• The Syrian Democratic Forces, a US partner in Syria, downed an MQ-9 Reaper drone.
• The incident shows the SDF has acquired air defenses of some sort.
• It's very possible that the SDF downed a low-flying Reaper with a shoulder-fired missile.

America's ally in Syria accidentally shot down an advanced US drone, suggesting these Kurdish-led forces have acquired some kind of air defenses.

A $30 million MQ-9 Reaper drone wasn't the only victim. A day later, the Syrian Democratic Forces — who partnered with the US to fight the Islamic State in Syria a decade ago — purposely shot down a Turkish drone.

A US official confirmed to Defense News that the SDF misidentified the MQ-9 as a threat on December 9 and shot it down, without specifying what kind of weapon was used; the SDF hasn't publicly acknowledged the incident. However, the SDF did release footage purportedly showing its forces shooting down Turkey's Aksungur drone.

"The SDF would need more capable air defense systems than older MANPADs (man-portable air defense system) like the Strela-2 to shoot down an MQ-9 Reaper unless the drone was flying far below its typical operating ceiling, possibly due to mission requirements or technical issues," Freddy Khoueiry, a global security analyst for the Middle East and North Africa at the risk intelligence company RANE, told Business Insider.

A Reaper drone has a 66-foot wingspan and can fly up to 50,000 feet in altitude, beyond the range of shoulder-fired Strela-2 missiles. The remotely piloted aircraft frequently carry Hellfire ground-attack missiles.

"A SHORAD (short-range air defense) or medium-range radar-guided SAM (surface-to-air missile) system would be required to effectively engage a Reaper drone operating at its standard altitude," Khoueiry said.

It is more likely that the SDF has shoulder-fired missiles due to their proliferation, which also have the benefit of being harder to spot than truck-mounted missile launchers. If the MQ-9 was downed by a MANPAD, it suggests it was flying very low, Khoueiry said.

The Aksungur is a much larger and more advanced drone than Turkey's widely exported Bayraktar TB2, but it is not in the same league as the American MQ-9.

"Aksungur drones are capable, 'middle-class drones' that are typically used for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, although increasingly modified to carry weapons," Nicholas Heras, senior director of strategy and innovation at the New Lines Institute, told BI.

Syrian soldiers abandoned their bases and weapons stockpiles during the dramatic fall of President Bashar al-Assad's regime in early December. Israel has already moved in and bombed large quantities of them. Turkey has also moved to prevent the SDF from capturing weapons. Turkish intelligence destroyed 12 trucks with missiles and other heavy weapons in the northeastern Kurdish city of Qamishli, and Turkish drones targeted abandoned tanks, armored vehicles, and rocket launchers strewn across northeast Syria.

"It is unlikely that the SDF captured and were able to quickly operationalize Syrian regime air defenses within the past week," RANE's Khoueiry said. "Furthermore, Israeli strikes have significantly degraded such systems across Syrian territory, making it even more difficult for a US-backed militia to acquire and effectively operate them."

Turkish media reported earlier this year that US troops in northeast Syria were training the SDF how to use the AN/TWQ-1 Avenger short-range air defense system, which fires Stinger missiles. However, sources in Syria cited by the UK-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights war monitor said only US troops operate the Avengers, which protect their bases against Iran-backed militia drone attacks.

"The challenge for the SDF to use systems such as the SA-2s (Soviet-made S-75s) or Avengers is that these anti-air systems require a logistical network to operate that is cumbersome for a non-state actor, especially if that non-state actor doesn't have accompanying anti-air capabilities to protect those systems," Heras said.

Ceng Sagnic, chief of analysis of the geopolitical consultancy firm TAM-C Solutions, believes it is possible the SDF is "independently operating" some air defenses in Syria.

"However, it should be noted that Kurdish groups have long had access to short-range air defense missiles, particularly those acquired from the black market and not NATO standard," Sagnic told BI. "There is also a possibility that an operator of one of these systems got lucky that day."

"In any case, the incident demonstrates the readiness of Kurdish groups in Syria to respond to drone operations, especially those conducted by Turkey," Sagnic said.

The Kurdistan Workers Party, commonly known by its PKK acronym, had Strela-2 missiles as far back as the 1990s and shot down two Turkish helicopters over northern Iraq in 1997.

The Middle East Eye news outlet reported earlier this year that Iran had transferred air-breathing anti-drone loitering missiles to the PKK. One such munition purportedly brought down an Aksungur over Iraqi Kurdistan in May. Iran-backed Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Houthis in Yemen have used the Iranian-made 358 missile to shoot down Israeli and American drones, including a number of MQ-9s.

It's unclear if the SDF — whose main Kurdish component Turkey charges with inextricable PKK links — acquired such a system.

"The claim that Iran supplies the PKK (and, by extension, the SDF) with a significant number of anti-drone missiles is highly questionable," Sagnic said. "Only a consistent pattern of successful anti-drone strikes by the SDF in the near future could indicate enhanced capabilities by the Kurdish group, and a single drone interception is not sufficient proof."

"However, there have been at least two reported interceptions of Turkish drones over northern Iraq in recent months, suggesting that Kurdish groups are adapting to the so-called drone wars, though their continued success remains uncertain."

Paul Iddon is a freelance journalist and columnist who writes about Middle East developments, military affairs, politics, and history. His articles have appeared in a variety of publications focused on the region.

• Russia faces the prospect of losing key bases in Syria but still has moves left.
• Keeping its bases may come down to lucrative deals with the now victorious groups it had attacked.
• These bases are critical to Russian influence in the Middle East and would not be easily replaced.

Syria has been central to Russian plans to project power across the Middle East — as evidenced by the recent signing of a 49-year lease for Syrian bases.

But after the ouster of the ally it propped up, Syrian President Bashar Assad, Russian officials face the likelihood its days in Syria are numbered.

"Russia's certainly doing everything in its power to maintain a presence in Syria while preparing for the possibility that this is the end," Ben Dubow, a nonresident senior fellow with the Democratic Resilience Program at the Center for European Policy Analysis, told Business Insider.

Moscow is doing so by "not only leaving their ships out at sea but, according to [Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham's] official Telegram channel, disbursing weapons to local Alawite groups," Dubow said. "Reaching out to the new leadership is both an act of desperation and an acceptance of the new reality."

This is a look at the dimming options Russia now faces.

Reduced footprint

Shortly after Assad fled to Russia, a deal was reportedly reached with the interim authorities, led by the victorious Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham Islamist movement, guaranteeing the security of these bases, and the armed opposition presently has no plans to attack them. Still, it's far from clear that the future leadership in Damascus is willing to tolerate a long-term Russian military presence.

For now, some Russian warships are anchored outside the Tartus base as a precaution, and there are other Russian military movements in Syria.

"There is quite a lot of military equipment that has been hastily withdrawn to the coastal region or is being withdrawn at the moment from various remote regions," Anton Mardasov, a nonresident scholar with the Middle East Institute's Syria program, told BI. "So, the ships that are going to Syria from the Baltic Fleet and the military transport planes that are coming to Hmeimim may be taking out this excess equipment."

Alongside its Tartus naval base, Russia also has a sizable airbase in Latakia named Hmeimim, which it has used as a launchpad to conduct airstrikes throughout Syria since intervening in the country's bloody civil war in 2015.

"It may not be a question of a complete evacuation of the bases right now," Mardasov said. "Rather, a new government, possibly appointed after March 2025, should issue a decree denouncing or legitimizing Damascus' past treaty with Moscow."

A bare minimum force in Syria would "deprive" Russia of its capacity to counter NATO on its southern flank, Mardasov said.

Renewed access

Russia signed an extendable 49-year lease agreement with Assad's regime in 2017 for these bases, seemingly entrenching its forces in the Middle Eastern country for generations to come. The treaty even granted the Russian military legal immunity for its personnel in the country, meaning they would not be held accountable for killing Syrians.

"I can't speak to whether the 2017 agreements are binding, but at this point, only Russia could enforce them, and there's no sign they have the will or capacity to do so," Dubow said. "If Damascus orders Russia to leave, Moscow would be hard-pressed to withstand a siege."

Russia's best hope may be to try to extend its access until new deals can be made with the new Syrian leaders. The offers will likely have to be very lucrative to win over a Syrian opposition inured to Russian airstrikes and ruthless mercenaries.

Russia would likely offer money and other economic incentives, such as discounted refined fuel products, in return for Syria's new rulers tolerating its military presence.

But these would likely be short-term arrangements.

"In the long run, it is unlikely Russia's use of the facilities can be preserved considering considerable antipathy to Russia among Syria's new authorities after Russia's years of support to the Assad regime," said Matthew Orr, a Eurasia analyst at the risk intelligence company RANE.

Syria's interim authorities could even benefit from a continued Russian presence in the short term, he said. That could counterbalance the US presence on the other side of the country and serve as a bargaining chip in negotiations with other powers.

Complete withdrawal

Russia's choices are stark if it can't reach a deal. It can try to guard bases in an uneasy stand-off with HTS-led forces, which comes with risks of its troops being harmed or captured and subjected to trials that would humiliate Russia. Or it can airlift out its forces and materiel.

Orr, the RANE analyst, doesn't anticipate a hasty Russian withdrawal from Syria. Instead, Russia is probably preparing "for an orderly withdrawal from the facilities, likely after failed attempts to negotiate their preservation in the coming months," Orr told BI.

"Their loss would harm Russia's power projection because they are crucial logistical points for Russian military operations in Africa, the Middle East, and Russia's global naval operations, and Russia does not have immediately available alternatives to the facilities."

Tartus remains Moscow's only naval facility in the Mediterranean, making it vital for any extended Russian Navy deployment south of the Black Sea and Turkish Straits. Along with Hmeimim, it serves as a hub for supporting Russian military and mercenary deployments in Africa.

Moscow has had access to Tartus since the Soviet era in the 1970s. Furthermore, Russia invested in its expansion in the 2010s, making its potential loss all the more painful.

One alternative Russian port outside of Syria could be Tobruk in eastern Libya, which is controlled by the Libyan warlord Khalifa Haftar. CEPA's Dubow is skeptical that the Libyan port near Egypt could be any substitute.

"Tobruk would not come close to making up for Tartus and Latakia," Dubow said. "It's both smaller and much further from Russia. Even a significant reduction of Russian presence in Syria would immensely damage Russia's power projection capacity."

In this case, could Russia's loss be Turkey's gain? Turkey is close to the HTS-led coalition, but it too may lack the cachet to win permanent bases.

"The Turkish Navy doesn't need the Tartus base, and the possibility will depend on security conditions on the ground, which are still unclear many months from now, so it doesn't seem likely in the near term," RANE's Orr said.

"But in general, the Tartus port is something that if there is a unified government in Syria, they will definitely try to leverage for security and economic ties with a great power, or remove the base as part of geopolitical balancing between powers."

Paul Iddon is a freelance journalist and columnist who writes about Middle East developments, military affairs, politics, and history. His articles have appeared in a variety of publications focused on the region.

• Syria's embattled president is losing ground to advancing rebels after years of stalemate.
• In the past, Iran orchestrated the interventions that stopped the opposition forces' momentum.
• "I'm not sure Iran can muster the numbers in time to turn this situation around," an analyst said.

Since the early stages of Syria's bloody civil war that began in 2011, Iran has supported Syria's strongman president, Bashar Assad. Now with the loss of Syria's second city, Aleppo, to Assad's opponents, Tehran has vowed to continue this support — but it almost certainly has less to offer than a decade ago.

Syrian rebel forces spearheaded by the Islamist Hayat Tahrir al-Sham militant group seized Aleppo in a shock offensive last week, surprising the world and returning the Syrian conflict to the headlines for the first time in years. The rebels did not stop there. Advancing in the face of Russian and Syrian airstrikes, they overran Syria's fourth-largest city, Hama, on Thursday.

"The Syrian government has lost a lot of terrain, including the city of Aleppo. You can't really overstate the seriousness of that," Aron Lund, a fellow with Century International and a Middle East analyst at the Swedish Defence Research Agency, told Business Insider. "Aleppo is a huge city, a really large urban area that will be difficult to retake once lost if Assad is unable to move on it before the insurgents dig in."

Earlier in the Syrian conflict, Iran helped orchestrate interventions on Assad's side by its powerful Lebanese proxy Hezbollah in 2013, and Russia in 2015.

These decisive interventions helped him turn the tide, culminating in a ferocious, scorched-earth campaign against opposition groups in east Aleppo in 2016.

The latest offensive has prompted some outside intervention. Hundreds of Iran-backed militiamen in Iraq are entering Syria. Russia has carried out airstrikes to impede the opposition's advance. However, these are small-scale compared to past interventions. And Hezbollah isn't intervening for now.

"I'm not sure Iran can muster the numbers in time to turn this situation around," Lund said. "Hezbollah, which was Tehran's primary instrument in Syria over the past decade, is now stuck in Lebanon, tending to its wounds and trying to get back on its feet after being mauled by Israel over the course of a two-month war."

Hezbollah is estimated to have upwards of 100,000 fighters and a vast missile arsenal, but those have been battered by Israel's airstrikes and occupation of southern Lebanon.

"The Lebanon ceasefire is really brittle, and as long as conflict could re-erupt at any moment, I don't think Hezbollah has the manpower to spare," Lund said. "Even if they're able to send some men Assad's way, I doubt it would be a game-changing number."

Iran's other options are mobilizing more Iraqi militias or sending personnel from its own Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps paramilitary or its regular army.

"It's possible that Iran will try to send more arms and ammunition," Barbara Slavin, a distinguished fellow at the Stimson Center in Washington and founder and former director of the Future of Iran Initiative at the Atlantic Council, told BI.

"It is also probably counting on Russian airstrikes to stall the HTS offensive and it is clearly having back-channel talks with Turkey," Slavin said. "The Turks may be angling to get Iran to turn a blind eye to new attacks on the Kurds in return for urging HTS to hit pause."

HTS is not a Turkish-controlled proxy like the self-styled Syrian National Army coalition of opposition militias that is also advancing across Aleppo province. However, Turkey has closely coordinated its army's deployment in Syria's Idlib with HTS, which has been the predominant power in that northwestern Syrian province for years now.

"Iran is also looking to cultivate a relationship with Trump, which further limits its freedom of maneuver in the region," Slavin said.

"Iran is in a terrible situation currently without the necessary military, economic, and political capacity to spare," Arash Azizi, senior lecturer in history and political science at Clemson University, told BI.

"Its myriad of problems includes the fact that many Iraqis are reluctant to get involved in a renewed war in Syria."

While Iran will undoubtedly remain committed to supporting Assad, it's unlikely to prove capable of organizing a 2016-style counteroffensive to recapture Aleppo.

"That would require a lot of planning and a lot of diplomatic bargaining with Turkey and other powers," Azizi said.

Century's Lund recalled that the last time Iran intervened to help Assad recapture Aleppo, it did so in close collaboration with Russia.

"If they're going to replicate that success now, the Russians would probably need to bring the air component," Lund said. "Iran has no air force to speak of and if Iranian jets were to show up in Syria, Israel would go after them immediately."

Russian jets and air defenses afford Iran some protection since Israel is more hesitant to clash with Russian forces than they are with Syrian or Iranian ones.

But it remains to be seen how much airpower Russia can spare with its fighters and bombers engaged in the invasion of Ukraine.

"It's worth noting that the Syrian conflict is so small-scale compared to Ukraine that even a relatively small contribution of assets could have an impact there," Lund said.

The Iraqi militiamen entering Syria are more likely to serve as a holding force to help Assad avoid losing more territory.

"Assad needs to hold onto the capital and its immediate environs if he has a chance to survive as Syrian leader," Stimson's Slavin said.

Since Syria doesn't have a sizable Shia minority like Lebanon, Iran has been unable to stand up a local proxy as effective or powerful as Hezbollah in neighboring Lebanon.

Any efforts Iran may take to help Assad coincide with its own priorities to seek an acceptable deal with President-elect Donald Trump's incoming administration. "Iran also wants to at least try for a deal with Trump, so a more aggressive regional posture will not work as regional issues will be on the table this time along with the nuclear file," Slavin said.

As this crisis unfolds, it's striking how "unimportant and absent" the US has been, Azizi noted.

"The US has forces on the ground and also airpower that it has used to attack certain forces on Syrian territory," Azizi said. "But it's clearly not a main player and doesn't seem to have a clear, strategic goal or any particular focus on Syria."

And it remains unclear what President-elect Trump will do about Syria upon reentering office in January.

"As with most other matters, President Trump remains unpredictable," Azizi said.

Paul Iddon is a freelance journalist and columnist who writes about Middle East developments, military affairs, politics, and history. His articles have appeared in a variety of publications focused on the region.

• The US blocked Turkey from acquiring F-35 stealth fighters.
• Turkey wants the F-35s and may be willing to move the Russian air defenses that triggered the ban.
• President-elect Trump may favor a deal, but he'll likely face resistance inside his administration.

Until five years ago, Turkey had planned to buy 100 of Lockheed Martin's F-35 stealth jets to modernize its air force. But its acquisition of a top-of-the-line Russian air defense missile system dashed that plan, with the US barring Turkey from acquiring any F-35s out of concern the sophisticated Russian system could compromise its tiny radar return.

Five years later, Ankara hopes the incoming Trump administration will reverse its ban.

Turkish sources are signaling the discussion may go beyond an appeal from Turkey's President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, with whom Donald Trump built a rapport. According to Bloomberg, Turkey may agree to restrict its Russian S-400s air defenses in return for the US lifting sanctions. Over the summer, Greek media reported that Washington suggested Ankara transfer the Russian missile launchers to the American section of Turkey's Incirlik airbase, effectively putting them under American supervision.

"If Turkey agrees to a soft decommissioning of the S-400s by storing them at Incirlik under US supervision, it could significantly accelerate Ankara's reintegration into the F-35 program," Suleyman Ozeren, a lecturer at the American University and senior fellow at the Orion Policy Institute, told Business Insider.

"However, this move would likely require Moscow's consent, which presents a complex challenge."

That's not the only hurdle. While analysts see signs that Trump and Turkey may try to clear the impasse, any agreement could still face resistance in his cabinet and in Congress, which passed the 2017 legislation under which Turkey would later be sanctioned for its acquisition of the S-400 system.

Ali Bakir, a Turkey expert at Qatar University's Ibn Khaldon Center and nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council's Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative, sees "cautious optimism" in Ankara.

He attributes this to the belief that "personal understanding and communication" between Trump and Erdogan will resolve outstanding issues in the Turkish-US relationship, paving the way for a "fresh start."

"However, it is important to acknowledge that Congress also plays a significant role in this dynamic," Bakir told BI. "Congress has often been the most problematic element in US-Turkish relations, rather than the US president."

"Early indications suggest that Congress may not be particularly favorable towards Ankara," Bakir said.

Ozeren also anticipates Ankara could find "greater room to maneuver" during Trump's second term, especially as Republicans will control the House and Senate.

"In theory, this could increase the chances of obtaining US approval for Turkey's return to the F-35 program," Ozeren said. "Nonetheless, given the deeply strained relations over the past decade, any progress would likely be fraught with difficulties and setbacks."

Ryan Bohl, a senior Middle East and North Africa analyst at the risk intelligence company RANE, believes Trump is personally "keen" on selling F-35s to Turkey.

However, Trump's nominee for secretary of state, Marco Rubio, is a Russia and China hawk and may prove "less flexible" on the requirements of the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act that became law in 2017. Bohl sees "little sign" that the law will be overturned.

"So, it will remain to be seen if Trump can overcome these institutional hurdles to a sale to Turkey," Bohl told BI.

Before Turkey received any S-400s, Washington had repeatedly warned Ankara it would not tolerate F-35s flying in a military that also operates S-400s, fearing that could compromise the low observable radar signature critical to the aircraft's survivability. Placing Turkish S-400s under US supervision in Incirlik could resolve such concerns.

"The damage will never be too severe in terms of relations; what matters is whether or not the administration, and Congress, decides Turkey has done enough to limit the potential exposure of the F-35 to Russian intelligence and/or information gathering," Bohl said.

"That will likely be a split between Trump, who tends not to emphasize such risks, and the Pentagon and intelligence services, who do," Bohl added. "Even with a pliable defense secretary compared to Mark Esper in his first term, this consideration may still be in play."

Turkey has repeatedly asserted over the years that it no longer needs F-35s since it is developing its indigenous stealth jet, the TF Kaan. Despite these assertions, Ankara would most likely welcome another chance to acquire the fifth-generation produced by Lockheed Martin, in partnership with Northrop Grumman and BAE Systems; its powerful single-engine is built by Pratt & Whitney, a subsidiary of RTX Corporation. The F-35 is flown by 17 American allies.

"I believe that if the ban on F-35s is lifted, Ankara would definitely want to acquire them, despite other parallel deals, as Turkey cannot afford to be overly dependent on a single player in critical times," Bakir said.

At the same time, Turkey is developing domestic air defenses and has never put the S-400 into service in the five years since receiving them. The intervening Ukraine war, where Russian S-400s suffered losses, could reduce the value Turkey sees in them.

"Certainly, the S-400's combat performance against Ukraine has been mixed; Turkey may conclude that more advanced F-35s are in its national interest, particularly given Israel's recent deployment of F-35s against Iran," Bohl said.

"At the same time, F-35s will be reliant on US supply chains, and those could be interrupted over politics or because of other priorities that make resupply difficult."

Paul Iddon is a freelance journalist and columnist who writes about Middle East developments, military affairs, politics, and history. His articles have appeared in a variety of publications focused on the region.

• US troops remain in Syria to counter ISIS and patrol oil fields in the region.
• Trump's return raises uncertainties about the status of these troops in this highly volatile region.
• Both Turkey and the Kurdish-led officials hope to sway the incoming Trump administration.

For almost a decade, US troops have been on the ground in Syria to assist Kurdish-led forces in the defeat of the infamous Islamic State. These forces tamp down on the ISIS remnants in the northern and eastern regions they presently control, where tens of thousands of captured ISIS fighters, their families and suspected affiliates remain in open-air camps and prisons.

But there's a new wrinkle of uncertainty in this highly volatile and contested region: US President-elect Donald Trump.

During his first term, Trump ordered the withdrawal of US troops partnered with the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces after ISIS' territorial defeat. Trump did this following a phone call with the president of Turkey, a staunch rival of the SDF, resulting in an immediate cross-border Turkish operation against those US-allied forces. Trump then backtracked and kept 900 US troops in Syria.

His imminent return to the Oval Office once again raises the specter that the US could pull out, leaving a power vacuum that Turkey, the Syrian regime, and Russia may move to fill at the SDF's expense. The resulting instability could be an opening for ISIS to regroup. Turkish officials want the US to leave, with the incumbent defense minister stating, "Trump will strongly focus on this." But the Kurds hope they can persuade him otherwise.

"We formed a successful alliance with the United States in combating terrorism," Sinam Mohamad, the representative of the Syrian Democratic Council mission to the United States and a top diplomat of the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria, told Business Insider.

"We may have felt frustrated during Trump's first term due to his decision to withdraw American forces from Syria in 2019," Mohamad said. "But today, as a result of the political circumstances in the Middle East and the world, we see that President Trump will have a different outlook than before."

The AANES administrates large swathes of north and east Syria under the SDF's control.

The regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, which is backed by Russia, does not recognize the AANES. Turkey vehemently opposes it, claiming the SDF has inextricable ties to its main adversary, the Kurdistan Workers' Party, or PKK. Turkish strikes against AANES infrastructure have cut off water and electricity to over a million people, leading to charges that Turkey is violating international law.

"The incoming Trump administration has an opportunity to reconfigure the entire US strategy in Syria, maintain its minimal but high-rewards troops presence in Syria, and proceed with a bold vision to mend fences between Syrian Kurds and Ankara," Mohammed A. Salih, a non-resident senior fellow in the Foreign Policy Research Institute and an expert on Kurdish and regional affairs, told BI.

"The focus should be on a win-win outcome for all sides, America, Kurds, and Turkey."

Some called for a US withdrawal after the January drone attack against a US base in Jordan that supports operations in Syria, killing three Americans and injuring 47.

The specific timing of any American withdrawal will also be a critical factor.

"The American withdrawal from Syria may take place in 2026 or before that, but what will be different are the circumstances that will accompany this withdrawal," the SDC's Mohamad said. "It may take into account the dangers facing the areas of the autonomous administration and Washington's allies in the fight against terrorism, and at that time, it is necessary to ensure the withdrawal with political security for the region."

The official underlined the continued importance of the American presence for ensuring "the continuation of the fight against terrorism" and that the SDF can continue securing the "large number of prisoners of the terrorist organizations languishing" in AANES detention.

The Kurds have thousands of former ISIS fighters in its camps and detention centers. The sprawling Al-Hol camp has a population of over 40,000, including thousands of ISIS women and children, a number of whom remain radicalized. It has warned that another Turkish invasion would divert SDF fighters and resources away from securing these facilities.

"The Syrian Democratic Forces have the qualifications to secure these facilities," said Mohamad, the Kurdish diplomat. "But they will not be able to perform their duty to the fullest extent if the withdrawal occurs without political security for the region's situation."

Mohamad stressed that AANES and SDF would want American guarantees that Turkey will not invade after a US withdrawal.

"A sudden troop withdrawal could probably result in even more disastrous outcomes than in Afghanistan, given the presence of various regional and global powers in Syria and the resurgence of ISIS and other jihadi groups there," said Salih, the FPRI regional expert.

"In all likelihood, the situation will be highly chaotic in the event of a withdrawal with serious consequences that could witness the mass escaping of ISIS prisoners, likely more radicalized and resentful as a result of their prison experience," Salih added.

While weakened from years of war, ISIS has already demonstrated its capability to regroup and threaten their adversaries. A coordinated ISIS jailbreak attempt in 2022 led to almost two weeks of heavy fighting with the SDF.

A rapid US withdrawal tips the uneasy balance of powers. Salih anticipates this could lead to "a hectic race" between Iran, Russia, the Syrian regime, and Turkey for the resource-rich AANES regions.

"All the problems we suffer from in the regions of North and East Syria are related to the necessity of placing our region within the international solution platforms related to Syria, political support, and finding a solution to the Syrian crisis with the participation of the Autonomous Administration and the Syrian Democratic Council in the political process," Mohamad said.

"This will have a major impact in changing the shape of the region, reducing hotbeds of tension, and ensuring global security and peace."

Paul Iddon is a freelance journalist and columnist who writes about Middle East developments, military affairs, politics, and history. His articles have appeared in a variety of publications focused on the region.