of being harder to spot than truck-mounted missile launchers. If the MQ-9 was downed by a MANPAD, it suggests it was flying very low, Khoueiry said.

The Aksungur is a much larger and more advanced drone than Turkey's widely exported Bayraktar TB2, but it is not in the same league as the American MQ-9.

"Aksungur drones are capable, 'middle-class drones' that are typically used for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, although increasingly modified to carry weapons," Nicholas Heras, senior director of strategy and innovation at the New Lines Institute, told BI.

Syrian soldiers abandoned their bases and weapons stockpiles during the dramatic fall of President Bashar al-Assad's regime in early December. Israel has already moved in and bombed large quantities of them. Turkey has also moved to prevent the SDF from capturing weapons. Turkish intelligence destroyed 12 trucks with missiles and other heavy weapons in the northeastern Kurdish city of Qamishli, and Turkish drones targeted abandoned tanks, armored vehicles, and rocket launchers strewn across northeast Syria.

"It is unlikely that the SDF captured and were able to quickly operationalize Syrian regime air defenses within the past week," RANE's Khoueiry said. "Furthermore, Israeli strikes have significantly degraded such systems across Syrian territory, making it even more difficult for a US-backed militia to acquire and effectively operate them."

Turkish media reported earlier this year that US troops in northeast Syria were training the SDF how to use the AN/TWQ-1 Avenger short-range air defense system, which fires Stinger missiles. However, sources in Syria cited by the UK-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights war monitor said only US troops operate the Avengers, which protect their bases against Iran-backed militia drone attacks.

"The challenge for the SDF to use systems such as the SA-2s (Soviet-made S-75s) or Avengers is that these anti-air systems require a logistical network to operate that is cumbersome for a non-state actor, especially if that non-state actor doesn't have accompanying anti-air capabilities to protect those systems," Heras said.

Ceng Sagnic, chief of analysis of the geopolitical consultancy firm TAM-C Solutions, believes it is possible the SDF is "independently operating" some air defenses in Syria.

"However, it should be noted that Kurdish groups have long had access to short-range air defense missiles, particularly those acquired from the black market and not NATO standard," Sagnic told BI. "There is also a possibility that an operator of one of these systems got lucky that day."

"In any case, the incident demonstrates the readiness of Kurdish groups in Syria to respond to drone operations, especially those conducted by Turkey," Sagnic said.

The Kurdistan Workers Party, commonly known by its PKK acronym, had Strela-2 missiles as far back as the 1990s and shot down two Turkish helicopters over northern Iraq in 1997.

The Middle East Eye news outlet reported earlier this year that Iran had transferred air-breathing anti-drone loitering missiles to the PKK. One such munition purportedly brought down an Aksungur over Iraqi Kurdistan in May. Iran-backed Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Houthis in Yemen have used the Iranian-made 358 missile to shoot down Israeli and American drones, including a number of MQ-9s.

It's unclear if the SDF — whose main Kurdish component Turkey charges with inextricable PKK links — acquired such a system.

"The claim that Iran supplies the PKK (and, by extension, the SDF) with a significant number of anti-drone missiles is highly questionable," Sagnic said. "Only a consistent pattern of successful anti-drone strikes by the SDF in the near future could indicate enhanced capabilities by the Kurdish group, and a single drone interception is not sufficient proof."

"However, there have been at least two reported interceptions of Turkish drones over northern Iraq in recent months, suggesting that Kurdish groups are adapting to the so-called drone wars, though their continued success remains uncertain."

Paul Iddon is a freelance journalist and columnist who writes about Middle East developments, military affairs, politics, and history. His articles have appeared in a variety of publications focused on the region.

• Russia faces the prospect of losing key bases in Syria but still has moves left.
• Keeping its bases may come down to lucrative deals with the now victorious groups it had attacked.
• These bases are critical to Russian influence in the Middle East and would not be easily replaced.

Syria has been central to Russian plans to project power across the Middle East — as evidenced by the recent signing of a 49-year lease for Syrian bases.

But after the ouster of the ally it propped up, Syrian President Bashar Assad, Russian officials face the likelihood its days in Syria are numbered.

"Russia's certainly doing everything in its power to maintain a presence in Syria while preparing for the possibility that this is the end," Ben Dubow, a nonresident senior fellow with the Democratic Resilience Program at the Center for European Policy Analysis, told Business Insider.

Moscow is doing so by "not only leaving their ships out at sea but, according to [Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham's] official Telegram channel, disbursing weapons to local Alawite groups," Dubow said. "Reaching out to the new leadership is both an act of desperation and an acceptance of the new reality."

This is a look at the dimming options Russia now faces.

Reduced footprint

Shortly after Assad fled to Russia, a deal was reportedly reached with the interim authorities, led by the victorious Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham Islamist movement, guaranteeing the security of these bases, and the armed opposition presently has no plans to attack them. Still, it's far from clear that the future leadership in Damascus is willing to tolerate a long-term Russian military presence.

For now, some Russian warships are anchored outside the Tartus base as a precaution, and there are other Russian military movements in Syria.

"There is quite a lot of military equipment that has been hastily withdrawn to the coastal region or is being withdrawn at the moment from various remote regions," Anton Mardasov, a nonresident scholar with the Middle East Institute's Syria program, told BI. "So, the ships that are going to Syria from the Baltic Fleet and the military transport planes that are coming to Hmeimim may be taking out this excess equipment."

Alongside its Tartus naval base, Russia also has a sizable airbase in Latakia named Hmeimim, which it has used as a launchpad to conduct airstrikes throughout Syria since intervening in the country's bloody civil war in 2015.

"It may not be a question of a complete evacuation of the bases right now," Mardasov said. "Rather, a new government, possibly appointed after March 2025, should issue a decree denouncing or legitimizing Damascus' past treaty with Moscow."

A bare minimum force in Syria would "deprive" Russia of its capacity to counter NATO on its southern flank, Mardasov said.

Renewed access

Russia signed an extendable 49-year lease agreement with Assad's regime in 2017 for these bases, seemingly entrenching its forces in the Middle Eastern country for generations to come. The treaty even granted the Russian military legal immunity for its personnel in the country, meaning they would not be held accountable for killing Syrians.

"I can't speak to whether the 2017 agreements are binding, but at this point, only Russia could enforce them, and there's no sign they have the will or capacity to do so," Dubow said. "If Damascus orders Russia to leave, Moscow would be hard-pressed to withstand a siege."

Russia's best hope may be to try to extend its access until new deals can be made with the new Syrian leaders. The offers will likely have to be very lucrative to win over a Syrian opposition inured to Russian airstrikes and ruthless mercenaries.

Russia would likely offer money and other economic incentives, such as discounted refined fuel products, in return for Syria's new rulers tolerating its military presence.

But these would likely be short-term arrangements.

"In the long run, it is unlikely Russia's use of the facilities can be preserved considering considerable antipathy to Russia among Syria's new authorities after Russia's years of support to the Assad regime," said Matthew Orr, a Eurasia analyst at the risk intelligence company RANE.

Syria's interim authorities could even benefit from a continued Russian presence in the short term, he said. That could counterbalance the US presence on the other side of the country and serve as a bargaining chip in negotiations with other powers.

Complete withdrawal

Russia's choices are stark if it can't reach a deal. It can try to guard bases in an uneasy stand-off with HTS-led forces, which comes with risks of its troops being harmed or captured and subjected to trials that would humiliate Russia. Or it can airlift out its forces and materiel.

Orr, the RANE analyst, doesn't anticipate a hasty Russian withdrawal from Syria. Instead, Russia is probably preparing "for an orderly withdrawal from the facilities, likely after failed attempts to negotiate their preservation in the coming months," Orr told BI.

"Their loss would harm Russia's power projection because they are crucial logistical points for Russian military operations in Africa, the Middle East, and Russia's global naval operations, and Russia does not have immediately available alternatives to the facilities."

Tartus remains Moscow's only naval facility in the Mediterranean, making it vital for any extended Russian Navy deployment south of the Black Sea and Turkish Straits. Along with Hmeimim, it serves as a hub for supporting Russian military and mercenary deployments in Africa.

Moscow has had access to Tartus since the Soviet era in the 1970s. Furthermore, Russia invested in its expansion in the 2010s, making its potential loss all the more painful.

One alternative Russian port outside of Syria could be Tobruk in eastern Libya, which is controlled by the Libyan warlord Khalifa Haftar. CEPA's Dubow is skeptical that the Libyan port near Egypt could be any substitute.

"Tobruk would not come close to making up for Tartus and Latakia," Dubow said. "It's both smaller and much further from Russia. Even a significant reduction of Russian presence in Syria would immensely damage Russia's power projection capacity."

In this case, could Russia's loss be Turkey's gain? Turkey is close to the HTS-led coalition, but it too may lack the cachet to win permanent bases.

"The Turkish Navy doesn't need the Tartus base, and the possibility will depend on security conditions on the ground, which are still unclear many months from now, so it doesn't seem likely in the near term," RANE's Orr said.

"But in general, the Tartus port is something that if there is a unified government in Syria, they will definitely try to leverage for security and economic ties with a great power, or remove the base as part of geopolitical balancing between powers."

Paul Iddon is a freelance journalist and columnist who writes about Middle East developments, military affairs, politics, and history. His articles have appeared in a variety of publications focused on the region.

• Syria's embattled president is losing ground to advancing rebels after years of stalemate.
• In the past, Iran orchestrated the interventions that stopped the opposition forces' momentum.
• "I'm not sure Iran can muster the numbers in time to turn this situation around," an analyst said.

Since the early stages of Syria's bloody civil war that began in 2011, Iran has supported Syria's strongman president, Bashar Assad. Now with the loss of Syria's second city, Aleppo, to Assad's opponents, Tehran has vowed to continue this support — but it almost certainly has less to offer than a decade ago.

Syrian rebel forces spearheaded by the Islamist Hayat Tahrir al-Sham militant group seized Aleppo in a shock offensive last week, surprising the world and returning the Syrian conflict to the headlines for the first time in years. The rebels did not stop there. Advancing in the face of Russian and Syrian airstrikes, they overran Syria's fourth-largest city, Hama, on Thursday.

"The Syrian government has lost a lot of terrain, including the city of Aleppo. You can't really overstate the seriousness of that," Aron Lund, a fellow with Century International and a Middle East analyst at the Swedish Defence Research Agency, told Business Insider. "Aleppo is a huge city, a really large urban area that will be difficult to retake once lost if Assad is unable to move on it before the insurgents dig in."

Earlier in the Syrian conflict, Iran helped orchestrate interventions on Assad's side by its powerful Lebanese proxy Hezbollah in 2013, and Russia in 2015.

These decisive interventions helped him turn the tide, culminating in a ferocious, scorched-earth campaign against opposition groups in east Aleppo in 2016.

The latest offensive has prompted some outside intervention. Hundreds of Iran-backed militiamen in Iraq are entering Syria. Russia has carried out airstrikes to impede the opposition's advance. However, these are small-scale compared to past interventions. And Hezbollah isn't intervening for now.

"I'm not sure Iran can muster the numbers in time to turn this situation around," Lund said. "Hezbollah, which was Tehran's primary instrument in Syria over the past decade, is now stuck in Lebanon, tending to its wounds and trying to get back on its feet after being mauled by Israel over the course of a two-month war."

Hezbollah is estimated to have upwards of 100,000 fighters and a vast missile arsenal, but those have been battered by Israel's airstrikes and occupation of southern Lebanon.

"The Lebanon ceasefire is really brittle, and as long as conflict could re-erupt at any moment, I don't think Hezbollah has the manpower to spare," Lund said. "Even if they're able to send some men Assad's way, I doubt it would be a game-changing number."

Iran's other options are mobilizing more Iraqi militias or sending personnel from its own Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps paramilitary or its regular army.

"It's possible that Iran will try to send more arms and ammunition," Barbara Slavin, a distinguished fellow at the Stimson Center in Washington and founder and former director of the Future of Iran Initiative at the Atlantic Council, told BI.

"It is also probably counting on Russian airstrikes to stall the HTS offensive and it is clearly having back-channel talks with Turkey," Slavin said. "The Turks may be angling to get Iran to turn a blind eye to new attacks on the Kurds in return for urging HTS to hit pause."

HTS is not a Turkish-controlled proxy like the self-styled Syrian National Army coalition of opposition militias that is also advancing across Aleppo province. However, Turkey has closely coordinated its army's deployment in Syria's Idlib with HTS, which has been the predominant power in that northwestern Syrian province for years now.

"Iran is also looking to cultivate a relationship with Trump, which further limits its freedom of maneuver in the region," Slavin said.

"Iran is in a terrible situation currently without the necessary military, economic, and political capacity to spare," Arash Azizi, senior lecturer in history and political science at Clemson University, told BI.

"Its myriad of problems includes the fact that many Iraqis are reluctant to get involved in a renewed war in Syria."

While Iran will undoubtedly remain committed to supporting Assad, it's unlikely to prove capable of organizing a 2016-style counteroffensive to recapture Aleppo.

"That would require a lot of planning and a lot of diplomatic bargaining with Turkey and other powers," Azizi said.

Century's Lund recalled that the last time Iran intervened to help Assad recapture Aleppo, it did so in close collaboration with Russia.

"If they're going to replicate that success now, the Russians would probably need to bring the air component," Lund said. "Iran has no air force to speak of and if Iranian jets were to show up in Syria, Israel would go after them immediately."

Russian jets and air defenses afford Iran some protection since Israel is more hesitant to clash with Russian forces than they are with Syrian or Iranian ones.

But it remains to be seen how much airpower Russia can spare with its fighters and bombers engaged in the invasion of Ukraine.

"It's worth noting that the Syrian conflict is so small-scale compared to Ukraine that even a relatively small contribution of assets could have an impact there," Lund said.

The Iraqi militiamen entering Syria are more likely to serve as a holding force to help Assad avoid losing more territory.

"Assad needs to hold onto the capital and its immediate environs if he has a chance to survive as Syrian leader," Stimson's Slavin said.

Since Syria doesn't have a sizable Shia minority like Lebanon, Iran has been unable to stand up a local proxy as effective or powerful as Hezbollah in neighboring Lebanon.

Any efforts Iran may take to help Assad coincide with its own priorities to seek an acceptable deal with President-elect Donald Trump's incoming administration. "Iran also wants to at least try for a deal with Trump, so a more aggressive regional posture will not work as regional issues will be on the table this time along with the nuclear file," Slavin said.

As this crisis unfolds, it's striking how "unimportant and absent" the US has been, Azizi noted.

"The US has forces on the ground and also airpower that it has used to attack certain forces on Syrian territory," Azizi said. "But it's clearly not a main player and doesn't seem to have a clear, strategic goal or any particular focus on Syria."

And it remains unclear what President-elect Trump will do about Syria upon reentering office in January.

"As with most other matters, President Trump remains unpredictable," Azizi said.

Paul Iddon is a freelance journalist and columnist who writes about Middle East developments, military affairs, politics, and history. His articles have appeared in a variety of publications focused on the region.

• The US blocked Turkey from acquiring F-35 stealth fighters.
• Turkey wants the F-35s and may be willing to move the Russian air defenses that triggered the ban.
• President-elect Trump may favor a deal, but he'll likely face resistance inside his administration.

Until five years ago, Turkey had planned to buy 100 of Lockheed Martin's F-35 stealth jets to modernize its air force. But its acquisition of a top-of-the-line Russian air defense missile system dashed that plan, with the US barring Turkey from acquiring any F-35s out of concern the sophisticated Russian system could compromise its tiny radar return.

Five years later, Ankara hopes the incoming Trump administration will reverse its ban.

Turkish sources are signaling the discussion may go beyond an appeal from Turkey's President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, with whom Donald Trump built a rapport. According to Bloomberg, Turkey may agree to restrict its Russian S-400s air defenses in return for the US lifting sanctions. Over the summer, Greek media reported that Washington suggested Ankara transfer the Russian missile launchers to the American section of Turkey's Incirlik airbase, effectively putting them under American supervision.

"If Turkey agrees to a soft decommissioning of the S-400s by storing them at Incirlik under US supervision, it could significantly accelerate Ankara's reintegration into the F-35 program," Suleyman Ozeren, a lecturer at the American University and senior fellow at the Orion Policy Institute, told Business Insider.

"However, this move would likely require Moscow's consent, which presents a complex challenge."

That's not the only hurdle. While analysts see signs that Trump and Turkey may try to clear the impasse, any agreement could still face resistance in his cabinet and in Congress, which passed the 2017 legislation under which Turkey would later be sanctioned for its acquisition of the S-400 system.

Ali Bakir, a Turkey expert at Qatar University's Ibn Khaldon Center and nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council's Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative, sees "cautious optimism" in Ankara.

He attributes this to the belief that "personal understanding and communication" between Trump and Erdogan will resolve outstanding issues in the Turkish-US relationship, paving the way for a "fresh start."

"However, it is important to acknowledge that Congress also plays a significant role in this dynamic," Bakir told BI. "Congress has often been the most problematic element in US-Turkish relations, rather than the US president."

"Early indications suggest that Congress may not be particularly favorable towards Ankara," Bakir said.

Ozeren also anticipates Ankara could find "greater room to maneuver" during Trump's second term, especially as Republicans will control the House and Senate.

"In theory, this could increase the chances of obtaining US approval for Turkey's return to the F-35 program," Ozeren said. "Nonetheless, given the deeply strained relations over the past decade, any progress would likely be fraught with difficulties and setbacks."

Ryan Bohl, a senior Middle East and North Africa analyst at the risk intelligence company RANE, believes Trump is personally "keen" on selling F-35s to Turkey.

However, Trump's nominee for secretary of state, Marco Rubio, is a Russia and China hawk and may prove "less flexible" on the requirements of the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act that became law in 2017. Bohl sees "little sign" that the law will be overturned.

"So, it will remain to be seen if Trump can overcome these institutional hurdles to a sale to Turkey," Bohl told BI.

Before Turkey received any S-400s, Washington had repeatedly warned Ankara it would not tolerate F-35s flying in a military that also operates S-400s, fearing that could compromise the low observable radar signature critical to the aircraft's survivability. Placing Turkish S-400s under US supervision in Incirlik could resolve such concerns.

"The damage will never be too severe in terms of relations; what matters is whether or not the administration, and Congress, decides Turkey has done enough to limit the potential exposure of the F-35 to Russian intelligence and/or information gathering," Bohl said.

"That will likely be a split between Trump, who tends not to emphasize such risks, and the Pentagon and intelligence services, who do," Bohl added. "Even with a pliable defense secretary compared to Mark Esper in his first term, this consideration may still be in play."

Turkey has repeatedly asserted over the years that it no longer needs F-35s since it is developing its indigenous stealth jet, the TF Kaan. Despite these assertions, Ankara would most likely welcome another chance to acquire the fifth-generation produced by Lockheed Martin, in partnership with Northrop Grumman and BAE Systems; its powerful single-engine is built by Pratt & Whitney, a subsidiary of RTX Corporation. The F-35 is flown by 17 American allies.

"I believe that if the ban on F-35s is lifted, Ankara would definitely want to acquire them, despite other parallel deals, as Turkey cannot afford to be overly dependent on a single player in critical times," Bakir said.

At the same time, Turkey is developing domestic air defenses and has never put the S-400 into service in the five years since receiving them. The intervening Ukraine war, where Russian S-400s suffered losses, could reduce the value Turkey sees in them.

"Certainly, the S-400's combat performance against Ukraine has been mixed; Turkey may conclude that more advanced F-35s are in its national interest, particularly given Israel's recent deployment of F-35s against Iran," Bohl said.

"At the same time, F-35s will be reliant on US supply chains, and those could be interrupted over politics or because of other priorities that make resupply difficult."

Paul Iddon is a freelance journalist and columnist who writes about Middle East developments, military affairs, politics, and history. His articles have appeared in a variety of publications focused on the region.

• US troops remain in Syria to counter ISIS and patrol oil fields in the region.
• Trump's return raises uncertainties about the status of these troops in this highly volatile region.
• Both Turkey and the Kurdish-led officials hope to sway the incoming Trump administration.

For almost a decade, US troops have been on the ground in Syria to assist Kurdish-led forces in the defeat of the infamous Islamic State. These forces tamp down on the ISIS remnants in the northern and eastern regions they presently control, where tens of thousands of captured ISIS fighters, their families and suspected affiliates remain in open-air camps and prisons.

But there's a new wrinkle of uncertainty in this highly volatile and contested region: US President-elect Donald Trump.

During his first term, Trump ordered the withdrawal of US troops partnered with the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces after ISIS' territorial defeat. Trump did this following a phone call with the president of Turkey, a staunch rival of the SDF, resulting in an immediate cross-border Turkish operation against those US-allied forces. Trump then backtracked and kept 900 US troops in Syria.

His imminent return to the Oval Office once again raises the specter that the US could pull out, leaving a power vacuum that Turkey, the Syrian regime, and Russia may move to fill at the SDF's expense. The resulting instability could be an opening for ISIS to regroup. Turkish officials want the US to leave, with the incumbent defense minister stating, "Trump will strongly focus on this." But the Kurds hope they can persuade him otherwise.

"We formed a successful alliance with the United States in combating terrorism," Sinam Mohamad, the representative of the Syrian Democratic Council mission to the United States and a top diplomat of the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria, told Business Insider.

"We may have felt frustrated during Trump's first term due to his decision to withdraw American forces from Syria in 2019," Mohamad said. "But today, as a result of the political circumstances in the Middle East and the world, we see that President Trump will have a different outlook than before."

The AANES administrates large swathes of north and east Syria under the SDF's control.

The regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, which is backed by Russia, does not recognize the AANES. Turkey vehemently opposes it, claiming the SDF has inextricable ties to its main adversary, the Kurdistan Workers' Party, or PKK. Turkish strikes against AANES infrastructure have cut off water and electricity to over a million people, leading to charges that Turkey is violating international law.

"The incoming Trump administration has an opportunity to reconfigure the entire US strategy in Syria, maintain its minimal but high-rewards troops presence in Syria, and proceed with a bold vision to mend fences between Syrian Kurds and Ankara," Mohammed A. Salih, a non-resident senior fellow in the Foreign Policy Research Institute and an expert on Kurdish and regional affairs, told BI.

"The focus should be on a win-win outcome for all sides, America, Kurds, and Turkey."

Some called for a US withdrawal after the January drone attack against a US base in Jordan that supports operations in Syria, killing three Americans and injuring 47.

The specific timing of any American withdrawal will also be a critical factor.

"The American withdrawal from Syria may take place in 2026 or before that, but what will be different are the circumstances that will accompany this withdrawal," the SDC's Mohamad said. "It may take into account the dangers facing the areas of the autonomous administration and Washington's allies in the fight against terrorism, and at that time, it is necessary to ensure the withdrawal with political security for the region."

The official underlined the continued importance of the American presence for ensuring "the continuation of the fight against terrorism" and that the SDF can continue securing the "large number of prisoners of the terrorist organizations languishing" in AANES detention.

The Kurds have thousands of former ISIS fighters in its camps and detention centers. The sprawling Al-Hol camp has a population of over 40,000, including thousands of ISIS women and children, a number of whom remain radicalized. It has warned that another Turkish invasion would divert SDF fighters and resources away from securing these facilities.

"The Syrian Democratic Forces have the qualifications to secure these facilities," said Mohamad, the Kurdish diplomat. "But they will not be able to perform their duty to the fullest extent if the withdrawal occurs without political security for the region's situation."

Mohamad stressed that AANES and SDF would want American guarantees that Turkey will not invade after a US withdrawal.

"A sudden troop withdrawal could probably result in even more disastrous outcomes than in Afghanistan, given the presence of various regional and global powers in Syria and the resurgence of ISIS and other jihadi groups there," said Salih, the FPRI regional expert.

"In all likelihood, the situation will be highly chaotic in the event of a withdrawal with serious consequences that could witness the mass escaping of ISIS prisoners, likely more radicalized and resentful as a result of their prison experience," Salih added.

While weakened from years of war, ISIS has already demonstrated its capability to regroup and threaten their adversaries. A coordinated ISIS jailbreak attempt in 2022 led to almost two weeks of heavy fighting with the SDF.

A rapid US withdrawal tips the uneasy balance of powers. Salih anticipates this could lead to "a hectic race" between Iran, Russia, the Syrian regime, and Turkey for the resource-rich AANES regions.

"All the problems we suffer from in the regions of North and East Syria are related to the necessity of placing our region within the international solution platforms related to Syria, political support, and finding a solution to the Syrian crisis with the participation of the Autonomous Administration and the Syrian Democratic Council in the political process," Mohamad said.

"This will have a major impact in changing the shape of the region, reducing hotbeds of tension, and ensuring global security and peace."

Paul Iddon is a freelance journalist and columnist who writes about Middle East developments, military affairs, politics, and history. His articles have appeared in a variety of publications focused on the region.