• The grinding Ukraine war has seen a rise in hit-to-kill drone interceptions of other drones.
• Kyiv and Moscow are increasingly using drones to take out enemy systems above the battlefield.
• This new tactic is pushing Ukraine to develop drones specifically for interceptor roles.

In the contested skies above Ukraine, a new kind of warfare is rapidly emerging as drones are increasingly sent on new attack missions. Their targets aren't armored vehicles or fighting positions — they are other drones.

Combat footage from the war in Ukraine has repeatedly captured these hit-to-kill intercepts in which a cheap drone slams into another unmanned aircraft. This practice is a cost-effective air-defense option that both the Ukrainians and Russians are using and intently pursuing.

Mykhailo Fedorov, Ukraine's minister for digital transformation, posted on Telegram in April that his country was on the hunt for interceptor drone solutions to shoot down Russian surveillance assets, the front-line eyes for strike drones and Russian artillery, "without wasting air defense assets."

Nataliia Kushnerska, a senior executive in Ukraine's defense industry, told Business Insider that using uncrewed systems in this way "marks the emergence of an entirely new segment of modern warfare — drone-on-drone combat."

A new tactic in the evolving drone war

Drones have dominated the battlefield throughout much of the Ukraine war, being used for land, sea, and air missions. Cheap first-person view (FPV) drones are frequently used to carry out pinpoint strikes on enemy armor and troop positions, while larger systems collect intelligence.

But as the war has dragged on, drones have increasingly been used in an air-defense role to take down enemy uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAVs) carrying out reconnaissance and attack missions. These aerial engagements can, at times, resemble the fierce dogfights of the World Wars.

An outfit that makes combat FPV drones posted in August that its modified drones had taken out 100 Russian UAVs. The Wild Hornets, as the operation calls itself, shared footage of some of the interceptions.

Kushnerska, the chief operating officer of Brave1, a Ukrainian government platform that facilitates innovation within the country's defense industry, said interceptor drones have become "one of the innovations of this war."

The tactic, she said, makes it more difficult for Russia to operate its drones deep behind the front lines and collect data to facilitate missile and drone strikes on Ukrainian positions, which has been a real challenge for Ukraine as Russia pushes to expand its reconnaissance strike complex. This also awards Kyiv more flexibility to carry out its military operations and maneuvers.

Kushnerska said Ukraine was the first to use drones to intercept Russian reconnaissance UAVs, but Moscow has since adapted to the tactic and found ways to evade the interceptors. Now, efforts are underway to improve the systems so they remain effective.

It is the latest iteration of what a senior Ukrainian official previously described to BI as a cat-and-mouse game between Kyiv and Moscow, where each side is constantly attempting to one-up the other in developing drones and other war-related technology.

Samuel Bendett, an expert on drones and Russian defense issues with the Center for Naval Analyses, told BI Moscow is similarly using FPV drones to take out Ukrainian systems and that Russia has also equipped its drones with defenses against interceptor drones, such as electronic-warfare jamming systems.

Bendett said that the Ukrainians "have gotten very successful in fielding their FPV drones against Russian ISR assets, and the Russians have gotten successful, up to a point, with using their FPV drones to go after Ukrainian heavy quadcopter UAVs."

Interceptor drones are limited in range and altitude and often carry less explosive power than more traditional air defenses like missiles. Drones provide Ukraine and Russia with an alternative way to take down aerial threats, one in which the cost of the intercept is often less than that of the system being targeted.

Kushnerska said an interceptor drone typically costs between $2,000 and $4,000. An air-defense missile, on the other hand, could cost hundreds of thousands — or even millions — of dollars. Using drones reduces dependency on more expensive munitions and frees up Ukraine's air-defense units to focus on the bigger threats like Russian aircraft and more deadly cruise and ballistic missiles.

Pursuit of more interceptor drones

For the Ukrainian soldiers tasked with intercepting Russian drones, it's a dangerous mission.

One drone operator in the Ukrainian military told BI that he operates from trench shelters very close to the front lines. He said the pilots are priority targets for Russia, which will use "every single thing at its disposal" to take them out.

The Ukrainian operator said that drone-on-drone combat is increasing. He said he sometimes uses interceptor drones up to five times a week. But Ukraine needs more of them.

Kyiv has taken steps to procure more of these interceptor drones. Last month, for instance, a Ukrainian drone engineering company announced it had completed testing for a new FPV drone designed to take down Russian reconnaissance UAVs, like the Orlan, and was ready for military use.

But there's still more to be done. Valeriy Romanenko, a former air-defense officer who's now a researcher at Ukraine's State Aviation Museum, told BI that Kyiv's interceptor drones are good for slower reconnaissance UAVs at lower altitudes.

However, he said, Kyiv ultimately needs faster interceptor drones to take down Russia's deadly attack drones, like the notorious Shahed-136. In October alone, Moscow fired around 2,000 of these systems at Ukraine, according to Western intelligence.

The Wild Hornets have been working on a new "Sting" UAV to effectively combat the Shaheds, but it's a work in progress.

This hit-to-kill intercept tactic has implications well beyond Ukraine and could be used in future conflicts, too. Mick Ryan, a retired Australian Army major general and strategist, said the use of drones for interceptions will likely be a lasting element of military operations.

"This is a trend that's here to stay unless there is some fundamental breakthrough in very low-cost anti-drone systems, and we're not seeing that at this point," he told BI. "I think this is an enduring kind of capability that many militaries should be looking at."

• Israel's potent air defenses are increasingly threatened by low-flying drones.
• Two retired Israeli generals say it needs new defenses against this "low sky" layer.
• Israel pioneered targeting air defenses with drones in a stunning victory four decades ago.

Israel's air and missile defense system is arguably the best in the world, having proven this year it can down Iranian ballistic missiles and Hamas-fired rockets. Its Iron Dome is the epitome of this success and is only one of many systems. But while these can protect Israeli cities, they have an increasingly glaring problem — they can't protect themselves from low-flying drones, two retired Israeli brigadier generals warn.

"We have to defend our air defense," wrote Eran Ortal and Ran Kochav in a blog for the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Defense at Bar-Ilan University near Tel Aviv, Israel.

Ortal and Kochav fear that enemy drones could knock out air defense systems such as the vaunted Iron Dome, enabling ballistic missiles, manned aircraft and artillery rockets to strike Israel without being intercepted. "The Israeli Air Force does continue to rule the skies, but under the noses of the advanced fighter jets, a new air layer has been created."

The authors call this the "low sky" layer. "The enemy has found a loophole here. The Air Force (and, within it, the air defense corps) is required to defend against the combined and coordinated threats of missiles, unmanned aircraft systems and rockets."

Over the past year, Israel's air and missile system has achieved remarkable success against a range of projectiles launched by Iran, Hamas and other Iranian proxies, including ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, artillery rockets and mortar shells. For example, Israel — with the assistance of the US, Britain and other nations — reportedly intercepted 99% of some 300 ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and large attack drones launched by Iran in April 2024.

However, Israel has struggled against small exploding drones launched by Hezbollah, the Iran-backed militia in Lebanon. More than a hundred Israeli soldiers and civilians have been killed or wounded by these UAVs, including 67 who were wounded when a drone hit a building in northern Israel in October. Still, the situation is a far cry from the Ukraine war, where hordes of small drones have rendered battlefield maneuver almost impossible.

Nonetheless, Ortal and Kochav worry that Israeli air defenses were designed in the pre-drone era, when the threat to Israel came from aircraft and ballistic missiles, a critique that also applies to Western- and Russian-made systems. "This array was built over the years under the premise of Israeli air superiority. The air defense itself was not supposed to be hunted."

"The enemy is able to penetrate deep into Israel and engage the air defense system in one lane while other aircraft take advantage of the diversion and penetrate in another, more covert lane. It can identify targets and strike immediately using armed or suicide UAS. Above all, it strives to locate, endanger, and destroy key elements of the air defense system itself."

Israel relies on a multilayer defense system, with long-range Arrow interceptors targeting ballistic missiles above the Earth's atmosphere, the medium-range David's Sling handling ballistic and cruise missiles about 10 miles high, and the short-range Iron Dome stopping cruise missiles, short-range rockets and artillery and mortar shells at low altitude. All depend on the production and reloading of missiles adequate to the threat.

The problem is that these three systems can't protect each other. "The degree of mutual assistance and protection between the layers is relatively limited," Ortal and Kochav wrote. To optimize the allocation of a limited supply of interceptor missiles, "each tier was designed to deal with a specific type of missile or rocket. Iron Dome can't really assist Arrow batteries or support their missions. This limitation is equally true among the other layers."

Nor are Israel's air defenses built for survivability, such as creating decoy missile batteries and radars to protect the real ones or frequently relocating systems. "The degree of mobility, protection and hiding ability of the Israeli air defense system is inadequate. Unlike similar systems in the world, our air defense system was not built with synchronization as a critical goal."

Their solution? The creation of a fourth layer focused on point protection of the radar, missile launchers and troops that operate them against rockets and drones that have penetrated the first three layers. Air defenses must be camouflaged and should be mobile enough to change location before the enemy can target them.

Ironically, Israel itself was one of the pioneers of using drones to suppress air defenses. Stung by heavy losses from Soviet-made surface-to-air missiles in the 1973 Yom Kippur War, Israel used drones in during the 1982 Lebanon War. By using unmanned aerial vehicles that mimicked manned aircraft, Israel lured Syrian air defense radars into coming online so they could be destroyed by anti-radiation missiles. The Israeli Air Force destroyed 29 out of 30 anti-aircraft missile batteries in the Bekaa Valley without loss and downed more than 60 Syrian aircraft.

Israel's Air Force became so dominant that the ground forces discarded their tactical anti-aircraft weapons (though the IDF recently reactivated the M61 Vulcan gatling cannon for counter-UAV defense on the northern border). Meanwhile, the IDF's air defense corps switched its focus from anti-aircraft to missile defense.

"The working assumption was, and remains to this day, that Israel's Air Force rules the skies," wrote Ortal and Kochav. "The job of air defense, therefore, is to focus on missiles and rockets. This assumption is no longer valid."

Michael Peck is a defense writer whose work has appeared in Forbes, Defense News, Foreign Policy magazine, and other publications. He holds an MA in political science from Rutgers Univ. Follow him on Twitter and LinkedIn.

• The US blocked Turkey from acquiring F-35 stealth fighters.
• Turkey wants the F-35s and may be willing to move the Russian air defenses that triggered the ban.
• President-elect Trump may favor a deal, but he'll likely face resistance inside his administration.

Until five years ago, Turkey had planned to buy 100 of Lockheed Martin's F-35 stealth jets to modernize its air force. But its acquisition of a top-of-the-line Russian air defense missile system dashed that plan, with the US barring Turkey from acquiring any F-35s out of concern the sophisticated Russian system could compromise its tiny radar return.

Five years later, Ankara hopes the incoming Trump administration will reverse its ban.

Turkish sources are signaling the discussion may go beyond an appeal from Turkey's President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, with whom Donald Trump built a rapport. According to Bloomberg, Turkey may agree to restrict its Russian S-400s air defenses in return for the US lifting sanctions. Over the summer, Greek media reported that Washington suggested Ankara transfer the Russian missile launchers to the American section of Turkey's Incirlik airbase, effectively putting them under American supervision.

"If Turkey agrees to a soft decommissioning of the S-400s by storing them at Incirlik under US supervision, it could significantly accelerate Ankara's reintegration into the F-35 program," Suleyman Ozeren, a lecturer at the American University and senior fellow at the Orion Policy Institute, told Business Insider.

"However, this move would likely require Moscow's consent, which presents a complex challenge."

That's not the only hurdle. While analysts see signs that Trump and Turkey may try to clear the impasse, any agreement could still face resistance in his cabinet and in Congress, which passed the 2017 legislation under which Turkey would later be sanctioned for its acquisition of the S-400 system.

Ali Bakir, a Turkey expert at Qatar University's Ibn Khaldon Center and nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council's Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative, sees "cautious optimism" in Ankara.

He attributes this to the belief that "personal understanding and communication" between Trump and Erdogan will resolve outstanding issues in the Turkish-US relationship, paving the way for a "fresh start."

"However, it is important to acknowledge that Congress also plays a significant role in this dynamic," Bakir told BI. "Congress has often been the most problematic element in US-Turkish relations, rather than the US president."

"Early indications suggest that Congress may not be particularly favorable towards Ankara," Bakir said.

Ozeren also anticipates Ankara could find "greater room to maneuver" during Trump's second term, especially as Republicans will control the House and Senate.

"In theory, this could increase the chances of obtaining US approval for Turkey's return to the F-35 program," Ozeren said. "Nonetheless, given the deeply strained relations over the past decade, any progress would likely be fraught with difficulties and setbacks."

Ryan Bohl, a senior Middle East and North Africa analyst at the risk intelligence company RANE, believes Trump is personally "keen" on selling F-35s to Turkey.

However, Trump's nominee for secretary of state, Marco Rubio, is a Russia and China hawk and may prove "less flexible" on the requirements of the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act that became law in 2017. Bohl sees "little sign" that the law will be overturned.

"So, it will remain to be seen if Trump can overcome these institutional hurdles to a sale to Turkey," Bohl told BI.

Before Turkey received any S-400s, Washington had repeatedly warned Ankara it would not tolerate F-35s flying in a military that also operates S-400s, fearing that could compromise the low observable radar signature critical to the aircraft's survivability. Placing Turkish S-400s under US supervision in Incirlik could resolve such concerns.

"The damage will never be too severe in terms of relations; what matters is whether or not the administration, and Congress, decides Turkey has done enough to limit the potential exposure of the F-35 to Russian intelligence and/or information gathering," Bohl said.

"That will likely be a split between Trump, who tends not to emphasize such risks, and the Pentagon and intelligence services, who do," Bohl added. "Even with a pliable defense secretary compared to Mark Esper in his first term, this consideration may still be in play."

Turkey has repeatedly asserted over the years that it no longer needs F-35s since it is developing its indigenous stealth jet, the TF Kaan. Despite these assertions, Ankara would most likely welcome another chance to acquire the fifth-generation produced by Lockheed Martin, in partnership with Northrop Grumman and BAE Systems; its powerful single-engine is built by Pratt & Whitney, a subsidiary of RTX Corporation. The F-35 is flown by 17 American allies.

"I believe that if the ban on F-35s is lifted, Ankara would definitely want to acquire them, despite other parallel deals, as Turkey cannot afford to be overly dependent on a single player in critical times," Bakir said.

At the same time, Turkey is developing domestic air defenses and has never put the S-400 into service in the five years since receiving them. The intervening Ukraine war, where Russian S-400s suffered losses, could reduce the value Turkey sees in them.

"Certainly, the S-400's combat performance against Ukraine has been mixed; Turkey may conclude that more advanced F-35s are in its national interest, particularly given Israel's recent deployment of F-35s against Iran," Bohl said.

"At the same time, F-35s will be reliant on US supply chains, and those could be interrupted over politics or because of other priorities that make resupply difficult."

Paul Iddon is a freelance journalist and columnist who writes about Middle East developments, military affairs, politics, and history. His articles have appeared in a variety of publications focused on the region.