Ukraine gambled big in its daring assault into Russia's Kursk. Was it worth the risk?
- Ukraine launched a risky attack on Russia last year, seizing swathes of territory in Kursk.
- Ukraine was able to go on offense and seize the initiative, but the impact hasn't been felt at home.
- Warfare experts said the move was likely worthwhile, but it remains to be seen if that holds true.
Ukraine's ambitious advance into Russia's Kursk region last summer was a tremendous risk.
Whether the gamble was ultimately worth it is something that military historians are likely to long debate. For Ukraine, there have been some signs it could double down with a new offensive.
There have been costs, but the Kursk assault offered the Ukrainians a chance to break from the slow, brutal, and grinding defensive situation at home and go on offense, as well as divert Russian resources. And there is still the possibility this helps Kyiv in potential peace talks.
"It's hard to say until everything plays out, but I would still say it was a good move," Mark Cancian, a senior advisor at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, said of Ukraine's actions in Kursk in recent months.
Ukraine's Kursk operation was a chance to change the status quo
Ukraine's Kursk operation was a surprise to war watchers, Ukraine's international partners, the Russian soldiers defending the country's borders, and even many of Kyiv's own troops.
Ukraine said that it was trying to create a buffer zone, strain Russian combat resources, and secure land and prisoners for negotiations with Moscow.
Ukraine was also likely aiming to boost the morale of its tired forces, as well as signal strength to Western nations that may have been growing weary of providing support.
The advance also gave it a shot at seizing the initiative and taking the fight onto Russian soil. Seizing the initiative has long been understood to be key to winning wars.
Without it, like in chess, "you're constantly on the defensive, your adversary boxing you into a corner," George Barros, a warfare expert at the Institute for the Study of War, said.
There's a risk of sooner or later being left with "a series of bad decisions that you'd rather not make," he said. Letting your adversary hold the initiative in a war is "how you end up losing."
Ukraine also proved it had more cards to play in this war.
Col. Hamish de Bretton-Gordon, a former commander for the UK's Joint Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear forces, highlighted Ukraine's use of drones and effective Ukrainian employment of armored maneuver warfare.
But those maneuvers were costly.
Reported tank losses suggest fighting in Kursk "has chewed up a fairly large portion" of Ukrainian armor assets from Western partner nations, said Matthew Savill, a former intelligence analyst at the UK Ministry of Defence who is now a military-strategy expert at the Royal United Services Institute.
That limits Ukraine's flexibility and the ability to surge forces elsewhere.
There's no guarantee, though, Ukraine would have been able to effectively employ the tanks back on its own soil, where the intense fighting and dense drone coverage have limited their use. Michael Bohnert, a warfare expert at the RAND Corporation, said that taking the tanks to Kursk may have been the most optimal way to use them.
The Ukrainian army was trying to relieve pressure on the front
Russian President Vladimir Putin's initial response was slow, and he didn't turn to the military for a fix, instead relying on a mix of other security groups. As Russia eventually stepped up its efforts to dislodge the assaulting Ukrainian troops, thousands of North Korean troops arrived to fight for Russia.
Russia's delayed, and irregular, reaction meant Ukraine could seize more territory and prepare better defenses, but it also meant that hopes of drawing a significant number of Russian troops away from the Ukrainian front lines were not fully realized.
Russia did not have to dramatically soften its efforts in Ukraine in response to Kursk, and its army has been grinding forward, advancing throughout the fall.
And Ukraine had to pull troops from the front lines at home for Kursk, potentially complicating its own defense. It remains unclear whether it was better for Ukraine to move its forces into Kursk or defend the lines at home.
But there were some good effects for Ukraine on its own soil.
"Ukrainian moves "fundamentally disrupted the Russian combat plans," Barros said, "because the forces and the plans that presuppose their availability were then consumed and taken by the newly imposed requirement for defending Kursk and repelling the Ukrainians from Kursk."
The head of Ukraine's armed forces said in December he had "no choice" but to assault Kursk, arguing he needed to reduce pressure on the fronts in Ukraine and stop Russia from opening a new front in Ukraine's Sumy region.
He said that it reduced the intensity of Russia's attacks across Ukraine, except at Pokrovsk and Kurakhove, areas where the Russians are advancing.
It's been a tough fight for Ukraine to hold ground inside Russia
Much less information is coming out of Kursk than from the fighting inside Ukraine, but Russia's losses have soared since August, per UK intelligence citing the Ukrainian military. Ukraine says that Russia has lost over 38,000 troops and more than 1,000 pieces of equipment in Kursk.
Bohnert said Kursk had been "very costly from the Russian perspective." He said that the losses Russia appears to be accepting there are surprising.
But Russia has been increasingly demonstrating it's willing to tolerate high losses, grinding away at Ukraine with its larger army in a war of attrition.
Ukraine, at the peak of the incursion into Russia, held about 500 square miles of territory in Kursk. But Russia appears to have taken back around half of that, and it's not clear what Ukraine's latest actions there may achieve.
Warfare experts told BI that the Ukrainians may have given up at least some of that willingly, less chained to holding every inch of territory than in their own country. De Bretton-Gordon said Ukraine still holds significant territory, which could prove helpful for the country if the war's end depends on negotiations — something for which president-elect Donald Trump has pushed.
"Whoever holds Kursk probably come the new year is going to be in the box seat for any ceasefire negotiations," said de Bretton-Gordon, adding that he largely views Ukraine's decision to advance into Russia's Kurks to be a "positive."
Beyond serving as a bargaining chip, Kursk also helped to dispel the idea the war was hopelessly stalemated. It also showed that surprise and big gains were possible for Ukraine.
"If enough Western officials and politicians believe that it's hopelessly stalemated, it can't change, then their appetite to continue supporting Ukraine will be destroyed over time. That is the Russian strategy in its entirety," Barros said.
Though some Western nations eventually gave Kyiv new permissions to use their weapons to strike into Russia, supporting Ukrainian operations, Kursk did not result in a huge boost in aid from Ukraine's partners, and it's unclear if it had any significant effects on their long-term thinking.
The push into Russia was a shocking moment and a morale booster, but it hasn't yielded the results Kyiv had hoped for and might not.
Assessing Ukraine's gamble in Kursk
So was Ukraine's Kursk operation worth it? That question's still up for debate.
Based on Ukraine's knowledge at the time of the attack, and what has happened since, Cancian said he would say, "Yes, it was the right thing to do."
Barros said that without Kursk, "you would have the Russians leaning into this attritional style of warfare where they get to keep conducting attacks." And Ukraine would have been leaning into the way Russia wanted to fight.
Savill said that he was "wary of criticizing it from a thousand miles away when they're fighting the existential fight and I'm not."
"The choice to do it was bold," he said. "It did put the Russians on the back foot temporarily. It did show something about what well-resourced Ukrainian forces could do if they identified a weak point." But he also said the decision to hold on to so much of Kursk after that first big advance "might turn out to have been the mistake."
Barros said the question of Kursk being worth it is a "complex question," as "we're looking at a live patient." But ultimately, he said, "it's a good thing that the Ukrainians sought to contest the initiative and impose problems on the Russians."